John Sigler, 6 August 2007
I. Preliminary Notes and Observations
Benjamin Pogrund is the founder and director of the Yakar Center for Social Concern in
“Their motivations vary: anti-Semitism and a visceral hatred of everything Jewish; or objections, based on religious belief, against the presence of a Jewish state on perceived Muslim Waqf land; or Jews on the left who feel driven to distance themselves publicly from Israel for reasons that are not always fathomable but seem to stem from embarrassment at having been born Jewish.” [1]
Being South African born, Pogrund considers himself supremely qualified to deny any and all connections between the modern ethnocentric state of
Pogrund is not particularly unique among those that are generally considered members of the “Zionist Left,” specifically those that do earnestly seek peace and reconciliation, but only insofar as Israel’s right to define itself as an ethnocentric state in which roughly half the resident population under its control is either denied full equality (inside the Green Line) or denied any standing at all (in the Occupied Palestinian Territories). Those of this camp can not, or will not, accept that there can never be any sustainable peace as long as the Zionist ideology is accepted as a means of creating an ethnically exclusive state in which roughly half the resident population is officially discriminated against as “non-Jews” in a “Jewish State.” Just as the Afrikaners came to accept the impossibility of maintaining an ethnocentric Afrikaner state in a land heavily populated with non-Afrikaners, so too must Zionists see the absurdity of trying to maintain a “Jewish State” in a land heavily populated by non-Jews.
Not surprisingly, as both a Zionist and as something of his extension of the rejection of any comparison between the
II. Deconstruction and Refutation
1. Paragraphs 1-7
The introduction begins with a brief description of the growing trend of comparing the Israeli system of ethnocentric domination with the former Apartheid system in
As the introduction continues Pogrund goes on to take assorted potshots at various other South African critics of
a) “Muslim organizations and individuals” though providing no examples;
b) South African journalist Allister Sparks who does advocate one democratic secular state. Pogrund specifically quotes
c) the Communist Party of South Africa that he accuses of being “unaware that
d) as well as a rather weird, though not necessarily hostile, quote by Shabnam Mohamed in
The introduction successfully illustrates who Pogrund sees as the “enemy” in
After the introduction Pogrund moves on to making his arguments, largely basing them on the work of Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, “Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israelis and Palestinians.” [5] In the process he relies upon six “crucial realms” that were explored in the book and uses these to show that the South African model does not present “a realistic way forward,” ascribing this conclusion to the authors of the book [6]. In fact, Pogrund relies so heavily on the Adam-Moodley book in many respects the following deconstruction and refutation is more one of these authors than Pogrund himself.
2. Paragraph 8
Paragraph eight presents the first of the “crucial realms” that ostensibly undermines the idea of one democratic secular state, namely the differences in the economic situations. Essentially three differences are raised…
“Blacks and whites in
Realistically the supposition that the Israeli and Palestinian economies are fundamentally separate or different completely lacks merit. Through force of arms and deliberate manipulation, it is true that the Israeli economy is not completely dependent on the Palestinians; but the inverse is completely false, with the Palestinian economy being completely controlled by and dependent on
While Israel has taken advantage of modern international labor flows to replace most Palestinian workers with non-Arabs for cheap labor, the cost differences for the Israeli employer - 2098.86 NIS per foreign worker earning a gross salary of 2085 NIS versus 3110.55 NIS for a Palestinian worker making the same gross amount [8] – are strictly due to legislative measures meant to encourage this trend as opposed to any tangible expenses. This is not a “natural” economic development, but a deliberate result of legislation meant to exclude ethnically undesirable workers, i.e. this result is not the product of economics, but an economic tool used to create a desired social/demographic result.
There is also the “captive market” factor. The good old days of exploiting the
“… the intifada has disrupted the “captive” market
Nevertheless,
“Because of the Israeli-controlled customs union, 73% of all imports to the OPT come from
Finally, the Israeli occupation itself plays a significant role – just as the need for ever increasing police and security forces played a direct role in the South African Apartheid economy – in the Israeli economy itself. “According to experts' estimates, the total economic cost of the occupation has by now reached more than $50 billion, including security and civilian expenses (the construction and maintenance of the settlements), as well as the potential loss of gross domestic product. The annual average of military expenses on maintaining control over the territory stands at about
Whether one wants to admit it or not, the Israeli and Palestinian economies are intimately linked and interdependent, though the power imbalance ensures that this interdependence works primarily to
The second difference that Pogrund reproduces is: “The growth of politicized trade unions enabled blacks to attack apartheid through industrial action such as strikes and consumer boycotts. In contrast, Palestinians do not have this power because
In this instance, the difference is valid but it is also somewhat inconsequential. Even at the height of the anti-Apartheid struggle, only about 10% of black workers were unionized [12] and the government brutally repressed labor strikes when they became significant. Though there were many black labor strikes, in general they played a minor role in actually bringing about the end of Apartheid. They were much more effective at organizing consumer boycotts – especially against foreign corporations operating in Apartheid South
It is fully conceded that a better planned and better directed strategy of generating economic pressure on Israel would be useful, but pretty much any organized Palestinian entity with popular support could accomplish this, labor unions per se are not necessary. Regardless, as was the case in
The third difference is: “
It is certainly true that white South Africans were always much more dependent on black labor than Israel has ever depended on Palestinian labor, but this doesn’t undo or invalidate the very real economic interdependence described previously. In fact,
“The word ‘separation’ must be deleted from our political lexicon, simply because it is impossible. Due to five main factors, Israelis and Palestinians can not be separated: Trade; Water; Energy; Environment; and Health Concerns. Separating the two entities would mean, in this regard, acting against nature – which we can not do. Naturally keeping Palestinian workers out of
While there are certainly substantive differences between the economic situations of Apartheid South Africa and modern
3. Paragraph 9
The second “crucial realm” cited by Pogrund relates to the religious element of the conflict. It is noted that in
Basically there is no denying the validity of these observations. The “common bond” of Christianity certainly played a significant role in undermining the pseudo-religious justifications for Afrikaner Apartheid and also served as a valuable device for carrying the anti-Apartheid message to the white beneficiaries of the system. Undoubtedly, various Christian clergy and efforts by various denominations played an important role in the eventual collapse of the South African white supremacy.
