One Democratic Secular State in Israel/Palestine

Onestate.Org (for & against one state for Palestine/Israel) has been updated

2008-05-09T22:24:00.001-06:00

The Online One State Bibliography in English website - http://www.onestate.org - that presents articles and essays discussing the idea of one state in Israel/Palestine (both for and against) has been updated with new material. New additions include:

I. Pro-Unity One State Articles (direct page: http://oss.internetactivist.org/PUOSA.html)

- Abunimah, Ali "Democracy: An existential threat?" Electronic Intifada
- Amayreh, Khaled "Embracing the one-state solution" Al Ahram
- Christison, Kathleen "One and Two State Solutions: The Myth of International Consensus" CounterPunch
- Cook, Jonathan "Two-State Dreamers" AntiWar.Com
- Hasan, Rumy "Just one state" Al Ahram
- Hishmeh, George S. "Back to square one" Gulf News
- Holachek, Alex "Author proposes one-state solution in Palestine" Wesleyan Argus
- Hull, Crispin "One-state solution to end Israel-Palestine conflict" Canberra Times
- Imadudeen, Ismail "Could One State Phenomenon be the Solution?" American Chronicle
- Khalidi, Ahmad Samih "Thanks, but no thanks" Guardian, 13 December 2007
- Khouri, Rami G. "Dissolve the Palestinian Authority" Daily Star (Lebanon)
- Klein, Shimon Z. "The Binational State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" Blogger News Network
- Lieberman, Dan "The Harsh Reality Of The Middle East Conflict" Counter Currents
- Mundow, Anna "Language and conflict: Interview With Saree Makdisi" Boston Globe
- Peled, Miko "Transforming Israel" Electronic Intifada, 25 March 2008
- Resmann, Nick and Santana, Maaika "Remembrance of the Naqba: Interview with Tal Dor and Nidal al-Azza" IndyMedia - Belgium
- Stern, Yoav "Adalah center says it may seek supranational regime in 'all historic Palestine'" Haaretz
- Walker, Terry "Wrestling with Jewishness" Tikkun
- Weekes, Anna "Interview with single-state activist Dr. Haider Eid" Electronic Intifada

II. Anti-Unity Ethnic Separatist Articles (direct page: http://oss.internetactivist.org/AUESA.html)

- Amdur, Reuel S. "Finklestein: Middle East powder keg ready to blow" Arab American News
- Chumbley, Lucy "Ecumenical conference in Washington D.C. seeks path to 'peace in Jerusalem'" Episcopal News Service
- Harris, Maurice "A place to call home" Register-Guard
- Isseroff, Ami "The rush to sell out Palestine and peace" MidEastWeb
- JPost Staff "Ben-Eliezer warns of bi-national state" Jerusalem Post
- Karsh, Efraim "1948, Israel, and the Palestinians: Annotated Text" Commentary Magazine
- Mendes, Philip "One State, No Solution" NewMatilda.Com
- Pinkas, Alon "Memo to the President - January 2009: Is there still a Two-State solution?" Jerusalem Post
- Rubin, Trudy "The looming threat to Israel lies within" Philadelphia Inquirer
- Warschawski, Michael "The One State Solution and Irreversibility" Alternative Information Center

III. Other Related Articles (direct page: http://oss.internetactivist.org/ORA.html)

- Abunimah, Ali "Anti-Arab racism and incitement in Israel" Electronic Intifada
- Boudreaux, Richard and Khalil, Ashraf "For some Palestinians, one state with Israel is better than none" Los Angeles Times
- Seale, Patrick "Death of the Two-State Solution" PatrickSeale.Com
- Slackman, Michael "Arab Leaders Say the Two-State Proposal Is in Peril" New York Times
- Susser, Leslie "One Land: How Many States?" The Jerusalem Report
- Whitbeck, John V. "If Kosovo, Why Not Palestine?" Media Monitors

If you know of other articles that should be included but are not, please feel free to forward them to us via http://books.dreambook.com/colsol/oss.sign.html or reply to this message.

Benjamin Pogrund: Blinded to Reality by Zionist Ideology

2007-08-06T21:02:00.000-06:00

Benjamin Pogrund: Blinded to Reality by Zionist Ideology
John Sigler, 6 August 2007

I. Preliminary Notes and Observations

Benjamin Pogrund is the founder and director of the Yakar Center for Social Concern in Israel which is a generally progressive non-governmental organization (NGO) that sponsors a number of programs to facilitate communication and dialogue between groups, both within the Israeli Jewish community and outside of it. In general, Pogrund’s work in Israel can be considered productive and useful, nevertheless, when it comes to questioning Israel’s right to define itself as an ethnocentric – i.e. racist – state, Pogrund leaves no doubt about his position toward those that question that decision:

“Their motivations vary: anti-Semitism and a visceral hatred of everything Jewish; or objections, based on religious belief, against the presence of a Jewish state on perceived Muslim Waqf land; or Jews on the left who feel driven to distance themselves publicly from Israel for reasons that are not always fathomable but seem to stem from embarrassment at having been born Jewish.” [1]

Being South African born, Pogrund considers himself supremely qualified to deny any and all connections between the modern ethnocentric state of Israel and the former Afrikaner ethnocentric regime – “Apartheid” – in South Africa; despite the fact that many outspoken anti-Apartheid leaders in South Africa – from Desmond Tutu [2] to Ronnie Kasrils [3] – completely disagree with this assessment.

Pogrund is not particularly unique among those that are generally considered members of the “Zionist Left,” specifically those that do earnestly seek peace and reconciliation, but only insofar as Israel’s right to define itself as an ethnocentric state in which roughly half the resident population under its control is either denied full equality (inside the Green Line) or denied any standing at all (in the Occupied Palestinian Territories). Those of this camp can not, or will not, accept that there can never be any sustainable peace as long as the Zionist ideology is accepted as a means of creating an ethnically exclusive state in which roughly half the resident population is officially discriminated against as “non-Jews” in a “Jewish State.” Just as the Afrikaners came to accept the impossibility of maintaining an ethnocentric Afrikaner state in a land heavily populated with non-Afrikaners, so too must Zionists see the absurdity of trying to maintain a “Jewish State” in a land heavily populated by non-Jews.

Not surprisingly, as both a Zionist and as something of his extension of the rejection of any comparison between the Israel and South African Apartheid, Pogrund also rejects the South African resolution model, one democratic secular state. The following article by Pogrund, “South Africa Is Not a Model for Us” [4] addresses many of his primary points and is therefore deserving of review and refutation.

II. Deconstruction and Refutation

1. Paragraphs 1-7

The introduction begins with a brief description of the growing trend of comparing the Israeli system of ethnocentric domination with the former Apartheid system in South Africa. This quickly devolves into an attack on Ronnie Kasrils; a South African Jew, former leader of the African National Congress’ military branch, and current South African Minister for Intelligence Services. Kasrils – an outspoken anti-Apartheid leader and critic of Israel – is characterized as an “an old-style Communist” that the South African Jewish community rejects, wanting “nothing to do with him.” All said there can be no surprise that an Israeli Zionist that has spent an enormous amount of time trying to counter the association between Zionism and Apartheid would target such an outspoken Jewish critic and anti-Apartheid activist who argues the opposite case.

As the introduction continues Pogrund goes on to take assorted potshots at various other South African critics of Israel and the Zionist ideology:

a) “Muslim organizations and individuals” though providing no examples;

b) South African journalist Allister Sparks who does advocate one democratic secular state. Pogrund specifically quotes Sparks as asking the perfectly reasonable question: “… if I, as a white South African can live in a secular, nonracial state with a black majority and feel perfectly secure in my own identity, can you not do the same in Israel?”;

c) the Communist Party of South Africa that he accuses of being “unaware that Jordan occupied the West Bank until June 1967” as though this has any bearing on anything at all. Most observers freely grant that the Jordanian occupation and attempt at annexation was also illegal, rejected by the world community (with the sole exceptions of the UK and Pakistan) and resisted by Palestinian nationalists;

d) as well as a rather weird, though not necessarily hostile, quote by Shabnam Mohamed in South Africa’s “Islamic Focus” magazine mentioning the historically valid friendship between Palestinians and the African National Congress.

The introduction successfully illustrates who Pogrund sees as the “enemy” in South Africa, though some of his attacks on them – and some of the comments ascribed to them – do not exactly paint the picture of a major threat.

After the introduction Pogrund moves on to making his arguments, largely basing them on the work of Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, “Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israelis and Palestinians.” [5] In the process he relies upon six “crucial realms” that were explored in the book and uses these to show that the South African model does not present “a realistic way forward,” ascribing this conclusion to the authors of the book [6]. In fact, Pogrund relies so heavily on the Adam-Moodley book in many respects the following deconstruction and refutation is more one of these authors than Pogrund himself.

2. Paragraph 8

Paragraph eight presents the first of the “crucial realms” that ostensibly undermines the idea of one democratic secular state, namely the differences in the economic situations. Essentially three differences are raised…

“Blacks and whites in South Africa were economically interdependent. … Two economies [Israeli and Palestinian] exist more or less side by side.”

Realistically the supposition that the Israeli and Palestinian economies are fundamentally separate or different completely lacks merit. Through force of arms and deliberate manipulation, it is true that the Israeli economy is not completely dependent on the Palestinians; but the inverse is completely false, with the Palestinian economy being completely controlled by and dependent on Israel in virtually every respect. Israel effectively controls all Palestinian produce (determining what Palestinians are allowed to produce and when), all Palestinian resources, all Palestinian trade (via absolute control of all trade routes, both internally and externally), Palestinian labor (via control of all Palestinian communities and arbitrary closure and curfew), and revenue collection (as per the Paris Protocol). [7]

While Israel has taken advantage of modern international labor flows to replace most Palestinian workers with non-Arabs for cheap labor, the cost differences for the Israeli employer - 2098.86 NIS per foreign worker earning a gross salary of 2085 NIS versus 3110.55 NIS for a Palestinian worker making the same gross amount [8] – are strictly due to legislative measures meant to encourage this trend as opposed to any tangible expenses. This is not a “natural” economic development, but a deliberate result of legislation meant to exclude ethnically undesirable workers, i.e. this result is not the product of economics, but an economic tool used to create a desired social/demographic result.

There is also the “captive market” factor. The good old days of exploiting the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a “captive market” for Israeli produce largely collapsed with the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada:

“… the intifada has disrupted the “captive” market Israel had in the Palestinian territories. The once strong purchasing power of Palestinians in the West Bank has dissipated due to Israel’s strangulation of the Palestinian economy through restrictions on movement. This profitable export market, … is now gone. [It is estimated] that Israel has lost approximately $1 billion in “profitable” export trade to the Palestinian territories since the start of the intifada.” [9]

Nevertheless, Israel has found ways and means of maintaining their “captive market,” to quote Shir Hever:

“Because of the Israeli-controlled customs union, 73% of all imports to the OPT come from Israel, and 92% of total exports to the Palestinian territories are directed to Israel. Therefore, Israel continues to enjoy a captive market in the Palestinians – controlling both imports and exports to and from the OPT. The humanitarian aid to the Palestinians is given mostly in kind, by distributing goods that are often purchased from Israeli companies. Administrative hurdles and customs make imports of such goods very difficult and expensive to from nearby countries (despite the basic lower costs of these goods, before customs). Utilities (such as water and electricity) are also controlled by Israel, which sometimes charges more money from Palestinians for the same services than it charges from Israelis. Altogether, the combination of severe limitations on movement imposed by Israel and the reliance on aid as a growing portion of the economy have turned the Palestinians into a nation of consumers, people who consume but do not produce, and thus increases the profits of Israeli companies without competing with them. Despite the fact that Israel interferes with the distribution of the aid, it benefits from this same aid immensely. The aid stalls the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, and in effect enables Israel to continue the occupation and the violent measures without being accountable for the effects on the civilian population. Israeli ministers have already realized the importance of the aid to the Israeli interests and have put pressure on the donors to sustain the aid.” [10]

Finally, the Israeli occupation itself plays a significant role – just as the need for ever increasing police and security forces played a direct role in the South African Apartheid economy – in the Israeli economy itself. “According to experts' estimates, the total economic cost of the occupation has by now reached more than $50 billion, including security and civilian expenses (the construction and maintenance of the settlements), as well as the potential loss of gross domestic product. The annual average of military expenses on maintaining control over the territory stands at about NIS 2.5 billion. …” [11]

Whether one wants to admit it or not, the Israeli and Palestinian economies are intimately linked and interdependent, though the power imbalance ensures that this interdependence works primarily to Israel’s benefit as was very much the case in favor of whites in Apartheid South Africa. The suggestion that there are two separate and distinct economies that exist “more or less side by side” is completely unfounded and incorrect.

The second difference that Pogrund reproduces is: “The growth of politicized trade unions enabled blacks to attack apartheid through industrial action such as strikes and consumer boycotts. In contrast, Palestinians do not have this power because Israel barely depends on Palestinian labor.”

In this instance, the difference is valid but it is also somewhat inconsequential. Even at the height of the anti-Apartheid struggle, only about 10% of black workers were unionized [12] and the government brutally repressed labor strikes when they became significant. Though there were many black labor strikes, in general they played a minor role in actually bringing about the end of Apartheid. They were much more effective at organizing consumer boycotts – especially against foreign corporations operating in Apartheid South Africa – but a labor union isn’t necessary for organizing such actions. In fact, Palestinians – and their international supporters – have on occasion successfully organized consumer boycotts against foreign corporations, such as that against Burger King [13]. Further, even without organized labor playing a role, due to the role of the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a “captive market” (see above), consumer boycotts of selected Israeli products – primarily nonessential ones – have been and are currently underway even without labor union organizing. [14]

It is fully conceded that a better planned and better directed strategy of generating economic pressure on Israel would be useful, but pretty much any organized Palestinian entity with popular support could accomplish this, labor unions per se are not necessary. Regardless, as was the case in South Africa, economic pressure tactics are only a complimenting factor to active national resistance, violent or otherwise.

The third difference is: “Israel uses closure as collective punishment, whereas South Africa’s whites were too dependent on black labor to be able to do this.”

It is certainly true that white South Africans were always much more dependent on black labor than Israel has ever depended on Palestinian labor, but this doesn’t undo or invalidate the very real economic interdependence described previously. In fact, Israel has always insisted that Israel Proper and the Occupied Palestinian Territories constitute one indivisible economic unit:

“The word ‘separation’ must be deleted from our political lexicon, simply because it is impossible. Due to five main factors, Israelis and Palestinians can not be separated: Trade; Water; Energy; Environment; and Health Concerns. Separating the two entities would mean, in this regard, acting against nature – which we can not do. Naturally keeping Palestinian workers out of Israel is possible, however it is unnecessary – and will not contribute, but rather, will disadvantage both sides. The economic bond is essential to both sides. The Israeli economy can gain from a better purchase of the Palestinian economy. It is stronger than the Palestinian economy ($20,000 GDP per capita compared with $1,000 on the Palestinian side) and can serve as a lever to the Palestinian economy. Both Israelis and Palestinians must understand that only through cooperation can a prosperous Palestinian economy be built.” [15]

While there are certainly substantive differences between the economic situations of Apartheid South Africa and modern Israel, these differences do not exclude the possibility of using the South African peace model – one democratic secular state – in modern Israel.

3. Paragraph 9

The second “crucial realm” cited by Pogrund relates to the religious element of the conflict. It is noted that in South Africa, all the primary factors were ostensibly Christian and that this connection provided a “common bond to assail and de-legitimize” the Apartheid system. This is contrasted to the situation in Israel/Palestine where “Judaism and Islam compete for sovereignty.” The rest of the point focuses on the relative strength of the religious extremists – both Muslim and Jewish – in their respective communities.

Basically there is no denying the validity of these observations. The “common bond” of Christianity certainly played a significant role in undermining the pseudo-religious justifications for Afrikaner Apartheid and also served as a valuable device for carrying the anti-Apartheid message to the white beneficiaries of the system. Undoubtedly, various Christian clergy and efforts by various denominations played an important role in the eventual collapse of the South African white supremacy.

The situation in Israel/Palestine is radically different, with most Palestinians being Muslim and most Israelis being Jewish to one extent or another. Further note should be made of the sharply divided Christian community representing at one end native Palestinian Christians who share the same basic national aspirations and perspectives of their Muslim neighbors; and on the other side the evangelical “Christian Zionists” that represent one of the most extreme elements of the radical Right-wing in Israel; and most other denominations that fall in between these two extremes.

Granting the validity of this difference between the two situations, it is also over exaggerated and realistically does not serve as a barrier to the creation of a unified state. This difference is exaggerated because the vast majority of people on both sides are not religious extremists and it does not serve as a significant barrier because the world is full of examples of functioning states that have more than one major religious community co-existing. In fact, Israel itself, within the Green Line, provides a significant example of a state able to function despite religious plurality.

On the Palestinian side, the vast majority of the population is reasonably well educated and more or less modern in outlook. Contrary to the portrayals by Israeli propagandists, the election victory of Hamas does not mean that the vast majority of Palestinians support Islamic fundamentalism and accordingly Hamas has not made any serious effort to impose an Islamist regime on the Palestinians [16]. The popularity of Hamas is primarily a reaction against Fatah corruption [17]; the view that Fatah had become a cat’s paw for Israel [18]; and the fact that unlike Fatah, Hamas has been able to provide many tangible social services to the poor [19]. In the end, the electoral support for Hamas is an expression of Palestinian frustration with the status quo, not a declaration of Islamist leanings [20].

Similarly, on the Israeli Jewish side of the equation, despite a very active radical right – only some of which is strictly religious, other portions defining itself as “Jewish” in an ethnic sense – the results of the last Israeli elections show that the vast majority of Israelis do not support them [21]. Further, contrary to the claims of some anti-Israel propagandists, Olmert’s decision to bring the Russian dominated extremist Israel Beitenu party into his ruling coalition was not so much a matter of endorsing Avigdor Lieberman’s radical views, but one of shoring up a weak coalition government [22]. Even granting Israel’s recent shift to the Right, this shift focuses on mainstream Rightist groups like Likud as opposed to extremist parties [23].

So, while both sides include violent extremists that would have to be controlled, neither side is dominated by them. Of course this is not to deny that the vast majority of people on both sides have certain religious “red lines” that must be taken into account. A prime example of this would be access to the major holy sites, especially the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. However, practical measures – many of which are already in practice – can ensure that these religious “red lines” are properly addressed without denying other communities similar rights where appropriate.