The situation in Israel/Palestine is radically different, with most Palestinians being Muslim and most Israelis being Jewish to one extent or another. Further note should be made of the sharply divided Christian community representing at one end native Palestinian Christians who share the same basic national aspirations and perspectives of their Muslim neighbors; and on the other side the evangelical “Christian Zionists” that represent one of the most extreme elements of the radical Right-wing in Israel; and most other denominations that fall in between these two extremes.
Granting the validity of this difference between the two situations, it is also over exaggerated and realistically does not serve as a barrier to the creation of a unified state. This difference is exaggerated because the vast majority of people on both sides are not religious extremists and it does not serve as a significant barrier because the world is full of examples of functioning states that have more than one major religious community co-existing. In fact,
On the Palestinian side, the vast majority of the population is reasonably well educated and more or less modern in outlook. Contrary to the portrayals by Israeli propagandists, the election victory of Hamas does not mean that the vast majority of Palestinians support Islamic fundamentalism and accordingly Hamas has not made any serious effort to impose an Islamist regime on the Palestinians [16]. The popularity of Hamas is primarily a reaction against Fatah corruption [17]; the view that Fatah had become a cat’s paw for
Similarly, on the Israeli Jewish side of the equation, despite a very active radical right – only some of which is strictly religious, other portions defining itself as “Jewish” in an ethnic sense – the results of the last Israeli elections show that the vast majority of Israelis do not support them [21]. Further, contrary to the claims of some anti-Israel propagandists, Olmert’s decision to bring the Russian dominated extremist Israel Beitenu party into his ruling coalition was not so much a matter of endorsing Avigdor Lieberman’s radical views, but one of shoring up a weak coalition government [22]. Even granting
So, while both sides include violent extremists that would have to be controlled, neither side is dominated by them. Of course this is not to deny that the vast majority of people on both sides have certain religious “red lines” that must be taken into account. A prime example of this would be access to the major holy sites, especially the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. However, practical measures – many of which are already in practice – can ensure that these religious “red lines” are properly addressed without denying other communities similar rights where appropriate.
The extremists represent a real threat, but one that can be – especially with collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian security authorities – controlled. In a pragmatic sense, the religious differences does not rule out co-existence within the same state; though the more emotional demands for exclusive domination and control represent a more difficult aspect of the question. As anyone who has tried to teach preschool children knows, teaching the concept of sharing can be difficult and yet it can be done.
4. Paragraph 10
The third “crucial realm” cited by Pogrund relates to the role of third party actors in the conflict. As was the case with the first “crucial realm,” this one is also broken down into three relatively distinct points.
The first of these refers to the role of third party mediation in negotiations, arguing that in South Africa, both sides – the National Party and the African National Congress – chose to negotiate directly between themselves without a strong role being played by third parties; whereas absolutely all negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have been conducted under the auspices of Israel’s patron, the United States. Further, the United States plays an active role in these negotiations generally supporting any and all Israeli positions and coercing the Palestinians into accepting these Israeli concerns via a series of “carrots” (U.S. provided rewards for doing as Israel says) and “sticks” (U.S. provided punishments for failing to properly acquiesce).
While the general observation, as presented by Pogrund is correct, what it fails to take into account is the differences in viability between Israel and South Africa. Specifically, with its ample land resources, fabulous mineral wealth, and functional economic base,
Consequently, unlike the factions in
The second point is based on quotes from the Adam-Moodley book:
“Sanctions (divestment and trade boycotts) are generally overrated in triggering South African change,” they say. “Only loan refusals and, to a lesser extent, moral ostracism, impacted significantly on the apartheid government. Such action against
The basic point here is completely valid and – with the sole exception of the loan refusals which have not happened due to
The third point of this paragraph is in the last sentence: “Israelis also have the benefit of a supportive diaspora, whereas Afrikaners faced a near-unanimously hostile world.”
Of course Pogrund himself counters this point back in his introduction when in paragraph 6 he writes: “It also claims that
While most of the world was certainly critical – even hostile – to the Apartheid regime and its policies, many countries and multinational corporations continued to deal with
Despite a general condemnation of the theory and practice of
Again, this point is more of a similarity with Apartheid South
5. Paragraph 11
This paragraph deals with what Pogrund defines as “political culture,” though in essence it makes four rather disparate points.
The first point is that: “Much more personal interaction in a vertical-status hierarchy shaped South African race relations, compared with the more horizontal social distance between Jews and Palestinians.”
This point is difficult to discuss in any detail based solely upon the synopsis provided by Pogrund. Nevertheless, the implication of the statement is that the “horizontal social distance between Jews and Palestinians” is a natural, i.e. a mutually accepted and acceptable, state of affairs though this is not really the case. Instead, this state of affairs is artificial, the creation of a specific policy of ethnic exclusion and isolation both within the Green Line and in the
Within the Green Line, the Israeli Palestinian minority is largely segregated from the Israeli Jewish mainstream through a series of measures that prevent equal participation in society and equal opportunities that is, interestingly enough, justified almost exactly along the same lines of the South African “separate development” concept, i.e. allowing separate cultures to maintain their integrity via “separate development.” To quote Israeli civil rights group Adalah:
“Israel never sought to assimilate or integrate the Palestinian population, treating them as second-class citizens and excluding them from public life and the public sphere. The state practiced systematic and institutionalized discrimination in all areas, such as land dispossession and allocation, education, language, economics, culture, and political participation. … Further attempts have been made to split the Palestinian community into ‘minorities within a minority’ through separate educational curricula, disparate employment and academic opportunities, and the selective conscription of Druze and some Bedouin men to military service. Israeli discourse has legitimated the second-class status of Palestinian citizens on the basis that the minority population does not serve in the military; however, the selective conscription of Druze and some Bedouin has not prevented discrimination against them. …” [33]
In the Occupied Palestinian Territories the separation is even more pronounced with the resident Israeli Jewish population living in “Jewish only” settlements and only traveling on “Israeli only” roads [34] and interaction being limited almost exclusively to Israeli soldiers maintaining the occupation over the Palestinian population.
Both of these situations are the results of specific policies and practices meant to maintain both Israeli Jewish domination and ethnic separation. What interaction does occur – on both sides of the Green Line – tends to be “on the job,” usually with Palestinians employees and Israeli Jewish bosses, very much akin to the situation in
The existing lack of personal interaction between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is not the natural outgrowth of the desires of both peoples, but exclusively the product of policies and practices meant to create and maintain this reality. Needless to say, removing the segregationist policies and practices will result in more personal interaction. While this point does highlight a difference, it is not a difference that affects the acceptance of a South African model for political integration.
The next point in this paragraph is “Moral erosion of the apartheid stance among the ruling elite in
The notion that many South African elites lost interest – some through morality, but more through self-interest - in maintaining the “apartheid stance” is true enough, but depending on who you ask the same can be said for modern Israeli elites and Zionism:
“On the other hand, the Israeli elites of the past 20 years have become totally divorced from reality. The capital, the media and the academic world of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, have blinded
The third point of this paragraph reads: “Both sides in the
This was also the case in Apartheid South
“And Afrikaners do feel the long hand of victimhood quite keenly. They have, of course, suffered genuine trauma from the apartheid conflict as well: one Afrikaner who lost his family to an ANC bomb asked the commission this question: ‘Do you know, you the truth commissioners, how a temperature feels between six and eight thousand degrees? Do you know how it feels to experience a blow so intense that it forces the fillings from one’s teeth? Do you know how it feels to look for survivors and only find dead and maimed?’” [36]
The National Party saw its mission as one of correcting past injustices against the Afrikaner people, and though this victim complex has largely dissipated with the revelations that followed the collapse of Apartheid, even to this day the Afrikaner Right focuses heavily on how their people have been – and continued to be – victimized. Obviously the South African blacks had, and have, a much more understandable victim complex due to their treatment at the hands of the whites in general, British and Afrikaner. This point does not illustrate a difference between the South African and Israeli situations.
The final point of this paragraph reads: “
Basically, with but a few exceptions, assuming the annual resolutions against Israeli policies and practices accurately reflect the voting country’s opinions, the same comment could be made about Israel if one replaces the “the Arab and Muslim world” with “the United States and countries subject to American pressure.” [37]
6. Paragraph 12
Paragraph twelve deals with violence and makes two relatively distinct points; the first of which is: “Suicide was never used as a weapon, and martyrdom was never celebrated during the South African anti-apartheid struggle.”
Suicide bombing is just a tactic, a means of resistance, and in of itself does not fundamentally alter the conflict or its resolution. Suicide bombing is a tactic of desperation generally used by resistance movements fighting vastly superior forces: currently including Palestinians against
The tactic becomes a crime against humanity when employed against civilians [38], but even then it is not – in of itself - fundamentally different than any other deliberate attack on civilians. The use of this tactic as well as the popular support for those using it, does not really affect the possibility of peace either way and is not better than, or worse than, any other deliberate attacks against civilians.