The extremists represent a real threat, but one that can be – especially with collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian security authorities – controlled. In a pragmatic sense, the religious differences does not rule out co-existence within the same state; though the more emotional demands for exclusive domination and control represent a more difficult aspect of the question. As anyone who has tried to teach preschool children knows, teaching the concept of sharing can be difficult and yet it can be done.

4. Paragraph 10

The third “crucial realm” cited by Pogrund relates to the role of third party actors in the conflict. As was the case with the first “crucial realm,” this one is also broken down into three relatively distinct points.

The first of these refers to the role of third party mediation in negotiations, arguing that in South Africa, both sides – the National Party and the African National Congress – chose to negotiate directly between themselves without a strong role being played by third parties; whereas absolutely all negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have been conducted under the auspices of Israel’s patron, the United States. Further, the United States plays an active role in these negotiations generally supporting any and all Israeli positions and coercing the Palestinians into accepting these Israeli concerns via a series of “carrots” (U.S. provided rewards for doing as Israel says) and “sticks” (U.S. provided punishments for failing to properly acquiesce).

While the general observation, as presented by Pogrund is correct, what it fails to take into account is the differences in viability between Israel and South Africa. Specifically, with its ample land resources, fabulous mineral wealth, and functional economic base, South Africa was – and remains – a fully independent, self-sufficient state. Quite simply, South Africa has too many valuable resources to be completely ignored and/or isolated, and thus it never was. Conversely, Israel is not – in of itself – a self-sufficient state and thus cannot be truly independent of its external patrons, a role played today by the United States of America. This is a point that has been noted by the United States government [24], many honest Israeli observers [25], and is certainly recognized by the Palestinians [26].

Consequently, unlike the factions in South Africa, Israel doesn’t even have the option of negotiating on its own at all with virtually all major decisions requiring U.S. approval first. There is nothing particular new about this, as even as far back as 1967 Israel required a “green light” from Washington before attacking its neighbors [27]. To put it bluntly, Israel doesn’t have the option of taking major actions vis-à-vis the Palestinians without the active approval of Washington, therefore the United States is an integral element of Israel’s negotiation position.

The second point is based on quotes from the Adam-Moodley book:

“Sanctions (divestment and trade boycotts) are generally overrated in triggering South African change,” they say. “Only loan refusals and, to a lesser extent, moral ostracism, impacted significantly on the apartheid government. Such action against Israel by the West is inconceivable at present.”

The basic point here is completely valid and – with the sole exception of the loan refusals which have not happened due to U.S. protection – the exact same can be said for external activism on behalf of the Palestinian people. That is, though there are divestment (e.g. among major Protestant churches and universities) and consumer boycott campaigns (largely in Europe), academic boycott efforts (e.g. in the U.K.), shareholder activism (e.g. Caterpillar), and other forms of grassroots activism; with but a few exceptions these have not really had much tangible effect. In fact, many grassroots organizers today privately recognize that most of these efforts are unlikely to have a practical effect, but they do serve as an effective means of raising public awareness of the issue [28]. Further, the virtually guaranteed shrill reaction by pro-Israel advocates assure such efforts of wide publicity [29]. All said, this point is not so much a difference than a similarity between the efforts against South African Apartheid and Israeli Zionism.

The third point of this paragraph is in the last sentence: “Israelis also have the benefit of a supportive diaspora, whereas Afrikaners faced a near-unanimously hostile world.”

Of course Pogrund himself counters this point back in his introduction when in paragraph 6 he writes: “It also claims that Israel ‘was the biggest friend and collaborator with the apartheid regime’ … . A friend, regrettably yes, as is well-known, but bigger than Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, which all supplied oil in defiance of international boycotts? And what of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and virtually every country in the world that traded with apartheid South Africa?”

While most of the world was certainly critical – even hostile – to the Apartheid regime and its policies, many countries and multinational corporations continued to deal with South Africa throughout the Apartheid period. The primary factor in this decision was South Africa’s economic wealth and resources, but there was even ideological justification in some quarters. For example, the United States openly considered the Apartheid regime a fundamental bulwark against Communism in Africa [30].

Despite a general condemnation of the theory and practice of Apartheid, South Africa continued to have many international friends that actively supported it in their respective countries as well as in international organizations. The same can be said for Israel. Virtually all countries and international organizations have at one time or another actively spoken out against Israeli policies and practices toward the Palestinian people – even including Israel’s primary benefactor, the United States [31] – and yet, largely through American support [32] Israel still has many friends above and beyond external Jewish communities.

Again, this point is more of a similarity with Apartheid South Africa than a difference.

5. Paragraph 11

This paragraph deals with what Pogrund defines as “political culture,” though in essence it makes four rather disparate points.

The first point is that: “Much more personal interaction in a vertical-status hierarchy shaped South African race relations, compared with the more horizontal social distance between Jews and Palestinians.”

This point is difficult to discuss in any detail based solely upon the synopsis provided by Pogrund. Nevertheless, the implication of the statement is that the “horizontal social distance between Jews and Palestinians” is a natural, i.e. a mutually accepted and acceptable, state of affairs though this is not really the case. Instead, this state of affairs is artificial, the creation of a specific policy of ethnic exclusion and isolation both within the Green Line and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The depersonalized nature of interaction between the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians is the product of a series of policies and practices designed to create just this effect.

Within the Green Line, the Israeli Palestinian minority is largely segregated from the Israeli Jewish mainstream through a series of measures that prevent equal participation in society and equal opportunities that is, interestingly enough, justified almost exactly along the same lines of the South African “separate development” concept, i.e. allowing separate cultures to maintain their integrity via “separate development.” To quote Israeli civil rights group Adalah:

“Israel never sought to assimilate or integrate the Palestinian population, treating them as second-class citizens and excluding them from public life and the public sphere. The state practiced systematic and institutionalized discrimination in all areas, such as land dispossession and allocation, education, language, economics, culture, and political participation. … Further attempts have been made to split the Palestinian community into ‘minorities within a minority’ through separate educational curricula, disparate employment and academic opportunities, and the selective conscription of Druze and some Bedouin men to military service. Israeli discourse has legitimated the second-class status of Palestinian citizens on the basis that the minority population does not serve in the military; however, the selective conscription of Druze and some Bedouin has not prevented discrimination against them. …” [33]

In the Occupied Palestinian Territories the separation is even more pronounced with the resident Israeli Jewish population living in “Jewish only” settlements and only traveling on “Israeli only” roads [34] and interaction being limited almost exclusively to Israeli soldiers maintaining the occupation over the Palestinian population.

Both of these situations are the results of specific policies and practices meant to maintain both Israeli Jewish domination and ethnic separation. What interaction does occur – on both sides of the Green Line – tends to be “on the job,” usually with Palestinians employees and Israeli Jewish bosses, very much akin to the situation in South Africa. Of course there are exceptions, such as the “mixed” cities inside the Green Line (e.g. Haifa), but these cannot be considered representative of the over all situation.

The existing lack of personal interaction between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is not the natural outgrowth of the desires of both peoples, but exclusively the product of policies and practices meant to create and maintain this reality. Needless to say, removing the segregationist policies and practices will result in more personal interaction. While this point does highlight a difference, it is not a difference that affects the acceptance of a South African model for political integration.

The next point in this paragraph is “Moral erosion of the apartheid stance among the ruling elite in South Africa contrasts with moral myopia in Israel …”

The notion that many South African elites lost interest – some through morality, but more through self-interest - in maintaining the “apartheid stance” is true enough, but depending on who you ask the same can be said for modern Israeli elites and Zionism:

“On the other hand, the Israeli elites of the past 20 years have become totally divorced from reality. The capital, the media and the academic world of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, have blinded Israel and deprived it of its spirit. Their repeated illusions regarding the historical reality in which the Jewish state finds itself, caused Israel to make a navigational error and to lose its way. Their unending attacks, both direct and indirect, on nationalism, on militarism and on the Zionist narrative have eaten away from the inside at the tree trunk of Israeli existence, and sucked away its life force. ... Instead of being constructive elites, in the past generation the Israeli elites have become dismantling elites. Each in its own area, each by its own method, dealt with the deconstruction of the Zionism enterprise. Step by step, the top 1000th percentiles abandoned the existential national effort. ... “ [35]

The third point of this paragraph reads: “Both sides in the Middle East display a collective sense of victimhood.”

This was also the case in Apartheid South Africa. The entire basis of Apartheid, “civilized labor,” and the nationalism of the National Party was rooted in the Afrikaner sense of victimhood, especially after Anglo-Boer War and the British concentration camps but expanded to include casualties of maintaining their order as well:

“And Afrikaners do feel the long hand of victimhood quite keenly. They have, of course, suffered genuine trauma from the apartheid conflict as well: one Afrikaner who lost his family to an ANC bomb asked the commission this question: ‘Do you know, you the truth commissioners, how a temperature feels between six and eight thousand degrees? Do you know how it feels to experience a blow so intense that it forces the fillings from one’s teeth? Do you know how it feels to look for survivors and only find dead and maimed?’” [36]

The National Party saw its mission as one of correcting past injustices against the Afrikaner people, and though this victim complex has largely dissipated with the revelations that followed the collapse of Apartheid, even to this day the Afrikaner Right focuses heavily on how their people have been – and continued to be – victimized. Obviously the South African blacks had, and have, a much more understandable victim complex due to their treatment at the hands of the whites in general, British and Afrikaner. This point does not illustrate a difference between the South African and Israeli situations.

The final point of this paragraph reads: “South Africa was ‘a pariah state that lacked the legitimacy of Israel outside the Arab and Muslim world.’”

Basically, with but a few exceptions, assuming the annual resolutions against Israeli policies and practices accurately reflect the voting country’s opinions, the same comment could be made about Israel if one replaces the “the Arab and Muslim world” with “the United States and countries subject to American pressure.” [37]

6. Paragraph 12

Paragraph twelve deals with violence and makes two relatively distinct points; the first of which is: “Suicide was never used as a weapon, and martyrdom was never celebrated during the South African anti-apartheid struggle.”

Suicide bombing is just a tactic, a means of resistance, and in of itself does not fundamentally alter the conflict or its resolution. Suicide bombing is a tactic of desperation generally used by resistance movements fighting vastly superior forces: currently including Palestinians against Israel; Iraqi resistance fighters against the U.S.; Sunni extremists against Iraqi Shiites and sporadically elsewhere around the world; Afghan fighters against NATO; and Tamil Tigers against the Sri Lankan government.

The tactic becomes a crime against humanity when employed against civilians [38], but even then it is not – in of itself - fundamentally different than any other deliberate attack on civilians. The use of this tactic as well as the popular support for those using it, does not really affect the possibility of peace either way and is not better than, or worse than, any other deliberate attacks against civilians.

This brings us to the second point in this paragraph that deals specifically with deliberate attacks on civilians. This, of course, does seriously affect the possibility for peace, but is not – contrary to the implication of this article – the sole domain the Palestinian resistance. In fact, all three of the other actors being compared in this article – the White Apartheid government [39], the Israeli government [40], and the black South African resistance [41] – are guilty of the exact same at least in the eyes of those who matter, the victims. The only difference being the tactical means of attack, not the perceived goal or the factual result. This simple reality invalidates the entire premise of the argument. Both sides in South Africa and both sides in Israel/Palestine have track records of deliberately targeting and murdering civilians of the opposing side, at least in the eyes of those who have been so targeted. Again, this point does not represent a difference between South Africa and Israel/Palestine, but a similarity.

7. Paragraph 13

This paragraph is a continuation on the issue violence that makes much of the official stance of the African National Congress, specifically that it was never official policy to target civilians in the course of their armed resistance to Apartheid. The paragraph concludes: “The ANC’s approach was proved correct: Only a few attacks on whites took place over the decades, and this was a significant factor in persuading whites that it was safe to end apartheid.”

Interestingly, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), seems to have reached a somewhat different conclusion:

“The Commission noted that, of the three main parties to the conflict, only the ANC committed itself to observing the tenets of the Geneva Protocols and, in the main, conducting the armed struggle in accordance with international humanitarian law. This report acknowledges the commitment of the ANC to upholding the Geneva Protocols as well as its comparative restraint in conducting the armed struggle – at least in terms of the manner in which it identified its targets and its leadership’s decision to instruct its cadres to abandon the landmine campaign when it became clear that it was resulting in the deaths and injuries of innocent civilians.

“However, the Commission drew a distinction between the conduct of a ‘just war’ and the question of ‘just means’. The Commission found that, whilst its struggle was just, the ANC had, in the course of the conflict, contravened the Geneva Protocols and was responsible for the commission of gross human rights violations. For this reason the Commission held that the ANC and its organs – the National Executive Council (NEC), the Secretariat and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) – had, in the course of their political activities and in the conduct of the armed struggle, committed gross human rights violations for which they are morally and politically accountable.” [42]

Further, contrary to the contention presented by Pogrund, the final years of Apartheid in the 1980’s in fact saw an increase – not decrease - in terrorist attacks against civilians that the TRC concluded was at least in part inspired by the official positions of the ANC and that the ANC shared at least partial responsibility for:

“The Commission finds that, in the 1980’s in particular, a number of gross violations of human rights were perpetrated not by direct members of the ANC or those operating under its formal command but by civilians who saw themselves as ANC supporters. In this regard, the Commission finds that the ANC is morally and politically accountable for creating a climate in which such supporters believed their actions to be legitimate and carried out within the broad parameters of a ‘people’s war’ as enunciated by the ANC.” [43]

The fact that the latter years of the Apartheid system saw an increase in acts of terrorism – whether committed officially by the ANC or merely inspired by it – utterly undermines the contention that it was the lack of black terrorist attacks on white civilians that convinced “whites that it was safe to end apartheid.” This entire paragraph is based not on the actual reality of South African history but on the historical revisionist school that has worked to whitewash the ANC and the anti-Apartheid struggle by falsely portraying it as a fundamentally pacifist struggle. The success of armed struggle in applying and maintaining pressure on the Apartheid system deserves to be remembered as it certainly played a significant role in the process.

8. Paragraphs 14-15

The next “crucial realm” relates to leadership: “Negotiations in South Africa were facilitated by the existence of cohesive and credible leaders. They could obtain popular mandates and sell a controversial compromise to their peoples. In contrast, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are fragmented.”

Unfortunately, this is true and represents a very real and undeniable difference between the South African and Israeli/Palestinian situations. However, this issue of fragmented leadership – among both Israelis and Palestinians – represents an obstacle to any and all possible settlements to the conflict. One state or two states, negotiated or unilaterally declared, humanitarian or criminal; all solutions depend on “cohesive and credible leaders” that can “obtain popular mandates and sell a controversial compromise” and frankly, neither Israelis nor Palestinians have this today.

The default, of course, is the status quo, which is effectively a discriminatory pseudo-segregated single state dominated by Israel. So failing the establishment of unified leadership with overwhelming popular support on either side, the effective result will be the continued development of a de facto single state that will eventually evolve into the struggle for a de jure one. This is, in fact, one of the key arguments of the one state camp; there is already effectively one state and in the absence of any real reason to believe this will change (ghettoization and Bantustan schemes notwithstanding) this de facto reality will remain so until it is patently obvious to everyone.

9. Paragraph 16

The gist of this paragraph is: “Above all, opponents in South Africa finally realized that neither side could defeat the other completely without destroying the country. This perception of stalemate as a precondition for negotiating in good faith is missing in the Middle East.”

This is beyond any doubt absolutely correct. The conflict is only viable as long as the majorities of one or both sides have a belief that they can achieve “total victory,” negotiated settlement only becomes viable once both sides reach the conclusion that there is a stalemate that cannot be resolved through sheer force.

On the Israeli side of the equation, the demand for a strictly “Jewish State” in an geographic area where roughly half the resident population is not “Jewish” is an absolute impossibility without resorting to outright ethnic cleansing – popularly described as “transfer” in Israeli parlance – or genocide. However, genocide has not been sincerely proposed by any Israeli faction and the notion of “transfer” – despite the shrill advocacy of its supporters – is really not a viable option for a myriad of reasons [44]. Ruling out these options as realistic, there is really no possibility of “total victory” meaning that eventually, through one means or another, a compromise will have to be made. The real question is whether such a compromise will be territorial (the “two-state solution”) or ideological (the one state option). Since Israel has evinced absolutely no interest in allowing for a viable territorial compromise (i.e. withdrawing the settlements, leaving the Jordan Valley, giving up the West Bank aquifers and the Jordan River, &c.), but has shown a growing lack of interest in its ideological underpinnings (e.g. “post-Zionism”); the latter seems considerably more likely than the former.

On the Palestinian side of the equation, the de facto reality of Israel and the utter impossibility of reversing this reality has essentially resulted in the acceptance that regardless of the outcome, Israeli Jews will remain a permanent presence in Israel/Palestine and have expressed willingness to compromise:

“Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate. … Palestinian opposition to violence increases when diplomacy proves effective. Public support for violence increases in an environment of greater pain and suffering and decreases when threat perception is reduced. ... All major transformations in Palestinian politics were preceded or accompanied by changes in public attitudes. The 1993 Oslo accords led to greater public willingness to oppose violence and support peace, negotiations, and reconciliation with Israel. Islamists lost much of their public support during this period. ... With the collapse of Oslo in 2000, Hamas reemerged as a credible alternative to the nationalist Fateh movement and the peace process. ...” [45]

However, at the same time it is patently absurd to expect or demand that Palestinians accept and support the domination of an openly discriminatory “Jewish State” in which they – as non-Jews – have no real place. Israel and Israeli Jews are there to stay and this flatly rules out any Palestinian option for “total victory” as well. This simple fact means, of course, that some sort of compromise represents the only option.

Like it or not, Israel and the Palestinians are stalemated. The Israelis cannot either get rid of the Palestinians or pummel them into submissive docility; conversely, the Palestinians can’t destroy Israel or break its power over any part of the territory controlled by it. To quote Colette Avital, MK:

“The first reality is that neither side can defeat the other. The Palestinians are too weak to war against Israel militarily. The Israelis are too weak to launch an attack on a defenseless people. So basically none of us can win, really, a war on the battlefield. This is some of the logic which we had to accept in the Middle East. This is what brought us first to Madrid. This is what we had hoped was really the beginning of reconciliation between the Palestinians and ourselves. It started in Oslo. ... The second reality is that both sides will continue to share the same land, breathe the same air, and therefore we have to learn to be courteous to each other. So even if right now we are in a situational stalemate and perhaps even hopeless, at the end of the day if there is no military solution and if we are condemned to continue to live with each other we will have to find the solutions around the conference table.” [46]

10. Paragraph 17

This paragraph delves into an argument that is patently absurd to anyone with even the vaguest knowledge of South Africa. Specifically it argues that in South Africa there are no real ethnic divisions, “merely a multiethnic society with many cross-cutting bonds between the legislated artificial racial groups;” whereas in Israel/Palestine, “a truly divided society exists.” The idea that no real divisions exist between whites (Afrikaners and Anglos); “Coloureds” (those of mixed race and culture); Indians; and blacks (e.g. Xhosa and Zulu) and that these divisions are merely the products of “legislated artificial racial groups” is so vastly beyond the pale of any conceivable interpretation of reality as to barely even deserve response.