This brings us to the second point in this paragraph that deals specifically with deliberate attacks on civilians. This, of course, does seriously affect the possibility for peace, but is not – contrary to the implication of this article – the sole domain the Palestinian resistance. In fact, all three of the other actors being compared in this article – the White Apartheid government [39], the Israeli government [40], and the black South African resistance [41] – are guilty of the exact same at least in the eyes of those who matter, the victims. The only difference being the tactical means of attack, not the perceived goal or the factual result. This simple reality invalidates the entire premise of the argument. Both sides in
7. Paragraph 13
This paragraph is a continuation on the issue violence that makes much of the official stance of the African National Congress, specifically that it was never official policy to target civilians in the course of their armed resistance to Apartheid. The paragraph concludes: “The ANC’s approach was proved correct: Only a few attacks on whites took place over the decades, and this was a significant factor in persuading whites that it was safe to end apartheid.”
Interestingly, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), seems to have reached a somewhat different conclusion:
“The Commission noted that, of the three main parties to the conflict, only the ANC committed itself to observing the tenets of the
“However, the Commission drew a distinction between the conduct of a ‘just war’ and the question of ‘just means’. The Commission found that, whilst its struggle was just, the ANC had, in the course of the conflict, contravened the
Further, contrary to the contention presented by Pogrund, the final years of Apartheid in the 1980’s in fact saw an increase – not decrease - in terrorist attacks against civilians that the TRC concluded was at least in part inspired by the official positions of the ANC and that the ANC shared at least partial responsibility for:
“The Commission finds that, in the 1980’s in particular, a number of gross violations of human rights were perpetrated not by direct members of the ANC or those operating under its formal command but by civilians who saw themselves as ANC supporters. In this regard, the Commission finds that the ANC is morally and politically accountable for creating a climate in which such supporters believed their actions to be legitimate and carried out within the broad parameters of a ‘people’s war’ as enunciated by the ANC.” [43]
The fact that the latter years of the Apartheid system saw an increase in acts of terrorism – whether committed officially by the ANC or merely inspired by it – utterly undermines the contention that it was the lack of black terrorist attacks on white civilians that convinced “whites that it was safe to end apartheid.” This entire paragraph is based not on the actual reality of South African history but on the historical revisionist school that has worked to whitewash the ANC and the anti-Apartheid struggle by falsely portraying it as a fundamentally pacifist struggle. The success of armed struggle in applying and maintaining pressure on the Apartheid system deserves to be remembered as it certainly played a significant role in the process.
8. Paragraphs 14-15
The next “crucial realm” relates to leadership: “Negotiations in
Unfortunately, this is true and represents a very real and undeniable difference between the South African and Israeli/Palestinian situations. However, this issue of fragmented leadership – among both Israelis and Palestinians – represents an obstacle to any and all possible settlements to the conflict. One state or two states, negotiated or unilaterally declared, humanitarian or criminal; all solutions depend on “cohesive and credible leaders” that can “obtain popular mandates and sell a controversial compromise” and frankly, neither Israelis nor Palestinians have this today.
The default, of course, is the status quo, which is effectively a discriminatory pseudo-segregated single state dominated by
9. Paragraph 16
The gist of this paragraph is: “Above all, opponents in
This is beyond any doubt absolutely correct. The conflict is only viable as long as the majorities of one or both sides have a belief that they can achieve “total victory,” negotiated settlement only becomes viable once both sides reach the conclusion that there is a stalemate that cannot be resolved through sheer force.
On the Israeli side of the equation, the demand for a strictly “Jewish State” in an geographic area where roughly half the resident population is not “Jewish” is an absolute impossibility without resorting to outright ethnic cleansing – popularly described as “transfer” in Israeli parlance – or genocide. However, genocide has not been sincerely proposed by any Israeli faction and the notion of “transfer” – despite the shrill advocacy of its supporters – is really not a viable option for a myriad of reasons [44]. Ruling out these options as realistic, there is really no possibility of “total victory” meaning that eventually, through one means or another, a compromise will have to be made. The real question is whether such a compromise will be territorial (the “two-state solution”) or ideological (the one state option). Since Israel has evinced absolutely no interest in allowing for a viable territorial compromise (i.e. withdrawing the settlements, leaving the Jordan Valley, giving up the West Bank aquifers and the Jordan River, &c.), but has shown a growing lack of interest in its ideological underpinnings (e.g. “post-Zionism”); the latter seems considerably more likely than the former.
On the Palestinian side of the equation, the de facto reality of
“Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate. … Palestinian opposition to violence increases when diplomacy proves effective. Public support for violence increases in an environment of greater pain and suffering and decreases when threat perception is reduced. ... All major transformations in Palestinian politics were preceded or accompanied by changes in public attitudes. The 1993
However, at the same time it is patently absurd to expect or demand that Palestinians accept and support the domination of an openly discriminatory “Jewish State” in which they – as non-Jews – have no real place.
Like it or not,
“The first reality is that neither side can defeat the other. The Palestinians are too weak to war against
10. Paragraph 17
This paragraph delves into an argument that is patently absurd to anyone with even the vaguest knowledge of
Virtually all the allegedly unique traits of the Israeli/Palestinian divide – with the exception of basic religion – cited in this paragraph (“language, and above all, by history and the mythologies that the ‘burden of history’ imprints on the self-concept and collective identity") apply not only among “the legislated artificial racial groups” but also within them among the various ethnicities of South Africa. Of course the difference is that these ethnic differences notwithstanding, they are not recognized in law since the demise of Apartheid, whereas in Israel/Palestine they are. The idea that somehow the ethnic divide in Israel/Palestine is more substantive or meaningful than the myriad of such divisions in
11. Paragraph 18
The point of this paragraph is essentially based upon a Adam-Moodley quote: “However, in the Middle Eastern reality of communal hostilities and national identities, the Zionist vision is deeply rooted and more difficult to dislodge than racist supremacist illusions in
Obviously this is one of primary questions that determine the viability of a one state scenario and the answer depends upon who you ask.
However, a common one state advocate response to the question is two fold; first showing that ethnic separation based upon territorial division isn’t a viable option (thereby defaulting to the status quo, the de facto single state); and secondly by showing the growing trend away from ideological “purity” and orthodoxy among Israeli Jews.
The first response, dealing with the impossibility of physical separation has been explored in detail from both the Left [47] and from the Right [48]. However, in that this is a general question of possibilities as opposed to a contention to be refuted, it is beyond the scope of this article to go into much detail on the topic.
Similarly, the rise of “post-Zionism” has merited an enormous amount of attention since the late 1990’s and continues to do so. The trend – and debate – graphically illustrates that the absolute loyalty to “Zionist identity” is no longer a reality and though many post-Zionists are not exactly die-hard anti-Zionists, their actions and lack of enthusiasm clearly reflect a “turning away” from ideologically driven ethnic definition and the demand that such definition be loyally accepted by all Israeli Jews. To quote a recent article on the “second-wave” of post-Zionism:
“Post–Zionism is a counter–hegemonic political culture that emerged in
“The great achievement of first wave post-Zionism was the ushering in of the counter–hegemonic concept “a state of all its citizens” into the public discourse, as against the dominant concept of “the Jewish and Democratic State”. Second–wave post-Zionism now further politicizes this concept and mobilizes citizens under its banner. One can say that the center of gravity of post–Zionism has began to shift now from the intellectual “bubble” of Tel Aviv into the Arab cities and villages of the Galilee, from aloof university intellectuals to public activists, from the Jewish sector to the Arab sector, and from the judicial arena to the political arena. With all these shifts, it is to be expected that post-Zionism will also shift its appellation. It will probably be called a struggle for a “
Our – as in one state advocates – argument is that, yes, Zionism can be overcome and that this is a process that has developed quite independently of any external advocacy as modernism – including a belief in multiculturalism and humanism – has confronted the very nineteenth century ethnocentric pseudo-racial ideology of Zionism. Of course reasonable people may disagree.
12. Paragraph 19
This paragraph raises a valid point regarding expressions of outright anti-Semitism by Palestinians and the need for this to be curtailed before a one state option would be acceptable. Many Left activists – Israeli, Palestinian, and other – that are the primary advocates for one state advocacy would certainly agree that Palestinian flirtation with European anti-Semitic libels like the “Protocols of Zion” and the Holocaust Denial are certainly counter-productive. Nevertheless, such expressions of anti-Semitism are not limited to Palestinians within Israel/Palestine, for example Russian anti-Semitism has continued to thrive in Israel going so far as to develop Israel’s first openly Neo-Nazi organization, the “Israeli White Union.” [50] This is not meant to excuse or downplay Palestinian flirtation with actual anti-Semitism, but is meant to illustrate that its absolute eradication, as desirable as this is, is not necessarily an absolute requirement for peaceful co-existence as long as it is marginalized.
13. Paragraphs 20-21
These two paragraphs focus on lessons from the South African experience that can be applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and though the list provided is rather limited, there is nothing that this refutation seeks to counter.
14. Paragraph 22
This paragraph is little more than another Adam-Moodley quote: “the simplistic assumption that the South African model readily lends itself to export may actually retard necessary new solutions by clinging to visions or processes of negotiation that may not work in another context.”
Very few – if any – one state advocates argue that an exact cookie-cutter copy of the South African process would be applicable in the Israeli/Palestinian process. Nevertheless, contrary to the views of those that still hold firmly to the Zionist demand for an exclusive ethnocentric “Jewish State” the goal of the South African process – for one democratic secular state – is not unreasonable or inherently negative. While the processes used to reach this goal will inevitably be different – reflecting the undeniable differences between the two situations – this in no way invalidates or de-legitimizes the goal itself. In fact, holding strictly to the antiquated notion of an ethnocentric state in what is a de facto bi-national state certainly undermines the introduction of “necessary new solutions by clinging to visions” that are no longer acceptable or viable.
15. Paragraph 23
Starting at this paragraph, the article moves back to Pogrund’s own writing as opposed to that of Adam and Moodley that served as the basis of most of the preceding. From a one state advocacy perspective, there is nothing to take exception to in this paragraph, despite its obvious intent to make the one state idea seem like an unrealistic fantasy:
“When all is said and done, it is tempting to go along with the notion of a single state. The South African “miracle” is a powerful image. Imagine Jews and Arabs living together on a tiny piece of land, a shared society of equals with one government; it would end their long and bitter conflict and fulfill the ideal of a united world in which people live together in amity and peace.”