Virtually all the allegedly unique traits of the Israeli/Palestinian divide – with the exception of basic religion – cited in this paragraph (“language, and above all, by history and the mythologies that the ‘burden of history’ imprints on the self-concept and collective identity") apply not only among “the legislated artificial racial groups” but also within them among the various ethnicities of South Africa. Of course the difference is that these ethnic differences notwithstanding, they are not recognized in law since the demise of Apartheid, whereas in Israel/Palestine they are. The idea that somehow the ethnic divide in Israel/Palestine is more substantive or meaningful than the myriad of such divisions in South Africa is truly an expression of utter and complete ignorance, and being reproduced by a South African without disclaimer must be considered dishonest at best. The study of ethnicity and the role of ethnic identity in South Africa has been explored so extensively from every conceivable angle that it virtually constitutes its own academic discipline today.

11. Paragraph 18

The point of this paragraph is essentially based upon a Adam-Moodley quote: “However, in the Middle Eastern reality of communal hostilities and national identities, the Zionist vision is deeply rooted and more difficult to dislodge than racist supremacist illusions in South Africa. Could the Israeli public ever abandon its Zionist identity and embrace an inclusive civic nationalism of all its inhabitants?”

Obviously this is one of primary questions that determine the viability of a one state scenario and the answer depends upon who you ask.

However, a common one state advocate response to the question is two fold; first showing that ethnic separation based upon territorial division isn’t a viable option (thereby defaulting to the status quo, the de facto single state); and secondly by showing the growing trend away from ideological “purity” and orthodoxy among Israeli Jews.

The first response, dealing with the impossibility of physical separation has been explored in detail from both the Left [47] and from the Right [48]. However, in that this is a general question of possibilities as opposed to a contention to be refuted, it is beyond the scope of this article to go into much detail on the topic.

Similarly, the rise of “post-Zionism” has merited an enormous amount of attention since the late 1990’s and continues to do so. The trend – and debate – graphically illustrates that the absolute loyalty to “Zionist identity” is no longer a reality and though many post-Zionists are not exactly die-hard anti-Zionists, their actions and lack of enthusiasm clearly reflect a “turning away” from ideologically driven ethnic definition and the demand that such definition be loyally accepted by all Israeli Jews. To quote a recent article on the “second-wave” of post-Zionism:

“Post–Zionism is a counter–hegemonic political culture that emerged in Israel during the 1990s. It exposed the inherent tension between the Jewish domination over the state and the latter’s democratic pretensions. While since the beginning of the current decade post-Zionism was declared to have exhausted itself with no tangible achievements, it turns out that in 2007 a second wave of post-Zionism is unfolding, albeit with noticeable changes from the first wave, yet with an even more invigorated impetus. …

“The great achievement of first wave post-Zionism was the ushering in of the counter–hegemonic concept “a state of all its citizens” into the public discourse, as against the dominant concept of “the Jewish and Democratic State”. Second–wave post-Zionism now further politicizes this concept and mobilizes citizens under its banner. One can say that the center of gravity of post–Zionism has began to shift now from the intellectual “bubble” of Tel Aviv into the Arab cities and villages of the Galilee, from aloof university intellectuals to public activists, from the Jewish sector to the Arab sector, and from the judicial arena to the political arena. With all these shifts, it is to be expected that post-Zionism will also shift its appellation. It will probably be called a struggle for a “free state” or as a campaign for constitutional reform.” [49]

Our – as in one state advocates – argument is that, yes, Zionism can be overcome and that this is a process that has developed quite independently of any external advocacy as modernism – including a belief in multiculturalism and humanism – has confronted the very nineteenth century ethnocentric pseudo-racial ideology of Zionism. Of course reasonable people may disagree.

12. Paragraph 19

This paragraph raises a valid point regarding expressions of outright anti-Semitism by Palestinians and the need for this to be curtailed before a one state option would be acceptable. Many Left activists – Israeli, Palestinian, and other – that are the primary advocates for one state advocacy would certainly agree that Palestinian flirtation with European anti-Semitic libels like the “Protocols of Zion” and the Holocaust Denial are certainly counter-productive. Nevertheless, such expressions of anti-Semitism are not limited to Palestinians within Israel/Palestine, for example Russian anti-Semitism has continued to thrive in Israel going so far as to develop Israel’s first openly Neo-Nazi organization, the “Israeli White Union.” [50] This is not meant to excuse or downplay Palestinian flirtation with actual anti-Semitism, but is meant to illustrate that its absolute eradication, as desirable as this is, is not necessarily an absolute requirement for peaceful co-existence as long as it is marginalized.

13. Paragraphs 20-21

These two paragraphs focus on lessons from the South African experience that can be applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and though the list provided is rather limited, there is nothing that this refutation seeks to counter.

14. Paragraph 22

This paragraph is little more than another Adam-Moodley quote: “the simplistic assumption that the South African model readily lends itself to export may actually retard necessary new solutions by clinging to visions or processes of negotiation that may not work in another context.”

Very few – if any – one state advocates argue that an exact cookie-cutter copy of the South African process would be applicable in the Israeli/Palestinian process. Nevertheless, contrary to the views of those that still hold firmly to the Zionist demand for an exclusive ethnocentric “Jewish State” the goal of the South African process – for one democratic secular state – is not unreasonable or inherently negative. While the processes used to reach this goal will inevitably be different – reflecting the undeniable differences between the two situations – this in no way invalidates or de-legitimizes the goal itself. In fact, holding strictly to the antiquated notion of an ethnocentric state in what is a de facto bi-national state certainly undermines the introduction of “necessary new solutions by clinging to visions” that are no longer acceptable or viable.

15. Paragraph 23

Starting at this paragraph, the article moves back to Pogrund’s own writing as opposed to that of Adam and Moodley that served as the basis of most of the preceding. From a one state advocacy perspective, there is nothing to take exception to in this paragraph, despite its obvious intent to make the one state idea seem like an unrealistic fantasy:

“When all is said and done, it is tempting to go along with the notion of a single state. The South African “miracle” is a powerful image. Imagine Jews and Arabs living together on a tiny piece of land, a shared society of equals with one government; it would end their long and bitter conflict and fulfill the ideal of a united world in which people live together in amity and peace.”

16. Paragraph 24

This paragraph adopts a more or less “standard” argument against the one state notion; that of listing examples of presumably successful partitions elsewhere. The problem with this notion is that it assumes – without any empirical foundation whatsoever – that a realistic, mutually acceptable, workable partition is on the agenda in Israel/Palestine. There is no valid reason whatsoever to make this assumption. Like it or not, Israeli demands (e.g. to control the West Bank aquifers [51], to control the Jordan Valley [52], to control all Palestinian borders [53], to maintain the primary settlement blocks [54], and so on) as well as the empirical reality as its exists today (the settlements [55], the total integration of the electricity grids between Israel and the OPTs [56], the total integration of the water systems of Israel and the OPTs [57], the largely integrated road networks of Israel and the OPTs [58], and so on) virtually rules out any pretension to a workable partition. Yes, a series of Palestinian ghettos with its own little “Palestinian Authority” Arabenrat administration might be imposed, but this will only be a temporary fix as such "solutions" are completely and utterly unsustainable in the face of Palestinian population growth.

The issue at hand is not whether or not the notion of partition has been successful in other cases but whether or not there is any realistic possibility of a sustainable partition in Israel/Palestine. Most one state advocates – basing their view not on abstract theoretical possibilities but the actual reality on the ground – suggest that there is no Israeli intention for a workable partition. Therefore, whether or not partition worked elsewhere is immaterial, partition – or at least a realistically sustainable one – is not, and has never been, on the agenda in Israel/Palestine.

17. Paragraph 25

This paragraph combines two relatively common arguments.

The first of which somewhat echoes the “special” nature of the conflict that was expressed to an absurdist degree in paragraph 17 above; specifically that unlike South Africa where apparently most blacks didn’t really “mistrust” whites during Apartheid, in Israel/Palestine the two sides really dislike one another. In this argument, “the blessings and the cruelty of historical experience” really didn’t matter all that much for Afrikaners or other South Africans, but play a key role in Israel/Palestine. While it may certainly be true that these didn’t play a role for Pogrund personally, to flatly declare that on behalf of all South Africans is disingenuous at best or an outright misrepresentation at worse.

Anyone familiar with Zionist ideology knows that “particularism” – the Zionist euphemism for the characteristic of all ethnocentric movements that see their own “struggle” as singularly unique and different from all others – is a defining characteristic, just as it is in every other ethnocentric and racist ideological movement. Comments like this are just expressions of this “particularist” delusion and most one state advocates – while recognizing the unique characteristics and circumstances that exist in each and every case – flatly refuse to put the Israeli/Palestinian conflict into some mythical “particularist” framework that radically separates it from all the rest of human experience. Recognizing the complexities of the conflict (no more or less so than most other long-standing ethnic conflicts), in the final analysis it isn’t particularly unique in the history ethnic conflicts.

The second argument isn’t really an argument at all, just a flat statement of personal opinion that is treated as though it has some polemical value; namely that Israeli Jews will simply never surrender the notion of a “Jewish” state utterly dominated by them and imposed on the rest of the population. To quote: “Israeli Jews will not forgo their Jewish state, … it’s not going to happen.” However, as noted previously (under Paragraph 18 above) contrary to this opinion, it is in fact happening right this moment. On the one hand Israeli Jewish “post-Zionists” are questioning the need for a strictly “Jewish State” in general, while on the other hand, others – unwilling to publicly question the concept – are effectively showing their lack of interest in this antiquated notion by emigrating in record numbers [59].

Quaint opinions about the absolute Israeli Jewish loyalty to the Zionist ideology, while probably applicable Pogrund himself as well as many others, are not in fact what is shown by actual events underway in the real world. Every day that passes it becomes ever more difficult to reconcile the demands of the Zionist ideology with the generally progressive outlook and attitudes of the vast majority of modern Jews (Israeli or otherwise). Such opinions are more an expression of hope by diehard ideologues than realistic assessments of the current reality and probable future.

18. Paragraph 26

The first three sentences of this final paragraph represent a unique difference of viewpoints between Pogrund and what many one state advocates would say is the current status quo: “True, the spread of settlements on the West Bank brings into question the viability of a Palestinian state and could point to the inevitability of a single state. But if that were ever to come about, it would be at the cost of democracy and Jewish values, because it would be a state in which Palestinians would be oppressed semi- or non-citizens. Palestinians would never accept that, and we would all be doomed to perpetual war.”

In the eyes of many one state advocates, this is a precise description of exactly where the situation stands today. “Democracy [60] and Jewish values [61]” have been being undermined, if not outright twisted into completely unrecognizable forms, for years now. Palestinians are already semi- (inside the Green Line [62]) or non- (in the OPTs) citizens and have made it quite clear that they have no intention of accepting this; and as long as Israel remains upon its current course there is absolutely no hope for anything beyond perpetual war (with the occasional lull now and then). This isn’t some potential future but a current reality that apparently Pogrund flatly refuses to face up to.

The last few sentences are just expressions of hope, from a Zionist point of view, that some through miracle Israel will be able to perpetually maintain its fundamentally racist identity against the wishes of an ever increasing number of people who are specifically excluded – as non-Jews – from equality in the state. That is, the rest of the article is just an expression of wishful thinking on the part of Pogrund.

III. Concluding Thoughts

If one discounts the paraphrasing of the points made in the Adam-Moodley book, very little of any originality or substance is presented in this article by Pogrund himself. The value of his input in the debate is apparently based on the premise that Pogrund is not a radical Rightist and is South African born. However, as illustrated by paragraphs 17 and 25, he plainly never identified himself very closely with any of the ethnic groups in South Africa, a supposition that might explain why his views are so dramatically at odds with those of most South Africans of all stripes, including many fellow Jews. Affording Pogrund the benefit of the doubt – that is, assuming that he was not being deliberately dishonest – one is forced to conclude that he only has a very cursory understanding of the tensions and acrimony that existed – and to an extent continue to exist – among the various ethnic groups of South Africa.

Further, paragraph 26 would seem to suggest that Pogrund refuses to honestly look at the existing situation in Israel/Palestine just as he apparently refused to do in South Africa. The “writing is on the wall” and Pogrund himself has accurately described the current reality though describing it as some sort of horrible possible future. One can only assume that his ideological blinders have left him in the dark and quite oblivious.

Regardless, this article does not undermine the notion of one democratic secular state for all its people in Israel/Palestine at all.

Notes:

[1] Benjamin Pogrund, “Looking for Truth Among the Lies,” The New Statesman, 26 February 2007, http://www.newstatesman.com/200702260021

[2] Desmond Tutu, “Apartheid in the Holy Land,” The Guardian, 29 April 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/comment/0,10551,706911,00.html

[3] Ronnie Kasrils, “Palestine at the Crossroads,” Umsebenzi Online, 16 July 2007, Reproduced online at: http://www.tlaxcala.es/pp.asp?reference=3370&lg=en

[4] Benjamin Pogrund, “South Africa Is Not a Model for Us,” Palestine-Israel Journal, Volume 14, No. 2, 2007. Reproduced online at: http://www.sazionfed.co.za/pages/hasbarah_updates.htm and http://zionism-israel.com/israel_news/2007/07/one-state-solution-south-africa-is-not.html

[5] Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israelis And Palestinians, 2005, Temple University Press, Online: http://www.temple.edu/tempress/titles/1813_reg.html

[6] For the record, this reviewer has not read the Adam-Moodley book so cannot comment on whether or not Pogrund’s characterization of their conclusions is valid.

[7] Elizabeth Young, “Palestinian Economic Dependence on Israel,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 23 March 2006, Policy Watch #1088, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2453

[8] International Federation for Human Rights, "Migrant Workers in Israel - A Contemporary Form of Slavery, Appendix C - Migrant and Palestinian Workers: Comparison of Salary and Cost to Employer," Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network & International Federation for Human Rights, 2003, http://www.euromedrights.net/usr/00000026/00000027/00000028/00000240.pdf

[9] Palestine Center, "Israel’s Economic Burden: Occupying the Palestinian Territories: Report from a Palestine Center briefing by Thomas Stauffer," Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development, 17 October 2002, http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/fortherecord.php?ID=71

[10] Shir Hever, "Foreign Aid to the OPT and Israel: Socioeconomic Bulletin Number One (2nd Edition): May 2005," Alternative Information Center, May 2005, http://www.alternativenews.org/aic-publications/the-economy-of-the-occupation/updated-economic-bulletin-1-foreign-aid-to-the-opt-and-israel-20050412.html

[11] Avi Shauli, “Cost of occupation – over $50 billion,” YNet News, 9 June 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3410537,00.html

[12] Multinational Monitor, "Working Against Apartheid, Trade Unions in South Africa: An Interview with Nomonde Ngubo," Multinational Monitor, Vol 7, No. 7, 15 April 1986, http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1986/0415/interview-ngubo.html

[13] Richard H. Curtiss, "Who Won the Battles of Burger King and Walt Disney Productions?," Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, December 1999, http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1299/9912013.html

[14] International Solidarity Movement, "Tulkarem Farmers in Boycott of Israeli goods," International Solidarity Movement, 19 September 2006, http://www.palsolidarity.org/main/2006/09/19/tulkarem-boycott/

[15] Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Deputy Defense Minister of Israel, cited in "Hostile or Friendly Separation? Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations at a Crossroad Highlights of the Public Event Held on Thursday, May 31, 2007, Tel Aviv University," The Peres Center for Peace, 31 May 2007, Tel Aviv University, http://www.peres-center.org/media/protocol.pdf

[16] Joshua Brilliant, "Interim report card for Hamas," United Press International, 7 July 2007, Reproduced online at: http://news.monstersandcritics.com/middleeast/features/printer_1327138.php

[17] Ian Fisher, "In One Village, Anger and a Hunger for Change," New York Times, 28 January 2006

[18] Mike Whitney, "Abbas is a Traitor," Arab-European League, 01 June 2006, http://www.arabeuropean.org/article.php?ID=114

[19] John Kifner, "Surprise leap from wild card to power: Hamas offers social services, an end to political corruption," New York Times, 29 January 2006, Reproduced online at: http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/01/29/MNGMHGVCED1.DTL

[20] Saree Makdisi, "Illusion of democracy: The Palestinian Elections," The Electronic Intifada, 23 January 2006, http://electronicintifada.net/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/12/4411

[21] Shmuel Rosner, "Israel's Big Bang," Slate, 30 March 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2138944/

[22] Gil Hoffman and JPost Staff, "Labor okays Israel Beiteinu in coalition," Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1159193514022

[23] Daily Star Staff, "Israeli poll indicates shift to right among electorate," Daily Star (Lebanon), 14 October 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=76134

[24] "Israel is not economically self-sufficient, and relies on foreign assistance and borrowing to maintain its economy. Since 1985, the United States has provided $3 billion in grants annually to Israel. Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, and is the largest cumulative recipient since World War II. In addition to U.S. assistance, it is estimated that Israel receives about $1 billion annually through philanthropy, an equal amount through short- and long- term commercial loans, and around $1 billion in Israel Bonds proceeds. ... U.S. aid to Israel has some unique aspects, such as loans with repayment waived, or a pledge to provide Israel with economic assistance equal to the amount Israel owes the United States for previous loans. Israel also receives special benefits that may not be available to other countries, such as the use of U.S. military assistance for research and development in the United States, the use of U.S. military assistance for military purchases in Israel, or receiving all its assistance in the first 30 days of the fiscal year rather than in 3 or 4 installments as other countries do."

Congressional Research Service, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance" OPENCRS Website, 26 April 2005, http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/IB85066

[25] "The Stars and Stripes were flown alongside the national flag. This is essentially a declaration that Israelis cannot celebrate their own independence day without remembering that their country's existence is wholly dependent on American backing. ... This backing has several aspects. One of them is the military and economic aid that Israel receives annually from Uncle Sam. ... After all, the world knows that without American backing, tiny Israel would quickly revert to its natural proportions. ... What is important is that Israel continue to enjoy the political support of the most powerful nation on earth. After all, were it not for America's veto in the United Nations Security Council, economic sanctions, a la South Africa during its apartheid regime, would have been imposed on Israel long ago. Without that veto, Israel would never have been able to continue fighting the Second Lebanon War when every other country in the world wanted it stopped as soon as it began. Anyone who needs further evidence of the sad fact that Israel is very far from independence - either economic or political - should know that Israel recently submitted another request for an increase in American military aid."