16. Paragraph 24
This paragraph adopts a more or less “standard” argument against the one state notion; that of listing examples of presumably successful partitions elsewhere. The problem with this notion is that it assumes – without any empirical foundation whatsoever – that a realistic, mutually acceptable, workable partition is on the agenda in Israel/Palestine. There is no valid reason whatsoever to make this assumption. Like it or not, Israeli demands (e.g. to control the West Bank aquifers [51], to control the Jordan Valley [52], to control all Palestinian borders [53], to maintain the primary settlement blocks [54], and so on) as well as the empirical reality as its exists today (the settlements [55], the total integration of the electricity grids between Israel and the OPTs [56], the total integration of the water systems of Israel and the OPTs [57], the largely integrated road networks of Israel and the OPTs [58], and so on) virtually rules out any pretension to a workable partition. Yes, a series of Palestinian ghettos with its own little “Palestinian Authority” Arabenrat administration might be imposed, but this will only be a temporary fix as such "solutions" are completely and utterly unsustainable in the face of Palestinian population growth.
The issue at hand is not whether or not the notion of partition has been successful in other cases but whether or not there is any realistic possibility of a sustainable partition in Israel/Palestine. Most one state advocates – basing their view not on abstract theoretical possibilities but the actual reality on the ground – suggest that there is no Israeli intention for a workable partition. Therefore, whether or not partition worked elsewhere is immaterial, partition – or at least a realistically sustainable one – is not, and has never been, on the agenda in Israel/Palestine.
17. Paragraph 25
This paragraph combines two relatively common arguments.
The first of which somewhat echoes the “special” nature of the conflict that was expressed to an absurdist degree in paragraph 17 above; specifically that unlike South Africa where apparently most blacks didn’t really “mistrust” whites during Apartheid, in Israel/Palestine the two sides really dislike one another. In this argument, “the blessings and the cruelty of historical experience” really didn’t matter all that much for Afrikaners or other South Africans, but play a key role in Israel/Palestine. While it may certainly be true that these didn’t play a role for Pogrund personally, to flatly declare that on behalf of all South Africans is disingenuous at best or an outright misrepresentation at worse.
Anyone familiar with Zionist ideology knows that “particularism” – the Zionist euphemism for the characteristic of all ethnocentric movements that see their own “struggle” as singularly unique and different from all others – is a defining characteristic, just as it is in every other ethnocentric and racist ideological movement. Comments like this are just expressions of this “particularist” delusion and most one state advocates – while recognizing the unique characteristics and circumstances that exist in each and every case – flatly refuse to put the Israeli/Palestinian conflict into some mythical “particularist” framework that radically separates it from all the rest of human experience. Recognizing the complexities of the conflict (no more or less so than most other long-standing ethnic conflicts), in the final analysis it isn’t particularly unique in the history ethnic conflicts.
The second argument isn’t really an argument at all, just a flat statement of personal opinion that is treated as though it has some polemical value; namely that Israeli Jews will simply never surrender the notion of a “Jewish” state utterly dominated by them and imposed on the rest of the population. To quote: “Israeli Jews will not forgo their Jewish state, … it’s not going to happen.” However, as noted previously (under Paragraph 18 above) contrary to this opinion, it is in fact happening right this moment. On the one hand Israeli Jewish “post-Zionists” are questioning the need for a strictly “Jewish State” in general, while on the other hand, others – unwilling to publicly question the concept – are effectively showing their lack of interest in this antiquated notion by emigrating in record numbers [59].
Quaint opinions about the absolute Israeli Jewish loyalty to the Zionist ideology, while probably applicable Pogrund himself as well as many others, are not in fact what is shown by actual events underway in the real world. Every day that passes it becomes ever more difficult to reconcile the demands of the Zionist ideology with the generally progressive outlook and attitudes of the vast majority of modern Jews (Israeli or otherwise). Such opinions are more an expression of hope by diehard ideologues than realistic assessments of the current reality and probable future.
18. Paragraph 26
The first three sentences of this final paragraph represent a unique difference of viewpoints between Pogrund and what many one state advocates would say is the current status quo: “True, the spread of settlements on the
In the eyes of many one state advocates, this is a precise description of exactly where the situation stands today. “Democracy [60] and Jewish values [61]” have been being undermined, if not outright twisted into completely unrecognizable forms, for years now. Palestinians are already semi- (inside the Green Line [62]) or non- (in the OPTs) citizens and have made it quite clear that they have no intention of accepting this; and as long as Israel remains upon its current course there is absolutely no hope for anything beyond perpetual war (with the occasional lull now and then). This isn’t some potential future but a current reality that apparently Pogrund flatly refuses to face up to.
The last few sentences are just expressions of hope, from a Zionist point of view, that some through miracle
III. Concluding Thoughts
If one discounts the paraphrasing of the points made in the Adam-Moodley book, very little of any originality or substance is presented in this article by Pogrund himself. The value of his input in the debate is apparently based on the premise that Pogrund is not a radical Rightist and is South African born. However, as illustrated by paragraphs 17 and 25, he plainly never identified himself very closely with any of the ethnic groups in South Africa, a supposition that might explain why his views are so dramatically at odds with those of most South Africans of all stripes, including many fellow Jews. Affording Pogrund the benefit of the doubt – that is, assuming that he was not being deliberately dishonest – one is forced to conclude that he only has a very cursory understanding of the tensions and acrimony that existed – and to an extent continue to exist – among the various ethnic groups of
Further, paragraph 26 would seem to suggest that Pogrund refuses to honestly look at the existing situation in Israel/Palestine just as he apparently refused to do in
Regardless, this article does not undermine the notion of one democratic secular state for all its people in Israel/Palestine at all.
Notes:
[1] Benjamin Pogrund, “Looking for Truth Among the Lies,” The New Statesman, 26 February 2007, http://www.newstatesman.com/200702260021
[2] Desmond Tutu, “Apartheid in the
[3] Ronnie Kasrils, “
[4] Benjamin Pogrund, “
[5] Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israelis And Palestinians, 2005, Temple University Press, Online: http://www.temple.edu/tempress/titles/1813_reg.html
[6] For the record, this reviewer has not read the Adam-Moodley book so cannot comment on whether or not Pogrund’s characterization of their conclusions is valid.
[7] Elizabeth Young, “Palestinian Economic Dependence on
[8] International Federation for Human Rights, "Migrant Workers in Israel - A Contemporary Form of Slavery, Appendix C - Migrant and Palestinian Workers: Comparison of Salary and Cost to Employer," Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network & International Federation for Human Rights, 2003, http://www.euromedrights.net/usr/00000026/00000027/00000028/00000240.pdf
[9]
[10] Shir Hever, "Foreign Aid to the OPT and
[11] Avi Shauli, “Cost of occupation – over $50 billion,” YNet News, 9 June 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3410537,00.html
[12] Multinational Monitor, "Working Against Apartheid, Trade Unions in
[13] Richard H. Curtiss, "Who Won the Battles of Burger King and Walt Disney Productions?," Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, December 1999, http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1299/9912013.html
[14] International Solidarity Movement, "Tulkarem Farmers in Boycott of Israeli goods," International Solidarity Movement, 19 September 2006, http://www.palsolidarity.org/main/2006/09/19/tulkarem-boycott/
[15] Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Deputy Defense Minister of
[16] Joshua Brilliant, "Interim report card for Hamas," United Press International, 7 July 2007, Reproduced online at: http://news.monstersandcritics.com/middleeast/features/printer_1327138.php
[17] Ian Fisher, "In
[18] Mike Whitney, "Abbas is a Traitor," Arab-European League, 01 June 2006, http://www.arabeuropean.org/article.php?ID=114
[19] John Kifner, "Surprise leap from wild card to power: Hamas offers social services, an end to political corruption," New York Times, 29 January 2006, Reproduced online at: http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/01/29/MNGMHGVCED1.DTL
[20] Saree Makdisi, "Illusion of democracy: The Palestinian Elections," The Electronic Intifada, 23 January 2006, http://electronicintifada.net/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/12/4411
[21] Shmuel Rosner, "
[22] Gil Hoffman and JPost Staff, "Labor okays Israel Beiteinu in coalition," Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1159193514022
[23] Daily Star Staff, "Israeli poll indicates shift to right among electorate," Daily Star (
[24] "
Congressional Research Service, "
[25] "The Stars and Stripes were flown alongside the national flag. This is essentially a declaration that Israelis cannot celebrate their own independence day without remembering that their country's existence is wholly dependent on American backing. ... This backing has several aspects. One of them is the military and economic aid that
Nehemia Shtrasler, "Just an optical illusion," Ha'aretz, 27 April 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/852930.html
[26] [Yasser Arafat:] "Dear God, who cares about the Americans? ... The Americans are on your side and they give you everything, ... `Who gave you the airplanes? The Americans. Who gave you the tanks? The Americans. ... Don't talk to me about the Americans.'' Associated Press, "Angry Arafat Accuses US Of Pro-Israel Bias," Common Dreams, 7 December 2001, Reproduced online at: http://commondreams.org/headlines01/1207-04.htm
[27] " [Mossad chief] Amit visited
[28] “If the divestment movement initially seemed like a gathering storm on Israel's horizon, lately both its supporters and opponents say they no longer see the issue as directly impacting on-the-ground realities in the Middle East. Instead, they said, fights over divestment now serve as a way to sway public opinion on the Israel-Palestine conflict in other parts of the globe. Divestment campaigns ‘might not have a practical impact,’ said Liat Weingart, the campaign director for Jewish Voice for Peace, which advocates divestment from certain companies whose products are used by
[29] "However, no confidence racket succeeds without the active aid of the marks. We are the marks. We all know about con games. Our e-mail in-boxes are filled with offers from Nigerian widows who want to make us rich, and hot tips on worthless penny stocks. Nonetheless, we fall for the boycott swindle every time. ... The news about the boycott is much worse than the boycott itself, and the news is largely made by pro-Israel activist organizations who turn mole hills into mountains. Anyone who wants free publicity only needs to do something sufficiently outrageous. We should be aware that a major object of the boycott campaign is to win publicity for the boycotters and attract attention to them, and we should stop helping them achieve their goals." Ami Isseroff, "Are we victims of the
[30] Salim Muwakkil, "Keyes’ Ideological Quest," In These Times, 7 September 2004, http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/985/
[31] For example: Reuters, "US condemns Israeli settlement plan" ABC News Online, 28 December 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200612/s1818964.htm
[32] Office of the United States Trade Representative Press Release, "United States, Egypt and Israel to Launch Historic Trade Partnership USTR Zoellick to Participate in Signing in Cairo," Office of the United States Trade Representative Website, 10 December 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/December/United_States,_Egypt_Israel_to_Launch_Historic_Trade_Partnership_USTR_Zoellick_to_Participate_in_Signing_in_Cairo.html
[33] Adalah, "Historical Background: History of the Palestinians in
[34] Ahmed Jaradat, "Tunnels and Roads, Closures, Crossings, and the Segregation Wall: Toward a Unique Racist Reality," Housing and Land Rights Network, 8 August 2006, http://www.hlrn.org/news_show_user.php?id=170
[35] Ari Shavit, "A Spirit of Absolute Folly," Ha'aretz, 11 August 2006 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749564.html
[36] Kenneth Christie, The South African Truth Commission, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 2000, p. 113
[37] "RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF
Resolutions and votes:
a) ES-10/16. Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the
In favor: 156 countries / Against: 7 countries (
b) ES-10/17. Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damage caused by the Construction of the Wall in the
In favor: 162 countries / Against: 7 countries (
c) 61/22. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People
In favor: 101 countries / Against: 7 countries (
d) 61/23. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat
In favor: 101 countries / Against: 7 countries (
e) 61/24. Special information programme on the question of
In favor: 157 countries / Against: 7 countries (
f) 61/25. Peaceful settlement of the question of
In favor: 157 countries / Against: 7 countries (
g) 61/26.