Nehemia Shtrasler, "Just an optical illusion," Ha'aretz, 27 April 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/852930.html

[26] [Yasser Arafat:] "Dear God, who cares about the Americans? ... The Americans are on your side and they give you everything, ... `Who gave you the airplanes? The Americans. Who gave you the tanks? The Americans. ... Don't talk to me about the Americans.'' Associated Press, "Angry Arafat Accuses US Of Pro-Israel Bias," Common Dreams, 7 December 2001, Reproduced online at: http://commondreams.org/headlines01/1207-04.htm

[27] " [Mossad chief] Amit visited Washington May 31-June 2. At a conference on the Six-Day War held June 3-5, 1992, he stated that he had three objectives in this mission: first, to compare notes on the situation, second, to find out whether any action was being planned to reopen the Strait of Tiran, and third, "to tell the Americans, I, Meir Amit, am going to recommend that our government strike, and I wanted to sense what would be their response, their attitude toward that." (Parker, Richard B., ed., The Six-Day War: A Retrospective, (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1996), p. 139) Amit said that he met with McNamara for 40 minutes and told him three things: first, a short description of the military situation, second, the impact of the Israeli mobilization on Israel's economy and the fact that it could not be sustained for a long period, and third, "I told him that I'm personally going to recommend that we take action, because there's no way out, and please don't react. He told me it was all right, the president knows that you are here and I have a direct line to the president." He said McNamara asked only two questions: how long a war would last, to which Amit replied, "Seven days," and how many casualties Israel would sustain. Amit said, "Here I became a diplomat. I said less than in 1948, when we had 6,000." (Ibid., p. 140)" Presented online by the United States Department of State at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28055.htm

[28] “If the divestment movement initially seemed like a gathering storm on Israel's horizon, lately both its supporters and opponents say they no longer see the issue as directly impacting on-the-ground realities in the Middle East. Instead, they said, fights over divestment now serve as a way to sway public opinion on the Israel-Palestine conflict in other parts of the globe. Divestment campaigns ‘might not have a practical impact,’ said Liat Weingart, the campaign director for Jewish Voice for Peace, which advocates divestment from certain companies whose products are used by Israel in the territories. But ‘when the archbishop of Canterbury says we need to look at [it]... that moves the discourse forward about 10 steps, and creates a space to talk about [Israel] where there wasn't a space before.’” Jennifer Siegel, "Vote To Divest Seen Having Little Effect," Jewish Voice for Peace, undated, http://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/publish/article_422.shtml

[29] "However, no confidence racket succeeds without the active aid of the marks. We are the marks. We all know about con games. Our e-mail in-boxes are filled with offers from Nigerian widows who want to make us rich, and hot tips on worthless penny stocks. Nonetheless, we fall for the boycott swindle every time. ... The news about the boycott is much worse than the boycott itself, and the news is largely made by pro-Israel activist organizations who turn mole hills into mountains. Anyone who wants free publicity only needs to do something sufficiently outrageous. We should be aware that a major object of the boycott campaign is to win publicity for the boycotters and attract attention to them, and we should stop helping them achieve their goals." Ami Isseroff, "Are we victims of the Israel boycott con?," ZioNation - Progressive Zionism and Israel Web Log, 25 April 2007, http://www.zionism-israel.com/log/archives/00000377.html

[30] Salim Muwakkil, "Keyes’ Ideological Quest," In These Times, 7 September 2004, http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/985/

[31] For example: Reuters, "US condemns Israeli settlement plan" ABC News Online, 28 December 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200612/s1818964.htm

[32] Office of the United States Trade Representative Press Release, "United States, Egypt and Israel to Launch Historic Trade Partnership USTR Zoellick to Participate in Signing in Cairo," Office of the United States Trade Representative Website, 10 December 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/December/United_States,_Egypt_Israel_to_Launch_Historic_Trade_Partnership_USTR_Zoellick_to_Participate_in_Signing_in_Cairo.html

[33] Adalah, "Historical Background: History of the Palestinians in Israel," Adalah Website, undated, http://www.adalah.org/eng/backgroundhistory.php

[34] Ahmed Jaradat, "Tunnels and Roads, Closures, Crossings, and the Segregation Wall: Toward a Unique Racist Reality," Housing and Land Rights Network, 8 August 2006, http://www.hlrn.org/news_show_user.php?id=170

[35] Ari Shavit, "A Spirit of Absolute Folly," Ha'aretz, 11 August 2006 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749564.html

[36] Kenneth Christie, The South African Truth Commission, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 2000, p. 113

[37] "RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE" A/AC.183/L.2/Add.28, 21 May 2007

Resolutions and votes:

a) ES-10/16. Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

In favor: 156 countries / Against: 7 countries (Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 6 countries

b) ES-10/17. Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damage caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

In favor: 162 countries / Against: 7 countries (Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 7 countries

c) 61/22. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

In favor: 101 countries / Against: 7 countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 62 countries

d) 61/23. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat

In favor: 101 countries / Against: 7 countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 62 countries

e) 61/24. Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

In favor: 157 countries / Against: 7 countries (Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 9 countries

f) 61/25. Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine

In favor: 157 countries / Against: 7 countries (Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 10 countries

g) 61/26. Jerusalem

In favor: 157 countries / Against: 6 countries (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 10 countries

h) 61/27. The Syrian Golan

In favor: 107 countries / Against: 6 countries (Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 60 countries

i) 61/112. Assistance to Palestine refugees

In favor: 173 countries / Against: 1 country (Israel) / Abstaining: 10 countries

j) 61/113. Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

In favor: 170 countries / Against: 6 countries (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 8 countries

k) 61/114. Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

In favor: 169 countries / Against: 6 countries (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 8 countries

l) 61/115. Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues

In favor: 170 countries / Against: (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 8 countries

m) 61/116. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

In favor: 90 countries / Against: 9 countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, United States) / Abstaining: 81 countries

n) 61/117. Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

In favor: 165 countries / Against: (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, United States) / Abstaining: 10 countries

o) 61/118. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

In favor: 162 countries / Against: 8 countries (Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, United States) / Abstaining: 10 countries

p) 61/119. Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

In favor: 157 countries / Against: 9 countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, United States) / Abstaining: 14 countries

q) 61/120. The occupied Syrian Golan

In favor: 163 countries / Against: 2 countries (Israel, Tuvalu) / Abstaining: 16 countries

r) 60/135. Assistance to the Palestinian people

In favor: 159 countries / Against: 0 countries / Abstaining: 7 countries

s) 61/152. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

In favor: 176 countries / Against: 5 countries (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 5 countries

t) 61/184. Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

In favor: 164 countries / Against: 6 countries (Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, United States) / Abstaining: 9 countries

[38] Human Rights Watch, “Israel/PA: Suicide Bombers Commit Crimes Against Humanity,” Human Rights News, 1 November 2002, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/11/isrl-pa1101.htm

[39] African National Congress, “Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” TRC Website, August 1996, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/submit/anctruth.htm

[40] Khalid Amayreh, "Palestinian children killed by Israel," Aljazeera.Net, 10 May 2004, http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=3006

[41] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), "Holding the Pan Africanist Congress Accountable," TRC Findings and Recommendations, Vol. 6, Section 5, Chapter 5, pp. 702-719. 2003 Online at: http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_5.pdf

[42] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), "Findings and Recommendations: Holding the ANC Accountable," TRC Findings and Recommendations ,Volume 6, Section 5, Chapter 3, pp. 642-643 http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf

[43] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), "Findings and Recommendations: Holding the ANC Accountable," TRC Findings and Recommendations, Volume 6, Section 5, Chapter 3, p. 650 http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf

[44] John Sigler, "Israel’s Ultimate Threat: A critical assessment of the viability of 'transfer'", For One Democratic Secular State in Israel/Palestine, 31 March 2007, http://one-israel-palestine.blogspot.com/2007/06/israels-ultimate-threat-critical.html

[45] Khalil Shikaki, "Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 158, January 2006, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158.html

[46] Colette Avital, MK "After the Israeli Elections: Prospects for Peace," Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on March 5, 2001, http://www.lawac.org/speech/pre%20sept%2004%20speeches/avital.htm

[47] For example: Jeff Halper, "The Livni-Rice Plan: Towards a Just Peace or Apartheid?," Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, 2 May 2007, http://www.icahd.org/eng/news.asp?menu=5&submenu=1&item=433

[48] Louis Rene Beres, "Palestine, More of a Threat to Israel than The Uprising," Gamla Online, February 1989, http://www.gamla.org.il/english/beres/12.htm

[49] Uri Ram, "Second Wave Post-Zionism and the Apartheid Backlash," Tikkun Magazine, 18 July 2007, http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/specials/postzionism

[50] For more on the topic visit The Israeli Information and Assistance Center for the Victims of Anti-Semitism, http://pogrom.org.il/

[51] Aubrey Wulfsohn, "What Retreat from the Territories Means for Israel's Water Supply," New York Jewish Times, 5 June 2005, http://www.nyjtimes.com/cover/05-06-05/WhatRetreatMeansForIsraeliWater.htm

[52] Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, "Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2005, http://www.defensibleborders.org/

[53] Yaakov Amidror, "Israel's Security: The Hard-Learned Lessons," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, http://www.meforum.org/article/575

[54] Dore Gold, "Bush Erases the Clinton Parameters," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 21, 15 April 2004, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-21.htm

[55] Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Settlement Database and Suitability Assessment,” FMEP Website, http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement_database.html

[56] "Responsibility for electric utility service delivery is currently vested in municipal departments or village councils, except for the Jerusalem District Electric Company (JDECO) -- a shareholder-owned utility. In Gaza (population of about 840,000) municipalities buy electricity from the Israeli Electric Company (IEC). In the West Bank (population of 1,830,000), there are 2 communities --- 110 take wholesale supplies from IEC for resale at low voltage; 67 have a partial supply from generation owned by the village; 75 have no formal electricity supply."

The World Bank, "West Bank and Gaza-Electricity Sector, Investment and Management Project" United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, 12 December 1995

[57] Fred Pearce, "Israel lays claim to Palestine's water," New Scientist, 27 May 2004, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn5037.html

[58] Jeff Halper, "The Matrix of Control," Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, undated, http://www.icahd.org/eng/articles.asp?menu=6&submenu=3

[59] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), "Emigration from Israel exceeds immigration, report," Jewish Federation of St. Louis, 20 April 2007, http://stlouis.ujcfedweb.org/page.html?ArticleID=144274

[60] On twisting the concept of "democracy;" Yitzhak Laor, "Democracy for Jews only," Ha'aretz, 31 May 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/864734.html

[61] On twisting "Jewish values;" Allan C. Brownfeld, "Gap Between Jewish Values, Israeli Policies Becoming Apparent to More," Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, May-June 2007, pp. 58-59, Reproduced online by Jewish Voices for Peace at: http://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/publish/article_866.shtml

[62] Democracy Now, "No Shelters, Sirens for Israel's Arab Citizens," Interview with Jafar Farah (Director of the Mossawa Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens of Israel) and Susan Nathan (author of "The Other Side of Israel: My Journey Across the Jewish/Arab Divide"), Democracy Now Website, 14 August 2006, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/08/14/1358258

Israel’s Ultimate Threat: A critical assessment of the viability of “transfer”

2007-06-19T06:43:00.000-06:00

Israel’s Ultimate Threat: A critical assessment of the viability of “transfer”
John Sigler*, 31 March 2007

With the collapse of the Oslo peace process the realistic options for a sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinian people have significantly narrowed. Among the options that remain ostensibly on the table, the Israeli Right’s call for “transfer” – a polite euphemism for ethnic cleansing – continues to find support among a significant portion of the Israeli public and is openly popular with some mainstream political factions. The inclusion of “transfer” advocate Avigdor Lieberman [1] in Olmert’s Kadima government illustrates that this position continues to be an acceptable perspective in Israeli political discourse.

As a result, the implicit threat of ethnic cleansing as a measure of last resort has remained an underlying factor in the Israeli position vis-à-vis the Palestinians. The implication being that the Palestinians ultimately must accept whatever Israel dictates because failure to do so will force Israel into adopting this “final solution” to resolve the conflict. In view of Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, this implicit threat has been taken seriously by both proponents and opponents. Nevertheless, when the actual mechanics of implementing a “transfer” policy are examined, the viability of this threat is significantly diminished. A number of factors make ethnic cleansing extremely unlikely if not completely impossible. This article touches on a number of these factors with the goal of undermining the utility and credibility of this implied threat from the Israeli camp.

I. Narrowing the Options

The eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada represented the final death knell of the Oslo peace process. Beginning in September of 2000, the new uprising was a dramatic expression of Palestinian frustration with almost ten years of negotiations with Israel that began with the Madrid talks in 1991. [2] Sharon’s provocative raid on Haram al-Sharif was just the final straw in an endless succession of Israeli policies, practices, and provocations – coupled with Palestinian reactions - that essentially doomed the peace process. The Palestinian perception that Israel was completely insincere was justified by Israel’s policy of creating “facts on the ground” that clearly illustrated Israel’s intention of remaining in effective control of the Occupied Palestinian Territories.[3]

Contrary to Israeli propaganda, the uprising was a spontaneous popular uprising [4] that – knowing what the inevitable Israeli response would be [5] - simply could not be dictated from above. The Intifada led to the Palestine Authority (PA) being viewed as essentially superfluous by both Palestinians and Israelis. In Palestinian eyes, the Palestine Authority was meant to be a provisional authority that would ultimately develop into the government of an independent Palestinian state.[6] The primary purpose of the Palestine Authority from the Israeli perspective was to serve as an auxiliary to the Israeli security establishment.[7] That is, the PA’s primary role was to maintain peace, prevent Palestinian attacks on both fellow Palestinians and Israelis, and to serve as an Israeli-authorized autonomous authority within those areas that the Israelis allowed them to operate.

The Intifada utterly destroyed any meaningful justification for the existence of the Palestine Authority. From the Palestinian perspective, the PA had effectively failed to secure an independent Palestinian state and therefore became nothing more than a new Arabic-speaking level of occupation bureaucracy.[8] From the Israeli perspective, it failed in its primary purpose of maintaining peace and security for Israel and its citizens in the Territories.[9] Subsequently, the PA and Fatah began to lose cohesion, with the more militant sections such as the Tanzim taking an active role in the resistance [10] while the less militant divisions launched desperate measures to assert control over the Palestinian people and trying to restore cooperation with the Israelis.[11] The effective Israeli imprisonment of Arafat in Ramallah and his later death coupled with an extreme expansion of the Israeli closure policy led to a complete collapse to any pretense of a centralized authority. [12] Isolated from each other and without an enthusiastic or universal acceptance of Abbas as successor to Arafat, [13] the separate PA entities have all become essentially independent local authorities working in cooperation with other local actors. [14] The final blow came with the January 2006 electoral success of Hamas, the leading non-PLO faction, a result that swept away the democratic pretense held by the PA executive under Mahmoud Abbas. [15]

These developments resulted in a dramatic shift in Israeli perceptions of the matter. The Israeli Right shifted further in that direction demanding an end to any concessions to the Palestinians. The Israeli Center became infatuated with the Sharon/Kadima notion of unilateral separation from the Palestinians. The Israeli Zionist Left, as differentiated from the non- or post-Zionist Left, made itself essentially irrelevant by maintaining support for what was undeniably a failed strategy of negotiated separation.

The Israeli Right, from Likud on, had been staunchly opposed to the Oslo process from the outset. Despite the fact that the Netanyahu government paid some lip service to Oslo to placate the United States, in practice it did everything possible to sabotage it.[16] The Intifada was something of a vindication of the anti-Oslo position and became known in Rightist circles as the “Oslo War.” [17] Today, the Right continues to argue in favor of maintaining total Israeli control, maintaining all the settlements, and affording the Palestinians various degrees of partial autonomy under Israeli domination. [18] The obvious problem is that such a position can never result in a sustainable peace and even the advocates of this position grant as much, accepting the use of force perpetually to maintain Israeli hegemony.[19] To quote one Right-wing extremist living in Hebron: “We want to fight our enemies until the Arabs know that this is the Jewish state and the only state we have and if they want our land we will fight them.”[20] The Israeli Center, that previously supported the Oslo process, lost all confidence after the failure of Camp David offers in 2000. [21] The Israeli government argued, and much of the Israeli Center accepted, that this was the absolute most that Israel would be willing to offer and since it didn’t meet the minimum demands of the Palestinians, further negotiation was seen as pointless. This, not surprisingly, resulted in a shift of the Center, away from supporting a negotiated settlement to supporting unilateral separation, manifested by Sharon’s “Disengagement” from Gaza. The Center put Kadima in power specifically on this program.[22] However, since “Disengagement” was never intended to actually free Gaza [23] and ultimately did not;[24] it was inevitable the Palestinian resistance would continue. The continued Palestinian resistance, in turn, convinced much of the Israeli Center that no Palestinian enclave could be allowed true control over their own affairs, thereby pushing much of this block reluctantly into the camp of the Israeli Right.

The Israeli Zionist Left rejected the government contention that the Camp David proposals represented the maximum concessions possible to bring about a mutually accepted two-state option. This view coalesced around the unofficial “Geneva Initiative” or “Geneva Accords” [25] worked out by a group of former Israeli and Palestinian officials and publicly announced in 2003. Despite widespread publicity and a number of high profile endorsements, this initiative never really moved forward. Arafat, before his death, suggested that he might accept this offer as the basis of a negotiated settlement, [26] despite the wishes of the Palestinian people for whom he was ostensibly speaking. [27] On the Israeli side, there has never been any expression of interest from the democratically-elected government. [28] Accounts from both the Israeli Right and Center are fairly unanimous in rejecting these terms, [29] and thus the Israeli Zionist Left has largely alienated itself by continuing to stand behind this and similar initiatives.

The net result of all these trends has been to significantly narrow the options available for a sustainable peace within Israel/Palestine. Basically no negotiated proposal that meets the minimum conditions of the Palestinian side is on the table at all, so a permanent negotiated settlement is not even at issue. The failure of “Disengagement” to bring about peace in Gaza has dampened Israeli enthusiasm for unilateral separation while the continuing violence has reinforced the Rightist position that no Palestinian autonomy - much less freedom - is compatible with Israeli security interests. The default position is to maintain the status quo, forcible subjection of the Palestinians to Israeli rule, but most observers agree that this will never result in peace and is ultimately unsustainable.

If one rules out a mutually accepted negotiated settlement and unilateral separation, any sort of sustainable two-state option becomes impossible. Continued subjugation through military force, though it can be maintained for quite some time, will not result in peace and is ultimately doomed to failure. This, in turn, brings us to the final two options that, at least in theory, could result in a sustainable permanent resolution of the conflict inside the borders of Israel/Palestine: either some sort of one state option or systematic ethnic cleansing.

Various notions of Israeli-Palestinian political unity – the one state idea – have been around from the outset of the Zionist colonization of Palestine [30] and, due to current circumstances, have been making a dramatic come back over the last few years. [31] Of course notions differ widely, from the extreme Right-wing Yesha Council’s proposal [32] to the notion of one democratic secular state that is being reluctantly accepted within the non- or post-Zionist Left. [33] Suggestions span a range of different configurations including the unitary democratic secular state, the democratic religious state, assorted bi-national models, federalization and so on. It is outside the scope of this article to explore this issue in any detail, but it does represent one of the alternatives remaining if one rules out a two-state solution.

II. The Rehabilitation of “Transfer”

The other option is also something of a “one state” notion, but it is based on the premise of one ethnic nation-state that would result after the systematic ethnic cleansing of the “others.” Like sharing the land, the notion of ethnic cleansing has been around since the beginning of the Zionist project [34] and on both sides of the divide.

On the Palestinian side, the idea of expelling the Zionists has been around since the colonization began in earnest and most famously articulated by the “drive the Jews into sea” notion in 1948. [35] Great capital has been made of such demands by Israeli propagandists and even today such rhetoric is occasionally heard in heated public reactions to various Israeli provocations. For example some Hamas activists made statements to this effect after the Israeli assassination of Shaykh Ahmed Yassin in 2004. [36] Nevertheless, the occasional rhetorical outburst notwithstanding, in general most Palestinians understand that the Israelis are there to stay and accept this reality: “…despite the bitterness of the conflict, the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians accept the permanence of the other, and on each side only a few really fantasize about the disappearance of the other.” [37]

On the Israeli side, the creation of the state itself depended on the ethnic cleansing of Palestine conducted in 1948, [38] so beyond rhetoric, the factual application of this tactic already constitutes a historical element of Zionist reality. To quote noted Israeli historian Benny Morris: “Ben-Gurion was right. If he had not done what he did, a state would not have come into being. That has to be clear. It is impossible to evade it. Without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen here.” [39] After Al Nakba – the original ethnic cleansing of 1948 – virtually all Israelis, except the extreme Right, ruled out a second ethnic cleansing as a desirable or realistic possibility. The pretense that the ethnic cleansing of 1948 never happened [40] and that modern Israel would never endorse ethnic cleansing [41] remained in vogue, even among the respectable Israeli Right, until the collapse of the peace process.

The idea of ethnic cleansing began to regain respectability after Sharon invited outspoken “transfer” advocate Rehavam Ze'evi to join his government in 2001. [42] The protests of Israeli Palestinians in support of the Al Aqsa Intifada [43] confirmed the popular suspicion that they still identified with their fellow Palestinians in the Territories and this too helped make talk of “transfer” more respectable in some Israeli circles. [44] Another significant factor in making talk of “transfer” more acceptable was the rise of advocacy on behalf of the Palestinian refugees calling on Israel to honor their Right of Return. [45] These and other factors led to a considerable increase in the number of Israelis that openly support the notion of “transfer”, as illustrated by various public opinion polls. [46] However, it should be noted that most Israelis supporting this notion in fact supported “voluntary transfer” as opposed to openly endorsing outright ethnic cleansing. Depending on who asked the question, “voluntary transfer” could mean either financially bribing Palestinians to leave or making life utterly impossible for Palestinians thereby “encouraging” emigration. The problem with the idea of “voluntary transfer” is that it is a largely fanciful notion that has never been seriously proposed and would probably be rejected by most Palestinians if it were.

Despite a myriad of proposals to provide economic incentives in exchange for Palestinian emigration, [47] realistically no serious offers to this effect have ever been presented by any Israeli government. In fact, even when the Israelis were encouraging the Palestine Authority to handle the “dirty work” of occupation on its behalf Israel refused to pay the bill, [48] calling on the world community do so. If Israel was unwilling to pay for the Palestinian Authority with full knowledge that most such money would remain within the Occupied Territories, and thus within reach; it seems extremely unlikely that Israel would be willing to pay vast sums to Palestinians to take outside of Israel/Palestine. Further, unless these financial incentives were truly extravagant, it is highly debatable how many Palestinians would accept such an offer knowing that to do so would mean permanently turning their back on their native land. [49] Like the Geneva Initiatives, there exists absolutely no reason to believe that any Israeli government would be willing to seriously consider this suggestion in terms that most Palestinians would accept.

As for “slow”, “creeping”, or “soft” transfer – slowly ethnically cleansing the land by attrition by making life utterly impossible for Palestinians – this has effectively been Israeli policy since the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada. [50] While the tactic has successfully resulted in the de facto expulsion of many Palestinians, [51] the tactic has not been effective enough to address Israel’s demographic concerns. Such measures have been primarily employed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where the legal status of the resident Palestinian population makes emigration extremely difficult, if not outright impossible. [52] Since most Palestinians in the Territories simply do not have the option of leaving, the notion of making their lives unbearable can not - and will not - result in increased emigration in large enough numbers to satisfy Israeli concerns.

The inescapable conclusion is that “voluntary transfer” is little more than a completely unrealistic fantasy. Therefore, most serious ‘transfer’ advocates must be really advocating forcible transfer, the deliberate and systematic ethnic cleansing of Israel/Palestine. This is the only way that “transfer” could result in a sustainable permanent peace inside the borders of Israel/Palestine and a unitary, undivided ethnocentric nation-state could be created. Though most advocates for this program are careful to frame this intention in relatively benign terminology, ultimately all transfer rhetoric is idle unless it is interpreted as meaning forced involuntary expulsion of the ethnically undesirable population.

This conclusion inevitably leads to another question: Is forced systematic ethnic cleansing really an option for Israel? Israel probably does have the brute military strength required to physically move any and all Palestinians from point A to point B against their will; however, when explored in detail, the idea of ethnic cleansing becomes much less viable than is popularly assumed. Further such a scheme seems likely to only exacerbate the existing problems of maintaining an indefinite military occupation and competing with the Palestinians demographically.

III. Expulsion to Where?

The most obvious problem with the supposition that “transfer” represents a realistic option for Israel deals with where, precisely, to expel the Palestinian population to. Despite some hints to the contrary, [53] none of Israel’s neighbors has any intention whatsoever of opening its borders to some four to five million highly-politicized involuntary Palestinian expellees. Such an enormous demographic shift would virtually guarantee the destruction of the existing governments of Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon; and while the Egyptian government might survive such an upheaval, it certainly wouldn’t voluntarily welcome it. Consequently, this means that Israel would be forced to invade and occupy the destination country as a first step in any ethnic cleansing scenario. The numbers involved mean that this would absolutely have to be a land based operation, meaning that these four states are the only ones under consideration as potential destinations. The question of where Israel could expel the Palestinian population deserves some attention.

a. Jordan

The most popular and traditional potential destination for the Palestinian population among “transfer” advocates is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on the other side of the Jordan river. A number of factors make this a popularly suggested destination, including Jordan’s historical association with the British Mandate, the fact that the majority of the Jordanian population is already Palestinian, [54] and the suggestion that Jordan has more than enough land to settle them on. [55]

However, the idea of invading and occupying Jordan also presents some major problems. First, in that there is virtually no chance that the Hashemite monarchy could survive such a massive influx of involuntary expellees, it can be safely assumed that they would use any all means available to resist. Secondly, the Jordanian monarchy represents one of the few Arabic governments that has both a historical record of cooperating with Israel [56] as well as a current policy of doing so [57] and is one of only two Arab states with a formal peace treaty with Israel. Finally, Jordan has entered into a close relationship with Israel’s primary benefactor, the United States, including a free trade agreement [58] and active cooperation with the U.S. “War on Terror." [59]

Thus, not only is it questionable as to whether or not wiping out the Hashemite monarchy would serve Israel’s interests, the notion that the United States would even allow Israel to do so is also debatable.

b. Lebanon

Another option that has been suggested is Lebanon. Lebanese instability, plus the large number of Palestinian refugees already living there, tends to suggest that Lebanon could serve as a suitable “dumping ground” in an ethnic cleansing scenario. The continued existence of Hezbollah could serve as an excuse for an Israeli invasion and occupation just as the existence of Palestinian resistance groups did in 1982. The Summer War of 2006 illustrated that no Lebanese government – even a pro-American one – can count on any external assistance when under Israeli attack. Finally, Israel already has considerable experience with maintaining a protracted occupation in Lebanon, as well as an extensive network of collaborators willing to handle some of the “dirty work.” [60]

However this scenario also presents a number of problems, not least of which is the fact that this would essentially result in a reversion to the situation as it existed in 1982. Such an enormous influx of angry expellees would almost inevitably result in a new Lebanese civil war, demanding protracted Israeli involvement throughout the country. Further, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, noting Hezbollah’s successful tactics, the revived Israeli occupation would be much more difficult than it was previously. Finally, such a move would effectively reintegrate the largest of the “forgotten” Palestinian refugee populations - those currently resident in Lebanon – back into the Palestinian struggle. [61]

While such an operation is theoretically possible, realistically it would be both an immediate and protracted disaster for Israel that would inevitably strain both the military and the state indefinitely. Once in, it would be virtually impossible for Israel to leave without sacrificing the security of most of northern Israel.

c. Egypt

Egypt is the one neighboring country whose government could probably survive the influx of Palestinian expellees. Further the Sinai could theoretically serve as both a destination area for the deported Palestinians and as a defensible buffer area between Israeli and Egyptian ground forces. In a strictly geographic sense, taking the Sinai would appear to be the best destination option for an ethnic cleansing scenario.

Of course looking beyond mere geography, a number of serious complications arise that make this option probably the least likely choice. First, Egypt is not only the most populous Arab state, but also has the most advanced military of Israel’s immediate neighbors [62] and has historically inflicted high casualties on Israel in previous wars. Egypt is also the other of the two Arab states with formal peace treaties with Israel and engages in significant – though downplayed – cooperation with Israel. [63] An even more important complication is Egypt’s relationship with the United States, from whom it receives massive financial aid [64] and has played a significant role in supporting the U.S. “War on Terror.” [65] The conclusion is that such a move would end Israel’s longest peaceful relationship with a neighboring state while Egypt can, and probably would, militarily resist exacting a significant price. Further, due to Egypt’s relationship with the United States and overall geopolitical significance, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the United States simply would not allow Israel to attack, invade, and occupy the Sinai or any other part of Egypt.

d. Syria

Syria is in the unenviable position of being confronted with active hostility from both Israel and the United States. Syria, like Jordan, ostensibly has enough land to handle the influx of expellees and an Israeli invasion would provide the opportunity to oust the regime of one of Israel’s primary regional enemies. Further, unlike Jordan or Egypt, such a move would be unlikely to receive censure from the United States. In fact it has been convincingly argued that the reason behind giving Israel a “free hand” during the Summer War of 2006 was that the U.S. intended for Israel to attack Syria. [66]

The primary problem with this notion - for Israel at least - is that Syria is not defenseless and maintains a “doomsday” option of its own. While in conventional terms it is unlikely that Syria would be able to effectively defend itself against an Israeli invasion, given a “nothing to lose” type situation, Syria has a massive chemical weapons stockpile [67] as well as an arsenal of missiles [68] capable of delivering these weapons. While the Israeli response to such an assault from Syria would probably be cataclysmic, if convinced that they are facing destruction anyway, there is no sound reason to believe that the Syrian government would shy away from using their “weapon of last resort.” All it would take would be a few Syrian missiles with chemical weapons to land in Israeli population centers to radically alter Israel’s situation in all respects. [69]

e. Protracted Occupation

Regardless of the destination chosen to serve as Israel’s “dumping ground” for the Palestinian population, another major aspect of the question is Israel’s ability to maintain its occupation for a protracted period. If Israel were willing to accept a Palestinian state with control of their own borders and import/export policy; then one of the major stumbling blocks for a two-state option within the Occupied Palestinian Territories would be resolved. However, as Israel has made clear, “security” precludes any Palestinian control over their borders or trade. [70] This same concern would hold true if the Palestinians were expelled to a neighboring state.

Specifically, if the Palestinians were allowed to freely import weapons and to freely import volunteer fighters, the Palestinian entity would become an intolerable threat to Israel’s security. Granting that even the expelled Palestinians would still have to be under Israeli security control, this would require massive long-term direct Israeli involvement. So in effect, this would amount to a radical expansion of the territory under perpetual Israeli military occupation. Such a scenario would also lead to an increase in the number of Arabs under Israeli military control as the already resident population would be added to the Palestinians. Increasing the area under long-term military occupation as well as the number of Arabs under direct Israeli control largely defeats the purpose of the whole exercise.

IV. Domestic Opposition

In the modern age when forced population transfers are no longer deemed acceptable, there would be inevitably be significant opposition to any effort at ethnically cleansing Israel/Palestine of its native population. Israel began the territorial aspect of its nationalist program too late to benefit from the conventional acceptance of ethnic cleansing that other earlier settler-states benefited from. The various ethnic cleansing schemes in Bosnia-Herzegovina finalized the notion that such tactics are completely unacceptable in the modern world.

This section only looks at the nature of opposition from the Palestinian victims and Israeli dissenters, as these are the two groups directly involved. Inevitably, an Israeli invasion and occupation of one of its neighbors followed by a forcible population transfer would result in various international reactions, but these are largely speculative. The Summer War in 2006 showed that the world community as a whole will not intervene against a full-scale Israeli onslaught against a neighboring state; nevertheless, the actions required to implement an ethnic cleansing program would be much more dramatic and as such might result in a more aggressive international response. Regardless, discussion of the nature of potential international reactions to such a scenario would be purely speculative and therefore this article does not concern itself with them.

The domestic opposition, namely the resistance of the Palestinians themselves as well as Israeli opposition are both completely predictable and can be explored in some detail based on current and past behaviors.

a. Palestinian Opposition

Obviously the most passionate opposition to an ethnic cleansing scenario would come from the victims themselves, the Palestinian people. In general, “transfer” advocates – excepting those arguing for unrealistic “voluntary” schemes – rarely go into any detail on how “transfer” or expulsion would be accomplished. This is because there is no “polite” way to describe such a process, therefore it is generally ignored. The strategy appears to be that first they want to gain a popular consensus supporting the general idea and only after that will all the nasty details be expounded upon. In the absence of any meaningful discussion of implementation, the default assumption appears to be that such a “transfer” would be similar to, and patterned on, the ethnic cleansing of 1948. That is, by use of terror tactics, psychological operations, and some forced removals; [71] the vast majority of Palestinians could be effectively “stampeded” in a panic to the “safety” of the desired destination.

The problem with such a fanciful notion is that it completely fails to take into account the lessons learned by the Palestinian people from Al Nakba. In 1948, the vast majority of Palestinians expelled were simple and uneducated fellahin and most that fled under Israeli pressure did so assuming that they would be able to return to their homes and properties after the fighting ended. Of course the Zionist movement had absolutely no intention of allowing this as it was the land they were after, not merely political control. The lesson – that if Palestinians leave their land they will never be allowed to return – has been learned; and as a consequence, Palestinians are much less likely to voluntarily flee than their forefathers were. This steadfastness was perhaps best exemplified during Israel’s 2002 “Operation Defensive Shield” that amounted to a series of full IDF attacks on various refugee camps in the West Bank. [72] Despite the onslaught, the vast majority of Palestinians flatly refused to evacuate the area. In a scenario of permanent removal – ethnic cleansing – one can safely assume that Palestinian steadfastness would be even more pronounced.

Further, unlike the majority of the fellahin in 1948, most modern Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have grown somewhat accustomed to living under brutal military rule, to Israeli attacks and raids, and other large scale violence. Thus the Palestinian people are not generally as easily frightened or intimidated as their forefathers were.

These two factors – knowledge that removal is probably permanent and a general unwillingness to be easily frightened away – mean that any Israeli effort at forced expulsion would inevitably be a very “hands on” affair. That is, ethnic cleansing would require direct individual-level forced expulsion, soldiers literally rounding up and physically removing the bulk of the Palestinian population. To make such a process even less desirable, it would inevitably be accompanied by various methods of Palestinian resistance, including armed resistance and suicide attacks, so there can be little doubt that any such effort would also be an extremely bloody affair. While the IDF record undeniably shows willingness to indiscriminately shoot Palestinians, [73] most such incidents are isolated from others and many are done at long range; whereas in an effort at forced expulsion the requisite killing would be on an entirely different order of magnitude and much more personal.

b. Israeli Opposition

As described above discussing Palestinian opposition, any modern effort at forced expulsion would inevitably be a very “hands on” up close and personal affair; therefore it would require a comprehensive national effort. Increased troops would be required to maintain and tighten control over Israel/Palestine collectively as well as maintaining control over the chosen destination for the expellees indefinitely.

Despite the fact that there would have to be a large majority of Israelis politically supporting the notion of “transfer” for it to move towards actual implementation; this support could not be only political. Such a massive effort would demand a full national mobilization of not only the standing IDF, but the reserves as well. For Israelis, such a policy would demand direct and active participation from most of the able-bodied populace, not just a quick, unobtrusive vote. When confronted with the necessity of direct personal participation, the idea loses a considerable amount of appeal.

The question of whether or not the Israelis could mobilize a full national effort to conduct such an onerous process is also highly questionable. In the mainstream Israeli view, the Summer War of 2006 was a fully justified response to the Hezbollah abduction of two Israeli soldiers. Nevertheless, despite the general view that the Israeli response was proper and justified, there were still thousands of Israelis actively marching in the street against the military onslaught in both Gaza and Lebanon. [74] This protest movement illustrated that even in situations where the vast majority of Israelis believe the action in question is justified, there is still significant opposition.

Another complication is that many in Israel clearly differentiate between ostensibly defensive military service “in their land” – which usually includes the Occupied Palestinian Territories as well – and serving in other countries. An example of this is the original Refusnik movement that was launched by Israelis refusing occupation duty in southern Lebanon. [75] The invasion, subjugation and protracted occupation of territory that is unquestionably not Israeli would likely pose a significant morale problem for Israel.