In favor: 157 countries / Against: 6 countries (
h) 61/27. The Syrian Golan
In favor: 107 countries / Against: 6 countries (
i) 61/112. Assistance to
In favor: 173 countries / Against: 1 country (
j) 61/113. Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities
In favor: 170 countries / Against: 6 countries (
k) 61/114. Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
In favor: 169 countries / Against: 6 countries (
l) 61/115.
In favor: 170 countries / Against: (
m) 61/116. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
In favor: 90 countries / Against: 9 countries (
n) 61/117. Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the
In favor: 165 countries / Against: (
o) 61/118. Israeli settlements in the
In favor: 162 countries / Against: 8 countries (
p) 61/119. Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the
In favor: 157 countries / Against: 9 countries (
q) 61/120. The occupied Syrian Golan
In favor: 163 countries / Against: 2 countries (
r) 60/135. Assistance to the Palestinian people
In favor: 159 countries / Against: 0 countries / Abstaining: 7 countries
s) 61/152. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
In favor: 176 countries / Against: 5 countries (
t) 61/184. Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
In favor: 164 countries / Against: 6 countries (
[38] Human Rights Watch, “Israel/PA: Suicide Bombers Commit Crimes Against Humanity,” Human Rights News, 1 November 2002, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/11/isrl-pa1101.htm
[39] African National Congress, “Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” TRC Website, August 1996, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/submit/anctruth.htm
[40] Khalid Amayreh, "Palestinian children killed by
[41] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (
[42] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), "Findings and Recommendations: Holding the ANC Accountable," TRC Findings and Recommendations ,Volume 6, Section 5, Chapter 3, pp. 642-643 http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf
[43] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa), "Findings and Recommendations: Holding the ANC Accountable," TRC Findings and Recommendations, Volume 6, Section 5, Chapter 3, p. 650 http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf
[44] John Sigler, "
[45] Khalil Shikaki, "Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 158, January 2006, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158.html
[46] Colette Avital, MK "After the Israeli Elections: Prospects for Peace," Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on March 5, 2001, http://www.lawac.org/speech/pre%20sept%2004%20speeches/avital.htm
[47] For example: Jeff Halper, "The Livni-Rice Plan: Towards a Just Peace or Apartheid?," Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, 2 May 2007, http://www.icahd.org/eng/news.asp?menu=5&submenu=1&item=433
[48] Louis Rene Beres, "
[49] Uri Ram, "Second Wave Post-Zionism and the Apartheid Backlash," Tikkun Magazine, 18 July 2007, http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/specials/postzionism
[50] For more on the topic visit The Israeli Information and
[51] Aubrey Wulfsohn, "What Retreat from the Territories Means for
[52]
[53] Yaakov Amidror, "
[54] Dore Gold, "Bush Erases the Clinton Parameters," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 21, 15 April 2004, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-21.htm
[55] Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Settlement Database and Suitability Assessment,” FMEP Website, http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement_database.html
[56] "Responsibility for electric utility service delivery is currently vested in municipal departments or village councils, except for the Jerusalem District Electric Company (JDECO) -- a shareholder-owned utility. In
The World Bank, "West Bank and Gaza-Electricity Sector, Investment and Management Project" United Nations Information System on the Question of
[57] Fred Pearce, "
[58] Jeff Halper, "The Matrix of Control," Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, undated, http://www.icahd.org/eng/articles.asp?menu=6&submenu=3
[59] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), "Emigration from
[60] On twisting the concept of "democracy;" Yitzhak Laor, "Democracy for Jews only," Ha'aretz, 31 May 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/864734.html
[61] On twisting "Jewish values;" Allan C. Brownfeld, "Gap Between Jewish Values, Israeli Policies Becoming Apparent to More," Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, May-June 2007, pp. 58-59, Reproduced online by Jewish Voices for Peace at: http://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/publish/article_866.shtml
[62] Democracy Now, "No Shelters, Sirens for