Yet another issue relates to the general assumption of innocence among Israelis regarding IDF behavior. That is, most Israelis still assume that although the military might make mistakes on occasion, in general it is a relatively humane and conscientious institution, despite testimony to the contrary. Since “transfer” would demand those participating to conduct an operation that could only be justified in an abstract political way and would involve actions that could not be characterized as in any way humane; the likelihood is that opposition and rejection would again be noticeably increased. Even today a number of Israeli soldiers have rejected occupation and decided to speak out against what they were ordered to do in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. [76]

The point is that it is extremely doubtful that Israel could conduct a comprehensive ethnic cleansing campaign without the active support and participation of an overwhelming majority of Israelis, and getting such an overwhelming majority to directly join in such a program seems unlikely at best.

V. Effects for Israel

Realistically speaking, the effects of engaging in such an operation would likely be completely disastrous for Israel on many different levels, even – as noted above – ignoring potential international intervention. As described below, not only is it unlikely that such a program would resolve most of the existing issues faced by Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but it would probably exacerbate many of them while placing a much greater strain on the Israeli state.

a. Expanding Military Occupation

As noted previously, one of the primary objections to a viable Palestinian state within Israel/Palestine is that Israeli security concerns completely rule out the notion of affording the Palestinians free control of their own borders, immigration policy, and trade – import/export – policy. If this is true for any Palestinian state inside Palestine/Israel, it is also true for any Palestinian state on the border. This means that Israel would have to maintain control over whatever territory is chosen as a destination for the ethnic cleansing program. Thus, after the operation was completed, Israel would remain locked in an indefinite military occupation of territory that it has even less of a claim to than the current Occupied Palestinian Territories.

b. More Arabs under Israeli control

Although a successful “transfer” scheme would ultimately result in less – or even no – Arabs within Israel/Palestine itself, the number of Arabs under permanent Israeli control would in fact increase. This is because not only would most of the Palestinians remain under Israeli control; to these would be added whatever Arab population was already resident in the destination territory. Although it is likely that Israel would institute various self-administration partial-autonomy measures, in the end the actual number of Arabs under Israeli military control would increase and these too would have valid grievances and claims against Israel.

c. Encouraging Jewish Emigration

For such a policy to be put into practice, a strong majority of Israelis would have to support – and actively participate – in the process. In that most Israelis, especially the more liberal secularists most likely to oppose such a measure, are well-educated and have marketable skills; it seems probable that those strongly opposed to ethnic cleansing would take advantage of their opportunities and would emigrate from Israel/Palestine. As of 2004 there were already some 760,000 Israelis living abroad full-time [77] and the adoption of such a policy could only result in even more leaving Israel permanently. Although after a successful ethnic cleansing operation the perceived “demographic crisis” within Israel/Palestine would be at least temporarily resolved; Israel would still be forced to constantly increase the gross number of Israeli Jews resident in Israel/Palestine to maintain the new status quo. Thus emigration would undermine the sustainability of the new situation in much the same way it undermines the current status quo.

d. Discouraging Jewish Immigration

Despite the blind eye turned toward Israeli actions and gross double standards applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, most non-Israeli Jews, being both minorities and the targets of hate groups, tend to be disposed toward a liberal and tolerant outlook. It is only by ignoring Israeli behavior and myopically focusing on the worst extremes of Palestinian reaction that are they able to maintain this double-standard regarding Israeli treatment of the Palestinian people. However, modern communications – flashing images and testimony of actual events around the world in real time – has severely undermined their ability to ignore the Palestinian situation.

In a development as extreme as invasion, occupation and ethnic cleansing, most non-Israeli Jews would find it virtually impossible to continue turning a blind eye to Israeli behavior, forcing them to literally choose between whatever ostensible connection they have to Israel and their general world view and outlook. In such a scenario and in view of current trends – an increase in Jewish dissent from orthodox Zionist ideology [78] – it is not unreasonable to believe that a significant number, perhaps even a majority, of non-Israeli Jews would repudiate Israel and Zionism. Further, even for those able to maintain the double-standard or those that believe ethnic cleansing is justifiable, in view of their relative security and prosperity elsewhere, it seems likely that few would choose to voluntarily hop into such a contentious situation by immigrating. It is one thing to support Israeli atrocity from the safety and security of the United States, but it is entirely another to move there and have your own children conscripted into the fighting. The probable result would be that immigration from the developed world – where the majority of non-Israeli Jews live – would decline dramatically; making Israel’s demographic situation even more precarious.

e. Extreme upsurge in Global Anti-Zionism

Regardless of the reaction of foreign governments and international formations, such a policy would inevitably result in a massive upsurge in popular global anti-Zionism and probably anti-Semitism as well by those who do not differentiate between Judaism and Zionism. Of course, Israel thrives on anti-Semitism, as it validates the entire Zionist project and encourages immigration, but as Israel is not economically self-sufficient, [79] it cannot turn its back on the rest of the world either. Therefore those Jews that flatly reject the ethnic cleansing policy – and thus refuse to immigrate to Israel – would be almost forced to become outspoken opponents of Israel and Zionism. The result would be even more Jewish dissidents strengthening the movement towards popular rejection of Zionism as an ethnocentric – racist - ideology and more clearly differentiating between racist anti-Semitism and humanist anti-Zionism.

VI. Conclusion

Although the threat of “transfer” – ethnic cleansing – has served as a dark shadow behind all Israeli measures related to the Palestinians, this article has tried to show that in reality it is largely an idle threat. Though such a policy could theoretically result in the ethnic “purification” of Israel/Palestine, it could only do so by radically expanding and exacerbating Israel’s current problems and would, in all probability, escalate the collapse of the entire Zionist enterprise.

When explored in some detail, the entire threat of ethnic cleansing as a viable option for Israel becomes much less likely and possibly even suicidal. Of course this means that the default – the sole remaining option – is some sort of co-existence model. Despite the threat of ethnic cleansing, it really is time that people devoted to finding a way out of the current impasse begin working on the ways and means of achieving peaceful co-existence within Israel/Palestine. Ethnic cleansing is simply not a real threat today and does not deserve the degree of serious consideration that it has been afforded by people both supporting the notion and fearing it.

Notes

*John Sigler is a writer and activist based in Denver, Colorado. Among the various projects he is currently involved with are the Colorado-Palestine Solidarity Campaign (http://colorado-palestine.blogspot.com/), Jewish Friends of Palestine (http://www.jewishfriendspalestine.org/), and the U.S. Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation. Recent independent side projects include the One State Online Bibliography Project (http://www.onestate.org/) and others.

[1] Ben Lynfield, "The Rise of Avigdor Lieberman," The Nation, 14 December 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070101/lynfield

[2] Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," (a.k.a. "The Mitchell Report"), U.S. Department of State, 30 April 2001, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm

[3] Geoffrey Aronson, "Separation Threatens to undermine Settlement," Settlement Report, July-August 2002, http://www.fmep.org/reports/vol12/no4/01-separation_threatens.html

[4] Graham Usher, “The unifying impact of the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Information Brief Number 51, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 3 November 2000, http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/pubs/20001103ib.html

[5] B’Tselem, “Illusions of Restraint: Human Rights Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories, September 29 – December 2, 2000,” B’Tselem Website, December 2000, http://www.btselem.org/Download/200012_Illusions_of_Restraint_Eng.doc

[6] David Makovsky, "Middle East Peace Through Partition," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2001, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010301faessay4261/david-makovsky/middle-east-peace-through-partition.html

[7] Yaakov Amidror, "Israel's Security: The Hard-Learned Lessons," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, http://www.meforum.org/article/575

[8] Steve Niva & Simona Sharoni, "Peace at Palestinian Expense," Z Magazine, March 1995, http://zena.secureforum.com/Znet/zmag/articles/mar95niva.htm

[9] Shlomo Ben-Ami, "Briefing by Acting Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami to the Diplomatic Corps" Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 October 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/7A3480ED-9DE8-44D4-A936-2AC11A7AE00D.htm

[10] Graham Usher, "Fatah's Tanzim: Origins and Politics," Middle East Report, Winter 2000, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_usher.html

[11] Suzanne Goldenberg, "Arafat faces open revolt," The Guardian, 1 October 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,561007,00.html

[12] John Ward Anderson & Molly Moore, "Palestinian Authority Broke and In Disarray; Collapse Is 'Real Possibility,'" Washington Post, 1 March 2004

[13] Jean Shaoul, "Fatah lines up behind Abbas and threatens Barghouti," World Socialist Web Site, 9 December 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/dec2004/abba-d09.shtml

[14] Graham Usher, "Palestine Militias Rising," The Nation, 11 April 2002, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020429/usher

[15] Karma Nabulsi, "This is an attempt to overturn our elections," The Guardian, 19 December 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,1975157,00.html

[16] Jonathan Broder, "The End," Salon, 16 January 1998, http://www.salon.com/news/1998/01/16news.html

[17] Avi Shavit, "Israeli Left should take responsibility for Oslo War," Ha'aretz, 22 February 2001, Reproduced online at: http://www.gamla.org.il/english/article/2001/feb/ari.htm

[18] Likud, "Platform," Excerpts reproduced on the Knesset Website in English: http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections/knesset15/elikud_m.htm

[19] Boris Shusteff, "Cutting Off Limbs," Gamla Shall Not Fall Again, 21 March 1999, http://www.gamla.org.il/english/article/1999/march/b2.htm

[20] Baruch Marzel, quoted in: Ellis Shuman, "Kach activist forms new party with goal of transferring out all Arabs," Israel Insider, 11 January 2004, http://web.israelinsider.com/bin/en.jsp?enPage=ArticlePage&enDisplay=view&enDispWhat=object&enDispWho=Article%5El3180&enZone=Politics&enVersion=0&

[21] Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey", (An interview with Shlomo Ben-Ami), Ha'aretz, 13 September 2001, excerpts online at: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=8212

[22] Chris McGreal, "Kadima wins Israel's general election as Likud humiliated," The Guardian, 29 March 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1741953,00.html

[23] Human Rights Watch, "Israel: 'Disengagement' Will Not End Gaza Occupation," Human Rights News, 29 October 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/10/29/isrlpa9577.htm

[24] Al-Haq, "A Year After 'Disengagement': Gaza Still Occupied and Under Attack," Electronic Intifada, 11 September 2006, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article5718.shtml

[25] Geneva Initiative - Israeli Palestinian Conflict Peace Agreement, http://www.geneva-accord.org/

[26] Danny Rubinstein, "PA: Arafat okayed Geneva Accord," Ha'aretz, 14 October 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=349493&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y

[27] Haithem El-Zabri, "Palestinians Outraged by Geneva Accord," Alaqsaintifada.Org, 19 October 2003, Reproduced at: http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Analysis/palestinians_outraged_by_geneva.htm

[28] Elaine Sciolino, “Informal Peace Plan for Mideast Is Unveiled in Geneva,” New York Times, 1 December 2003

[29] Ricki Hollander, "Backgrounder: 'Geneva Accords,'" CAMERA, 6 January 2006, http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=36&x_article=599

[30] Dan Leon, "Martin Buber and Jewish-Arab Peace," Cross Currents, Winter 1998-1999, http://www.crosscurrents.org/leon.htm

[31] One State Online Bibliography in English, http://www.onestate.org/

[32] JPost Staff, "Settlers brewing one-state solution," Jerusalem Post, 6 September 2006, Reproduced at: http://www.jnewswire.com/article/1085

[33] Ari Shavit, "Cry, the beloved two-state solution," Ha'aretz, 10 August 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=326324

[34] Chaim Simons, A Historical Survey of Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine, 1895-1947, Self-Published, Kiryat Arba, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Revised edition, 3 June 2003

[35] Rony E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study), Paris: Librairie Minard, 1959, p. 88.

[36] For example: “They will never enjoy rest. We will send death to every house, every city, every street in Israel.” Reuters, "Hamas cries for blood of assassins," Los Angeles Times, 23 March 2004, Reproduced at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/22/1079939588024.html?from=storyrhs

[37] Ali Abunimah, "Palestine/Israel: The end of the road for the two-state solution?," Lecture given at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 20 February 2004, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/lecturesarchive/abunimah.pdf

[38] Ari Shavit, “Survival of the fittest” (An interview with Benny Morris)," Ha'aretz, 9 January 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=380986

[39] Benny Morris, from: Ari Shavit, “Survival of the fittest” (An interview with Benny Morris)," Ha'aretz, 9 January 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=380986

[40] Eitan Bronstein, "The Nakba - an event that did not occur (although it had to occur)," Nakba in Hebrew, 14 December 2004, Reproduced online at: http://www.palestineremembered.com/Articles/General/Story1649.html

[41] Bradley Burston, "The new torah of Transfer," Ha'aretz, 4 October 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/770381.html

[42] Jessica Steinberg, "Slain Rehavam Ze'evi was known as an ultra-hawk," Jewish News Weekly of Northern California, 19 October 2001, http://www.jewishsf.com/content/2-0-/module/displaystory/story_id/17077/edition_id/336/format/html/displaystory.html

[43] Jonathan Cook, "Israel’s Or Commission Finds Evidence of “Shoot-to-Kill” Policy Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel," Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, July 2001, http://www.wrmea.com/archives/july01/0107008.html

[44] Asher Arian, "A Further Turn to the Right, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security - 2002" Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Strategic Assessment, June 2002, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v5n1p4Ari.html

[45] BADIL Resource Center, "The Right of Return: Palestinian Refugees and Prospects for a Durable Peace, BADIL Briefing Paper," BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights Website, 8 April 2000, http://tari.org/badil.htm

[46] Yulie Khromchenko, "Survey: Most Jewish Israelis support transfer of Arabs," Ha'aretz, 22 June 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=441681

[47] Matthew Wagner, "New proposal: Transfer-for-cash plan," Jerusalem Post, 21 January 2007, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1167467783009

[48] MIFTAH, "Fact Sheet: The Palestinian National Authority's Sources of Funding," MIFTAH - Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy Website, February 2006, http://www.miftah.org/Doc/Factsheets/MIFTAH/English/PA_Sources_of_Funding2.pdf

[49] A famous poll commissioned by a group supporting the “voluntary transfer” of ethnic undesirables (Arabs) from the “Jewish State” relates: "Close to 20% (17%) explicitly declare that if they had the ability and resources, they would relocate and permanently reside in some other country." Jerusalem Summit, “Poll among Palestinians favors Humanitarian Solution,” Jerusalem Summit Website, 22 November 2004, http://www.jerusalemsummit.org/eng/news.php?news=102

[50] Tanya Reinhart, Israel/ Palestine: How to End the War of 1948, Seven Stories Press, St. Paul (MN), 2002

[51] JPost Staff, "Palestinian emigration on the rise," Jerusalem Post, 1 November 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1161811251277

[52] Recognizing this problem, at least one Right-wing Israeli Jewish organization has been established to “assist” Palestinians with leaving and selling their landed property to Jews: Hamotzi-Assisted Emigration Services, http://www.emigrations.net/ See: Haim Shapiro, "New organization aims 'to empty the state of Arabs'," Jerusalem Post, 26 August 2002

[53] Benny Elon, "Jordan is the partner," Ha'aretz, 8 June 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=301018&contrassID=2&subContrassID=4&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y

[54] Global Exchange, "The Palestinian Diaspora: A History of Dispossession," Global Exchange Website, 2 October 2005, http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/mideast/palestine/refugeeFacts.html

[55] Daryl Temkin, "Purim and a Viable Palestinian Arab State," Arutz Sheva, 26 February 2007, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/6948

[56] Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine, Columbia University Press, 1988

[57] Lori Plotkin, Israel-Jordan Peace: Taking Stock, 1994-1997, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997

[58] Office of the Press Secretary, "Overview: U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA)," The United States White House Website, 28 September 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010928-12.html

[59] U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training & Instrumentation, "Press Release: Groundbreaking Ceremony Marks Counterterrorism Alliance," U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation Website, 14 November 2006, http://www.peostri.army.mil/PAO/pressrelease/KASOTCgroundbreaking.jsp

[60] Jack Khoury, "Report: Israeli spy network in Lebanon uncovered," Ha'aretz, 12 June 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=725940&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0

[61] Sherifa Shafie, "FMO Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon," Forced Migration Online, August 2003, http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo018/

[62] Yiftah S.Shapir, "Middle East Military Balance," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2006, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/

[63] Office of the United States Trade Representative, "United States, Egypt and Israel to Launch Historic Trade Partnership USTR Zoellick to Participate in Signing in Cairo," The Office of the United States Trade Representative Website, 10 December 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/December/United_States,_Egypt_Israel_to_Launch_Historic_Trade_Partnership_USTR_Zoellick_to_Participate_in_Signing_in_Cairo.html

[64] Charles Levinson, “$50 billion later, taking stock of US aid to Egypt,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 April 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html

[65] George W. Bush, "Remarks With Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak," U.S. Department of State Website, 12 April 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/31309.htm

[66] Yitzhak Benhorin, “Neocons: We expected Israel to attack Syria,” YNet News, 16 December 2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3340750,00.html

[67] John Pike, "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Chemical Weapons," GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/cw.htm

[68] John Pike, "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Missle Programs," GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/missile.htm

[69] Yaakov Katz, "Assad may attack if pressure escalates," Jerusalem Post, 9 February 2006, Reproduced online at: http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/jpost090206.html

[70] Robert E. Hunter & Seth G. Jones, "Building a Successful Palestinian State: Security," Rand Corporation, 2006, http://www.cmep.org/SharedJER/RAND_Pal_Security.pdf

[71] Benny Morris, "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948," Middle Eastern Studies, January 1986, pp. 5-19.

[72] For a collection of news reports and stories, see "Operation Defensive Shield" (March/April 2002)” presented by Electronic Intifada: http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/200.shtml

[73] B'Tselem, "Trigger Happy - Unjustified Gunfire and the IDF's Open-Fire Regulations during the al-Aqsa Intifada," B'Tselem Website, March 2002, http://www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Summaries/200203_Trigger_Happy.asp

[74] Attila Somfalvi, “Tel Aviv: Thousands rally against war,” YNet News, 22 July 2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3279792,00.html

[75] Peretz Kidron, "Yesh Gvul: a uniquely Israeli innovation in the culture of protest," Peace News, June-August 2002, http://www.peacenews.info/issues/2447/244732.html

[76] Yitzhak Laor, "In Hebron," London Review of Books, 22 July 2004, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n14/laor01_.html See also the website of the "Breaking the Silence" group: http://www.shovrimshtika.org/index_e.asp

[77] Gideon Alon, “760,000 Israelis have left the Promised Land,” Ha’aretz, 19 November 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=362237

[78] Gaby Wood, "The new Jewish question," The Observer, 11 February 2007, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,2010212,00.html

[79] Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," CRS [Congressional Research Service] Issue Brief for Congress - CRS Web, 26 April 2005, http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/israel_asst.pdf "Israel is not economically self-sufficient, and relies on foreign assistance and borrowing to maintain its economy."

Contra Michael Neumann & his "snake oil"

2007-05-27T22:25:00.001-06:00

Contra Michael Neumann & his “snake oil”
By John Sigler, 27 May 2007

I. Preliminary Notes and Observations

On May 15, 2007, Michael Neumann - the Canadian academic, writer, and outspoken advocate for Palestine – had an article entitled “Two States, One State and Snake Oil” published at Counterpunch.

Like many of those hostile to one state advocacy, Neumann’s credentials in support of the Palestinian people are impeccable, so this should be seen as an argument among friends. This author flatly rejects the contention by Uri Avnery that there can be “no compromise”[1] between one state supporters and two state supporters; instead agreeing with the Jewish Voice for Peace position: “the situation is so dire and so far away from a permanent resolution that allowing academic debates over one or two state solutions to divide us does not make sense to us.” [2]

That being said, Neumann’s “Two States, One State and Snake Oil” is a direct attack on modern one state advocacy that deserves analysis and refutation. The over all gist of the piece is that modern integrationist one state advocacy is “cheap” and “is sold without a price tag” and is therefore “snake oil,” or a magical cure all that cannot be taken seriously. While there are a myriad of apparently random attacks on various aspects of one state advocacy, the key argument tends to focus on the settlements and settlers, arguing that removing the Israeli settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), is a much more realistic option than challenging the dominant role of the Zionist ideology in both Israel Proper (pre-1967) and the OPTs collectively. This is not an uncommon argument and deserves to be addressed, as will be done in the following deconstruction of the article in question.

One observation that should be noted is that in his book “The Case Against Israel,” Neumann identifies the political ideology of Zionism as being more or less the root of the conflict, but then goes on to validate this ideology by arguing that the solution is for Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders. While sharing the view that the ethnocentric and exclusivist ideology of Zionism is the root of the problem, many one state supporters argue that as such, this should be the target of our activism. In other words, that the physical manifestation of this ideology – the modern state of Israel and the only functional governmental authority in all of Israel/Palestine – is not the problem in of itself, but instead can serve as an effective foundation for the creation of a post-Zionist ethnically-neutral state encompassing all of Israel/Palestine.

II. Deconstruction and Refutation

1. Paragraphs 1-3

Neumann begins his article by constructing a disingenuous “straw man” that is promptly toppled by the end of the third paragraph. A not uncommon rhetorical device, in this instance it is accomplished by describing the old 1960’s PLO one state proposition, specifically that most – or even all – Jews that have immigrated to Palestine over the past hundred years or so as part of the Zionist project simply pack up and leave, leaving the land to the Palestinians. Neumann finds this proposition “unattainable but otherwise unobjectionable” and promptly tears down his construction by saying “I don’t feel there’s the slightest chance that Israelis would accept a one-state solution as described….”

The clear intent is to associate one state advocacy in general with what amounts to a completely unrealistic scenario as an opening salvo. In reality, this “straw man” construct has no bearing on the issue at all. One of the core assumptions of modern one state advocacy is that both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are “there to stay” and thus have to find some realistic way to co-exist within the confines of modern Israel/Palestine. A few marginal fringe elements notwithstanding, in general no serious advocate for the modern one state position argues for Israeli Jews to leave en masse. In fact, such a position completely defeats the purpose of modern one state advocacy as if this was seen as a realistic option then the old PLO model would be the rallying cry: “One Palestinian State” as opposed to the actual position of one democratic secular state for all its people regardless of ethnicity or religion.

2. Paragraph 4

Paragraph four is essentially an attack on modern one state advocacy arguing that the promise of one democratic secular state is “cheap,” i.e. that neither side has much to lose in adopting this strategy.

It is true that in general the modern one state camp argues that the transition away from exclusionary nationalism is easier than changing all elements of the physical reality on the ground, but this assertion is not based on the supposition that such an ideological transformation is “easy” per se; instead it is based on the notion that this transformation is already well underway. Modern one state advocacy is merely the logical result of current trends on both sides of the divide.

On the Palestinian side of the equation, the “vanguard” of the movement is the 1948 Palestinians that hold Israeli citizenship. This camp has become dramatically more outspoken in recent years, as exemplified by the recent release of “The Future Vision” paper by the Israeli Palestinian leadership [3] and Adalah’s “The Democratic Constitution” document [4]. Within the OPTs, popular support for a bi-national state has remained within the 25% to 35% range for the last few years [5] and this is a trend that is growing. With the refusal of Israel to end the effective occupation of Gaza even after “Disengagement” and the continued expansion of both the Wall and settlements in the West Bank, it is only logical that an ever increasing number of Palestinians are reaching the realization that a truly sovereign Palestinian state is not in the cards. Among the external refugees, especially those most desperately interested in return like those in Lebanon, many of their claims are focused inside the Green Line, and therefore it is unlikely that concentration in a Palestinian statelet would be considered an acceptable resolution to their situation.

On the Israeli side, despite the official standing of the Zionist ideology and its outspoken propaganda efforts, on the individual level many Israelis do not consider the notion of maintaining Zionist supremacy worth the effort. This trend is known as Post-Zionism and was well documented by Yoram Hazony in his desperate appeal for a rejuvenation of Zionist enthusiasm [6]. However, more than just an intellectual exercise, the trend is graphically illustrated in the number of Israelis choosing to voluntarily emigrate abroad. Already by 1993 some 760,000 Israelis had already emigrated abroad [7], though for demographic purposes they are still counted among “Israelis” with the false implication that they actually live in Eretz Israel. Further this is a trend that continues to increase as illustrated in recent media reports about how emigration has now overtaken immigration among Israeli Jews [8]. Quite simply, younger Israelis, like younger Jews of other cultures, are no longer locked in the persecution complex that demands an ethnocentric and exclusive “Jewish State” today and there can be no bolder statement of this than the emigration trends from Israel.

The one state advocate is not generally arguing that shedding ethnocentric and exclusionary ideology is a “cheap” or easy undertaking, but that it is a current reality happening by itself without any external stimuli. In the absence of the ideological demands for exclusivity and ethnic domination – on both sides – the one state proposition is both logical and realistic. Of course this is not to argue that there aren’t many obstacles to overcome – all one state advocates concede this – but that the obstacles are ones of ideology and attitude as opposed to physical separatist schemes.

3. Paragraphs 5-9

The focus of this section of the article is a series of random attacks on various aspects of the common one state practice of drawing inspiration and examples from the South African experience. Neumann quite correctly points out that many modern one state advocates – including this writer – rely heavily on the South African example and then he moves on to point out some of the key differences between South Africa and Israel/Palestine. However, this is something of another “straw man” construct as no one argues that the two situations are/were identical or that the significant differences should be ignored. It is not difficult to point out significant differences, but this does not invalidate many similarities either; the proposition that “no comparison is valid unless all comparisons are valid” is patent nonsense.

Neumann’s first line of attack relates to land and resources:

“South Africa is big (1,219,912 sq km), Palestine tiny (26,320 square kms). South Africa resource-rich, Palestine resource-poor. What is tolerable in South Africa is by no means tolerable in Palestine: the extraordinary magnanimity of South Africa's current leaders towards the white population is based on an abundance of land and resources not available in the Israel/Palestine conflict.”

Of course this is a legitimate difference, but it is also a misleading one. Both South Africa and Israel/Palestine are modern states whose primary economic strength is urban and industrial/technological in nature with the rural agricultural sector playing a secondary role. The same is true in modern Israel and would be true in the OPTs if they were allowed to develop without the retarding influence if the Israeli military occupation. The modern rural Afrikaner farms and African farming villages play an important sentimental role, but are not driving forces of the modern state and the same could be realized in Israel/Palestine. There is nothing to say that there cannot be small “Jews Only” rural kibbutzim or “Arab Only” farming villages in a united democratic state because the real economic power will remain urban and industrial/technological in nature.

Neumann then moves on to make a quick observation regarding the demographic differences, that are real enough but also relatively immaterial to the overall one state perspective. The demographic balance already slightly favors the Palestinians [9] and this is a trend that will only continue. Nevertheless, even this constitutes something of an argument in favor of a one state accommodation as to paraphrase noted Israeli one state supporter Daniel Gavron, it behooves Israeli Jews reach an accommodation from a position of strength before demographics erode it.

Neumann then moves on to a very valid point:

“When at last South African whites made serious concessions, it was not because they were awed by the fortitude of Nelson Mandela or crushed by economic boycotts. It was because violence within South Africa's borders was spiraling out of control.”

This is a valid observation. Unlike some of the self-congratulatory arguments presented by some of the anti-Apartheid activists abroad [10] it was of course the domestic opposition – much of which was violent – that really forced the white population to come to terms with the situation [11]. Similarly, the uprisings in the OPTs have also played a pivotal role in the Israel/Palestine conflict. It is almost impossible to believe that the Madrid or Oslo talks would have come about were it not for the First Intifada and similarly that Israel would be paying any attention whatsoever to the Palestinian issue if it wasn’t for the current hostilities, as has been repeatedly illustrated in times of relative Palestinian docility, 1967-1987 and 1993-1996. While clearly differentiating between terrorism and legal armed resistance [12], it cannot be realistically denied that violent pressure is required to keep the issue on the table at all. In so many words, the Palestinians only have one thing to offer that Israel really wants and needs and that is peace, so they would be foolish to surrender this one bargaining chip for anything less than an acceptable resolution to the issue.

However, Neumann then continues on to conclude that: “Israel does not fear massive violent unrest within its own borders. Israeli Arab rioters will not bring it down.”

What is neglected here is that the same was true in Apartheid South Africa. In a feat of strength, the African opposition had virtually no chance of forcibly bringing down Apartheid either. It was suggested that if it the whites chose to fight it out to the bitter end, they could have maintained their system for another couple of decades through increased armed repression and violence. Similarly no one – even most of the Palestinian militants that have discussed it publicly – believe that they can bring down the Israeli system through sheer force of arms; but they do recognize the vital role for continued resistance to maintain the pressure. This is standard guerrilla strategy in asymmetric conflicts, use violence to keep up the pressure though recognizing that victory will not be won through this tactic alone. Both sides of the conflict in South Africa and Israel/Palestine essentially hit an impasse; the insurgents couldn’t overthrow the existing system by force, but the existing system couldn’t eliminate the violent opposition either. In South Africa, the whites recognized this impasse and opted to compromise from a position of strength because time was against them; and most one state advocates argue that it is only a matter of time before Israelis reach this same conclusion.

So Neumann is correct, Palestinian resistance will not bring down the Zionist system, then again, African resistance could not bring down the Apartheid system either. Instead the goal is a strategic shift in the thinking of the dominant group that is/was the goal and this is realizable.

4. Paragraph 10

This paragraph makes two distinct arguments. The first is that the Zionist drive for a “Jewish State” is more deeply felt than the Afrikaner belief that white supremacy was fundamental to their national survival; and the second is that the world community lends more legitimacy to this article of faith among Zionist ideologues than it ever did for the similar case presented by Afrikaner nationalists.

Neumann writes:

“Finally and crucially, Israel's attachment to its existence as a Jewish state runs far deeper than the Boers' attachment to apartheid, because Israel thinks of itself as the sole barrier to the physical extermination of the Jewish race.”

Anyone who has bothered to read the writings of Afrikaner nationalists recognizes immediately how absurd this contention is. The Afrikaner people represent a unique national grouping unlike any other people – very much as Israeli Jews constitute a completely unique Jewish nationality unlike any other, even other Jewish communities – and as such they fervently believed in no uncertain terms that the maintenance of white supremacy against the “black menace” was absolutely vital for maintaining their national existence. In fact, the Afrikaner arguments were almost identical to Zionist arguments today, from the threat of being “driven into the sea” and/or otherwise exterminated to arguments that their right to national self-determination precludes accommodation with fellow residents of the same country that are not part of the nation. The arguments of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) – the Afrikaner “think-tank” that justified and defended Apartheid – almost exactly parallel similar arguments presented today by the World Zionist Organization and similar formations. The hard-core Afrikaner nationalist saw the white supremacy of Apartheid as “the sole barrier to the physical extermination” of the Afrikaner people just as fervently as any avid Zionist sees the same in Israel.

In the second part of the argument, Neumann writes:

“This commitment is fervently supported by the great powers; its legitimacy is an article of faith: in marked contrast, it was the *ill*egitimacy of South Africa's apartheid state that became an article of faith among those same great powers. In other words, international support for Israel's current status is mountainously greater than support for South Africa's apartheid.”

It is certainly true that the world community in general, and especially the dominant “First World” states, have afforded Zionist ideology and its claims vastly more legitimacy and justification than they ever extended to the exact same arguments made by the Afrikaners. However, the last 20 years of Palestinian struggle (beginning with the start of the First Intifada and continuing to the present) coupled with the fact that Jews – in fact a majority of Jews – live throughout the “First World” and live well there, has utterly undermined the central Zionist thesis, namely that Israel is an absolute requirement for the continuation of the Jewish people. A review of United Nations voting patterns [13] clearly illustrates that if it were not for US diplomatic pressure and protection, most of the world community – including most of the “First World” - would have long ago imposed South African-style sanctions against Israel pending a mutually acceptable resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians. In effect, the empirical voting record of the United Nations as well as other international bodies (such as the Conference of Signatory Powers to the Geneva Conventions) graphically illustrates the invalidity of Neumann’s contention.

5. Paragraphs 11-24

This section of the article is focused primarily on the issue of Palestinian land claims. One of the interesting elements of this portion of the article is the “shift” from individual to collective rights within the space four paragraphs (11-14). In paragraph 11 Neumann invalidates a comparison – not unreasonably – with South Africa by focusing on the individual land claims, correctly pointing out that precise land ownership in Israel/Palestine is much better documented than was the case in much (though not all) of South Africa. However, by paragraph 14, in presenting his argument for a resolution of the issue, he completely discards the individual land claims in favor of collective national rights, namely that everything in the OPTs becomes “Palestinian” and that’s that. However, if you are to discard the individual land claims in favor of collective rights, the South African example regains some of its appeal and the issue becomes solvable within a one state model.

Land claims and restitution are issues that are hotly contested even within the one state camp. So the view expressed here should not be taken as that of anyone else. The following is just one of a number of proposed resolutions to the issues raised by Neumann.

For the record, the exact restitution of properties is not mandated by international law as exemplified by U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 [14]. Secondly, an exact restitution is made inviable by 60 years of radical transformation under Israeli auspices; one claimant might find his property is now a high rise apartment building housing hundreds, while another might find his traditional land is now a landfill. Thirdly, since entire generations of refugees have been born since 1948, it has to be assumed that virtually any property from 1948 would today have a myriad of legitimate claimants making exact restitution virtually impossible. If one accepts these arguments – or any of a number of others - as ruling out exact individual restitution as a possibility, one must by necessity accept the contention that a just resolution to the refugee claims has to be treated collectively.

In fact, this is exactly what Neumann suggests in paragraph 14:

“In a two-state solution, land claims are settled in the clearest and most brutal way. The Jewish settlers in the occupied territories leave, period. The whole of the occupied territories belong to the Palestinians. In Israel, the property situation is essentially unchanged, with Israeli Arabs doing as well as they can. Though immeasurably better than the death and starvation that today stalks the Palestinians, this is a bad solution. But it is doable, and its flaws are out in the open.”

Completely discarding the obvious moral and justice related problems with this proposal, there is a much more salient and practical objection, namely could a Palestinian statelet – even granting the unfounded premise that this involved a total Israeli withdrawal and complete Palestinian control of their own borders and resources – physically sustain an influx of Palestinian refugees? While in such a scenario those refugees with acceptable alternatives would probably choose financial compensation over return, those in more dire circumstances – such as those in Lebanon and Iraq – would have little choice but to accept the offer of “return” to the 22% of Palestine that would comprise the Palestinian state.

Even in the most optimistic models – and assuming a total lack of Israeli interference and extremely generous international support – it would take the Palestinian statelet decades to recover from the Israeli occupation and to create a functional enterprise. At the same time, already existing population pressures due to natural growth would only increase creating a situation in the West Bank similar to the one that already exists in Gaza; an enormous population of people in abject poverty with no realistic chance at improving their lot. Is it realistic to expect such an entity to also take responsibility for major segments of the external refugee population as well?

Another of the key elements of modern one state advocacy is that even given ideal circumstances (a complete and total Israeli withdrawal, complete lack of Israeli interference, fully supportive neighboring states, and extremely generous international support), the 22% of Palestine under discussion is simply not large enough, or has the requisite resources, to address the Palestinian issue realistically, especially once the external refugees are added to the equation.

In view of the above, Neumann prudently writes the following:

“And how does this work in the snake oil one-state solution? Here the sales pitch gets murky. In Israel, Jewish property holders either keep what they have, or the disputes continue as they have since before Israel's foundation--it isn't clear. In the occupied territories, though, the settlers get a sweet deal: Jews in the occupied territories simply keep what they have.”

Neumann is very much correct in pointing out that few one state advocates have even suggested a resolution to these issues; however the following represents one proposed solution to the problem.

Granting the previously established premise that individual restitution isn’t a realistic option, the question has to be answered from the perspective of collective rights as opposed to exact restitution of exact properties. In such a scenario the fact that most land is owned not by individuals but by the state provides the answer. Within the Green Line, some 93% of the land is owned by the state and within the OPTs more than 50% of the land has been placed under the ownership of the state [15] including most of the land upon which settlements exist.

First, what privately held land there is should remain privately held by its rightful owners. Should the ownership of such privately held land be contested, the matter should be brought before the courts and the resolution should be based on the merits of the specific case. This does NOT include land held by the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael) inside the Green Line whose lands are governed by the Israeli Land Authority and have been held by the courts to represent Israeli State Lands [16]. Lands held in the OPTs owned by the World Zionist Organization, another pseudo-governmental formation, are also to be considered state land and not private property. UN controlled property, the refugee camps, would also be considered state land.

With respect to state lands, the issue isn’t one of private property rights opposed to state control, but one of non-discriminatory access; a matter of legislation. Using existing Israeli legislation [17] in a non-discriminatory manner as well as existing Israeli legal precedent stemming from the measures taken to integrate previous mass inflows of Jewish olim, the state could easily accommodate the entire Palestinian population, including those external refugees opting for return. Interestingly, Israel’s own unique experience in accepting and integrating large numbers of foreign olim gives it ample experience – as well as an already existing legal/social infrastructure – for integrating large numbers of people who are essentially foreign in every respect. Israel already has the ability to fully house and integrate – with decent conditions – the entire Palestinian population without radically altering the state or harming existing property holders. On the Palestinian side, it wouldn’t be a perfect solution, but it would still be vastly superior to the current situation in the refugee camps and the like.

Finally, who gets to live where? Private land holders should be able to include or exclude who they like, thus the ethnically exclusive kibbutzim or Palestinian villages alluded to previously. However, state lands would have to adopt a non-discriminatory premise, meaning that whoever has the money to purchase a lease should be allowed to do so regardless of ethnicity or religion. Obviously, due to the wealth disparity, many of the well-to-do neighborhoods would see virtually no change at first. The majority of Palestinians would end up in government subsidized communities on state lands, probably with lease restrictions. As for the existing settlements, being almost exclusively on state land, they would have to be open to integration, a process that would probably involve massive security expenditure at first, on par with the forcible integration of institutions in the United States after Brown vs. Board of Education. As for the existing settlers, they could stay or go as they see fit, and being in better financial circumstances they would have a wider range of options available to them.

The above represents one of many proposed solutions to the questions raised by Neumann with respecting to land claims, housing, the settlements and integration.

6. Paragraphs 25-26

The point of these two paragraphs is that it is much easier to remove the settlers than to expect a major ideological shift and the examples of Gaza and Algeria are cited. As commented on previously, the ideological shift is happening on its own quite naturally; so the new question raised here is: would moving the settlers really be easier?

Even if we discard the more important issues (Israeli security, natural resources, Palestinian border control and import/export policy, &c. [18]) and accept Neumann’s premise that if only the settlers could be removed a two state solution would be virtually accomplished, a review of the political climate shows that this isn’t even under consideration, much less in the offing. In a strictly technical sense, Neumann’s observations in these paragraphs are quite legitimate, specifically that the settlements and settlers are not self-sufficient and could not exist without the encouragement, support, and protection of the Israeli state. But this argument rests upon the premise that the Israeli state could be convinced to withdraw this support, something of the standard two state case. However, there are three primary problems here: first there is the character of the settlements and settlers themselves, second there is Israel’s dependency on coalition governments to do anything, and finally there is the very simple lack of Israeli will to change its policy.

To quote Elyakim Ha’etzni:

“The settlers who moved into the house in Hebron and those who plan to march on Homesh today, … are seeking to correct the mistaken belief that the Israeli regime can survive the expulsion of 300,000 people as easily as it survived the expulsion of 8,000… . We must go back to the first grade of pioneering Zionism, on which all of this was built.” [19]

This statement is quite accurate despite the fact that it excludes the 160,000 additional settlers that reside in and around Jerusalem/Al Quds. Quite simply you have almost half a million fully armed, militarily-trained settlers living in the West Bank thriving with the active collaboration and cooperation of the Israeli military [20], even when such collaboration and cooperation runs contrary to official IDF policy. Further, in the wake of the “Disengagement” from Gaza (most of whose settlers relocated to the West Bank [21]), the settlers are reorganizing their political apparatus [22] and increasing their violence against Palestinians [23]. Ha’etzni is quite correct in pointing out that removing hundreds of thousands of settlers is a very different undertaking than removing 8,000 isolated and fenced off settlers from Gaza. Even the bribery technique that convinced most of the Gaza settlers to leave voluntarily – some $200,000 to $350,000 per family [24] – isn’t an option in the West Bank due to the sheer numbers of settlers. Of course Neumann could be right in suggesting that if the Israeli state leaves the OPTs, the settlers will come running right behind and this brings us to the second problem.

The second question is whether or not any Israeli government could remove the settlers due to its political structure. Israel has a proportional multi-party political structure and throughout Israeli history, every government – without exception – has been a coalition government. In many respects this system is more democratic than one- or two-party systems, but at the same time it gives minority parties significant leverage. This means that for a real Israeli withdrawal to even be a possibility, the Israeli public would have to elect a Knesset that is utterly dominated by parties and groups that would be willing to simply leave the OPTs – and following Neumann’s suggestion – leave the settlers behind on the assumption that they would quickly follow the state’s forces behind the Green Line. In order for Neumann’s scenario to work, Israeli citizens would have to elect a strong majority to the Knesset that would be willing to simply turn its back on some 460,000 Israeli citizen settlers on the hope that they would be smart enough to come running “home” afterwards. Discarding the simple fact that absolutely no Israeli political party would – or probably even could – adopt such a platform and maintain any relevance, it is at least theoretically possible, which brings us to the third problem.

Specifically, the third problem rest with Israeli popular will to end the occupation. Poll data does suggest that a majority of the Israelis residing within the Green Line are in general opposed to the settlements, or at least those that are not part of Greater Jerusalem, and is the basis of the Zionist Left’s two state advocacy. However, poll numbers notwithstanding, this alleged majority has never – through forty years of occupation and fifteen years of negotiation – managed to even stop its government’s support of settlement expansion, much less press for withdrawal. Without exception, all Israeli governments since 1967 – Labour, Likud or Kadima – have pressed forward with settlement expansion and are continuing to do so even to this day. [25] Over the last forty years there has only been one brief period when the government stopped all settlement expansion, a period that lasted a few months during the presidency of George H.W. Bush and was literally imposed by the U.S. through then Secretary of State James Baker, and he remains vilified by the Zionist Right to this day because of it. [26] By almost all accounts Israel is a democracy, at least for its Jewish population, therefore the only real conclusion is that either the Israeli majority supporting withdrawal is a myth or that most Israelis, while opposed in principle, don’t really consider the settlements – and by extension the two state solution and the continuation of a “Jewish State” – all that important.

Either way, there is no where near the required popular will to see an Israeli withdrawal from the OPTs as a realistic possibility at present. Even if there were this political will – as the Zionist Left still claims – then it is extremely doubtful whether or not that will would translate into a Knesset capable of maintaining a government that attempted a withdrawal. And finally, even if there were the will and they managed to elect a government strong enough to carry out a withdrawal, due to the sheer numbers of settlers in the West Bank and the religious significance of that region, the level of forced withdrawal – and the subsequent national trauma – would be of an entirely different magnitude than the small withdrawals from Yamit or Gaza.

So, would it truly be easier to remove the settlers than it would be to encourage already existing trends in promoting a shift away from ethnocentric and exclusionary nationalism? Reasonable people may disagree in answering this question, but the notion of simply “removing the settlers” is certainly as cheap – if not more so – than any suggestion coming from the one state camp. At least the one state argument against the nationalist ideologies reflects a current and growing trend whereas forcibly evicting 460,000 Israeli settlers most certainly does not.

7. Paragraph 27

In paragraph 27, Neumann opposes the one state movement on the grounds that it validates the Israeli settler movement and the settlements and “means a great big pat on the back for the very worst, least conciliatory, most violent political forces in Israel, the spoilt, fanatic racial supremacists who conceived the settler movement and made it into the formidable force it is today.”

By this, it has to be assumed the “very worst, least conciliatory, most violent political forces in Israel” being discussed is every democratically elected Israeli government since 1967 “who conceived the settler movement and made it into the formidable force it is today.” In this, he is correct. The entire premise of the one state notion is an acceptance of Israel as a de facto reality that isn’t “going anywhere” just as it accepts the Palestinian people as a de facto reality that isn’t “going away” either. From the beginning of the occupation, every Israeli government set out on a deliberate policy of making separation impossible – just as the vast majority of Palestinians decided they would not be chased out of their country a second time – and both have succeeded in these goals. The one state argument is that separation is no longer an option and in the absence of this possibility there is only one viable alternative.

8. Paragraph 28

This concluding paragraph is just a rather crude attack on Jeff Halper and Virginia Tilley as well as the one state idea in general. His final line – “Humpty Dumpty couldn't have got it more ass-backwards.” – summarizes both his opinion and this paragraph more than adequately. There is nothing to respond to here as everyone is welcome to their own opinion.

III. Concluding Thoughts

This article was chosen to introduce this blog project because it touched on a number common attacks against one state advocacy and raised some legitimate questions and concerns. Contrary to Neumann’s suggestion, a two state solution is no closer than a one state option; neither can be implemented tomorrow nor will be. In fact, it seems that either option is at least a couple decades away from being realizable and if one accepts this, one has to take into account the realities as they will be then. Virtually all one state supporters concede that this notion is a long term idea but also believe that this will be the only route to a viable sustainable permanent peace. This is NOT to argue against palliative measures to relieve the current situation, but only Israel can implement these and it has made it clear that it’s idea of a two state option is either a series of ghettos (like modern Qalqilyah) or a completely controlled little Palestinian Bantustan (like the Palestine Authority during Oslo); and in the end, these options will not result in a lasting peace.

Notes:

[1] Uri Avnery, “One State: Solution or Utopia,” Uri Avnery’s Column (Gush Shalom), 12 May 2007

[2] Jewish Voice for Peace, “JVP Deeply Appreciates Rabbi Lerner's Apology,” Email to JVP list, 12 May 2007

[3] National Committee for the heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, 2006, (English)

[4] Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), The Democratic Constitution, March 2007, (English)

[5] See the routine polls conducted by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC), online at: http://www.jmcc.org/

[6] Yoram Hazony, The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel’s Soul, 2000, Basic Books,

[7] Gideon Alon,"760,000 Israelis have left the Promised Land," Ha'aretz, 19 November 2003

[8] For example, "Emigration from Israel exceeds immigration, report," German Press Agency (DPA), 20 April 2007

[9] Michael Brown, Ali Abunimah, Nigel Parry, “EI Exclusive: Palestinian population exceeds Jewish population says U.S. government” Electronic Intifada, 1 March 2005

[10] For example, George W Shepherd Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western policy in the Liberation of South Africa, 1977, Greenwood Press

[11] For a good introduction to the matter, see: William Cobbett and Robin Cohen, eds. Popular Struggles in South Africa, 1988, Africa World Press

[12] John Sigler, “Palestine: Legitimate Armed Resistance vs. Terrorism,” Electronic Intifada, 17 May 2004

[13] American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, “United Nations Voting Records,” Jewish Virtual Library Website (pro-Zionist source), undated

[14] The resolution “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;” U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, Para.11

[15] B’Tselem, Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002, B’Tselem Website

[16] Uri Avnery, “Abolish the JNF,” ZNet, 21 April 2007,

[17] For example: Agricultural Control Authority Law (5748-1988), Agricultural Settlement (Restrictions on Use of Agricultural Land and of Water) Law (5727-1967), Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law (5710-1950), Development Towns and Development Zones Law (5748-1988), Planning and Building Law (5725—1965), State Property Law (5711-1951), et al.

[18] To quote some of my own comments on this topic made at Realistic Dove at: http://www.realisticdove.org/archives/103#comments

“First there is the issue of borders. Israel’s argument – which is fairly legitimate – is that if a Palestinian state has control of its own borders, esp. in respect to import/export policy and immigration, the Palestinian state would be able to (or assuming the Palestinian gov’t was acting in good faith, its militants would be able to take advantage of corruption to) import all manner of advanced weaponry and/or volunteer fighters resulting in intolerable cross border security situation for Israel. Giving the legitimacy of this concern, the net result is that the borders of the Palestinian Bantustan would remain under Israeli control either directly or indirectly (via the use of international intermediaries, but with an Israeli security override along the lines of the current Gaza crossing into Egypt) thereby placing all external trade and population movement under perpetual Israeli control. This is absolutely unacceptable in any and all Palestinian-supported two-state scenarios.

“Second there is the natural resources issue, which is interpreted as a security matter (http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-29781-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html). This primarily relates to water presently, though once the natural gas deposits off the Gaza coast are tapped, this will be included as well. The key points of contention at present are access to the Jordan River and the West Bank aquifers. As it is, the Jordan River is already under severe threat due to its exploitation by Israel and Jordan even with the existing extreme restrictions on Palestinian water usage in the West Bank (http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/JORDAN.HTM). A sovereign Palestinian state would demand an extreme upsurge in Palestinian access to Jordan River water, a drain that would be not be workable unless Israel dropped its usage, which isn’t on the agenda. In all Israeli-backed plans for a two-state solution, Israel maintains control of the Jordan Valley in part to control the borders and in part to maintain control over the water.

The West Bank aquifers are also being taxed to an extreme today and Israel’s answer is not to stop using the aquifers for its own purposes (most of northern Israel relies on the W. Bank aquifers) but that the Palestinian statelet is to acquire its water from a massive desalination facility in Caesaria – within Israel Proper - instead (http://www.countercurrents.org/pa-pearce210604.htm). This clearly tightens the Bantustan’s dependency on Israel allowing Israel to simply “turn off the water” should the Bantustan misbehave in some way, the same way Israel controls most of the electricity in Gaza. It is a control mechanism that again is completely and utterly incompatible with any Palestinian-supported notion of independence or acceptable vision for a Palestinian state.

“Third, there is the issue of a functioning Palestinian government that would be required to administrate the Bantustan and is plainly a requirement for security. However, as most honest observers will grant, there is no functioning Palestinian government at all and since neither the PLO nor the PA were designed to serve this function (as discussed in more detail on the other thread) there isn’t even the pretense to a starting point. In this case you end up with something of a Catch-22, an effective Palestinian governmental structure can’t be established as long as Israel maintains direct military occupation (as any such entity would either have to comply with Israeli administration, meaning it is viewed domestically as a quisling force OR it could try to function independently, meaning it would have to be established under IDF fire) and at the same time, Israeli security demands that military occupation be maintained until there is a effective Palestinian government.”

[19] Cited in Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Living Without A Solution – Forty Years of Occupation and Settlement,” Settlement Report, Vol. 17 No. 3, May - June 2007

[20] B’Tselem, Foreseen but not Prevented: The Performance of Law Enforcement Authorities in Responding to Settler Attacks on Olive Harvesters, B’Tselem Website, 2 December 2002

[21] Greg Myre, “Many Evicted Gaza Settlers Go to West Bank, at Least at First,” New York Times, 23 August 2005

[22] Nadav Shragai, "Yesha Council hopes makeover will renew its political relevance," Ha'aretz, 10 May 2007

[23] Ahmad Jaradat and Anahi Ayala Iacucci, "Israeli Settler Attacks in the OccupiedPalestinian Territories During April 2007 ," Alternative Information Center, May 2007

[24] Nathaniel Popper, "Gaza Settlers Brace for Disengagement," The Forward, 28 January 2005

[25] Foundation for Middle East Peace, "A New Era of Settlement Expansion in Jerusalem and Environs Begins" Settlement Report, Vol. 17 No. 2, March-April 2007

[26] Herb Keinon, "Israel should embrace, not fear, James Baker," Jerusalem Post, 21 November 2006

Introducing this Blog – Idea, Goal & Rules

2007-05-18T21:37:00.000-06:00

I. The Idea

This blog is an extension of the Online One State Bibliography Project - http://www.onestate.org - that actively seeks to provide a wealth of information about the ever increasing one state / two state debate in Israel/Palestine. True to its name, the project is primarily concerned with compiling articles, papers, and other documents related to the one state / two state discussions from all relevant perspectives for both ideas. However, as is readily apparent by the header image, the project is run by a one state advocate arguing for one democratic secular state in Israel/Palestine.

The author and administrator – John Sigler – is a Jewish-American activist that has been engaged in the struggle to achieve justice for the Palestinian people for many years. Beginning from a strong two-state position and, like many, falling for disingenuous “peace process” that began in Madrid; over the years his position has evolved and today he is an unapologetic anti-Zionist one state supporter, believing that the ethnocentric and exclusive ideology of Zionism is the root of the problem.

The creation of this blog was stimulated by two recent events, specifically locating new articles for the bibliography and a recent series of exchanges on the issue at another website.

The process of updating and maintaining the bibliography involves a near constant search for, and at least cursory review of, new articles on the topic. The process is itself quite educational in that it gives the person undertaking it insight into the newest arguments and/or spin being added to the debate by extremely diverse writers and commentators. At the same time one is constantly coming across the same old arguments and rhetorical straw-man constructs, so assuming the person compiling the information already has given opinions and counter-arguments, there is definite desire to comment on much of these.

The second event was a recent series of exchanges and discussions exploring the issue in some detail on Dan Fleshler’s “Realistic Dove” website. The exchanges were conducted on the comment threads and remained civil though, like this blog, the administration was already strongly opinionated (in that case, in favor of a two state solution; whereas this blog is clearly supportive of the one state idea). Giving full credit where it is due, the administration did allow alternative perspectives and even opposing points of view; however, due to the bias of the administration, the posted topics kept the discussion within a Zionist Left framework that essentially confined alternative perspectives to the role of reactionary polemics.

These two events combined has resulted in this blog. One of the interesting things about the reactionary polemics at Realistic Dove is that because of the framework, the articulation of the one state case had to be analytical, deconstructing the opposing arguments point by point, in some cases almost line by line. This is the same methodology that Norman Finkelstein (a two state supporter) used to such telling effect in Appendix III of his Beyond Chutzpah in countering much of Dershowitz’s fanciful hasbara work. Such a methodology removes rhetorical flourish and turn of phrase from the discussion replacing it with a detailed analytical response to the contentions being challenged. As part and parcel of maintaining the bibliography project, there are many new articles being presented that deserve this analytical treatment and this is what this blog intends to do.

II. The Goal

The overall goal of the Online One State Bibliography Project is to provide a resource for those interested in the topic and presents information from most viewpoints. Despite the tone and context of the site, the actual material is essentially impartial and has hopefully been of some use.

This blog, on the other hand, makes no pretense to being impartial. The purpose is to deconstruct and carefully counter selected articles that either support a two state solution or actively oppose the one state idea, with an emphasis on the latter. The goal is to stimulate debate and discussion of the topic.

III. The Rules

The actual postings – the blogs – are open and free to public as long as the source is properly given, which is more or less a standard online convention. As long as credit is properly attributed, anyone is welcome to reproduce, in full or in part, the actual postings.

The administration reserves the right to edit actual postings UNTIL there is either a comment or a link back to the posting in question affirming that someone has actually read the material. The primary concern is correcting typos or poor phrasing, nevertheless, once there is proof – a comment or link back - that someone has read the material no further editing will take place. The exception to this rule is this initial posting which is subject to revision at any time or for any reason.

The blog is beginning with open comments, i.e. anyone is allowed to comment at their leisure. However, the administration does reserve the right to delete comments, especially those that:

a) Are completely off topic or spam;

b) Are racist – including anti-Semitic (not to be confused with anti-Zionist) and Islamaphobic – in nature;

c) Are extremely crude or graphic ad hominem attacks on other individuals.

If, in the future if the open comment feature turns into a mess, moderation may be implemented.

The administration of this blog can be contacted by CLICKING HERE