Israel’s Ultimate Threat: A critical assessment of the viability of “transfer”
John Sigler*, 31 March 2007
With the collapse of the Oslo peace process the realistic options for a sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinian people have significantly narrowed. Among the options that remain ostensibly on the table, the Israeli Right’s call for “transfer” – a polite euphemism for ethnic cleansing – continues to find support among a significant portion of the Israeli public and is openly popular with some mainstream political factions. The inclusion of “transfer” advocate Avigdor Lieberman [1] in Olmert’s Kadima government illustrates that this position continues to be an acceptable perspective in Israeli political discourse.
As a result, the implicit threat of ethnic cleansing as a measure of last resort has remained an underlying factor in the Israeli position vis-à-vis the Palestinians. The implication being that the Palestinians ultimately must accept whatever Israel dictates because failure to do so will force Israel into adopting this “final solution” to resolve the conflict. In view of Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, this implicit threat has been taken seriously by both proponents and opponents. Nevertheless, when the actual mechanics of implementing a “transfer” policy are examined, the viability of this threat is significantly diminished. A number of factors make ethnic cleansing extremely unlikely if not completely impossible. This article touches on a number of these factors with the goal of undermining the utility and credibility of this implied threat from the Israeli camp.
I. Narrowing the Options
The eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada represented the final death knell of the Oslo peace process. Beginning in September of 2000, the new uprising was a dramatic expression of Palestinian frustration with almost ten years of negotiations with Israel that began with the Madrid talks in 1991. [2] Sharon’s provocative raid on Haram al-Sharif was just the final straw in an endless succession of Israeli policies, practices, and provocations – coupled with Palestinian reactions - that essentially doomed the peace process. The Palestinian perception that Israel was completely insincere was justified by Israel’s policy of creating “facts on the ground” that clearly illustrated Israel’s intention of remaining in effective control of the Occupied Palestinian Territories.[3]
Contrary to Israeli propaganda, the uprising was a spontaneous popular uprising [4] that – knowing what the inevitable Israeli response would be [5] - simply could not be dictated from above. The Intifada led to the Palestine Authority (PA) being viewed as essentially superfluous by both Palestinians and Israelis. In Palestinian eyes, the Palestine Authority was meant to be a provisional authority that would ultimately develop into the government of an independent Palestinian state.[6] The primary purpose of the Palestine Authority from the Israeli perspective was to serve as an auxiliary to the Israeli security establishment.[7] That is, the PA’s primary role was to maintain peace, prevent Palestinian attacks on both fellow Palestinians and Israelis, and to serve as an Israeli-authorized autonomous authority within those areas that the Israelis allowed them to operate.
The Intifada utterly destroyed any meaningful justification for the existence of the Palestine Authority. From the Palestinian perspective, the PA had effectively failed to secure an independent Palestinian state and therefore became nothing more than a new Arabic-speaking level of occupation bureaucracy.[8] From the Israeli perspective, it failed in its primary purpose of maintaining peace and security for Israel and its citizens in the Territories.[9] Subsequently, the PA and Fatah began to lose cohesion, with the more militant sections such as the Tanzim taking an active role in the resistance [10] while the less militant divisions launched desperate measures to assert control over the Palestinian people and trying to restore cooperation with the Israelis.[11] The effective Israeli imprisonment of Arafat in Ramallah and his later death coupled with an extreme expansion of the Israeli closure policy led to a complete collapse to any pretense of a centralized authority. [12] Isolated from each other and without an enthusiastic or universal acceptance of Abbas as successor to Arafat, [13] the separate PA entities have all become essentially independent local authorities working in cooperation with other local actors. [14] The final blow came with the January 2006 electoral success of Hamas, the leading non-PLO faction, a result that swept away the democratic pretense held by the PA executive under Mahmoud Abbas. [15]
These developments resulted in a dramatic shift in Israeli perceptions of the matter. The Israeli Right shifted further in that direction demanding an end to any concessions to the Palestinians. The Israeli Center became infatuated with the Sharon/Kadima notion of unilateral separation from the Palestinians. The Israeli Zionist Left, as differentiated from the non- or post-Zionist Left, made itself essentially irrelevant by maintaining support for what was undeniably a failed strategy of negotiated separation.
The Israeli Right, from Likud on, had been staunchly opposed to the Oslo process from the outset. Despite the fact that the Netanyahu government paid some lip service to Oslo to placate the United States, in practice it did everything possible to sabotage it.[16] The Intifada was something of a vindication of the anti-Oslo position and became known in Rightist circles as the “Oslo War.” [17] Today, the Right continues to argue in favor of maintaining total Israeli control, maintaining all the settlements, and affording the Palestinians various degrees of partial autonomy under Israeli domination. [18] The obvious problem is that such a position can never result in a sustainable peace and even the advocates of this position grant as much, accepting the use of force perpetually to maintain Israeli hegemony.[19] To quote one Right-wing extremist living in Hebron: “We want to fight our enemies until the Arabs know that this is the Jewish state and the only state we have and if they want our land we will fight them.”[20] The Israeli Center, that previously supported the Oslo process, lost all confidence after the failure of Camp David offers in 2000. [21] The Israeli government argued, and much of the Israeli Center accepted, that this was the absolute most that Israel would be willing to offer and since it didn’t meet the minimum demands of the Palestinians, further negotiation was seen as pointless. This, not surprisingly, resulted in a shift of the Center, away from supporting a negotiated settlement to supporting unilateral separation, manifested by Sharon’s “Disengagement” from Gaza. The Center put Kadima in power specifically on this program.[22] However, since “Disengagement” was never intended to actually free Gaza [23] and ultimately did not;[24] it was inevitable the Palestinian resistance would continue. The continued Palestinian resistance, in turn, convinced much of the Israeli Center that no Palestinian enclave could be allowed true control over their own affairs, thereby pushing much of this block reluctantly into the camp of the Israeli Right.
The Israeli Zionist Left rejected the government contention that the Camp David proposals represented the maximum concessions possible to bring about a mutually accepted two-state option. This view coalesced around the unofficial “Geneva Initiative” or “Geneva Accords” [25] worked out by a group of former Israeli and Palestinian officials and publicly announced in 2003. Despite widespread publicity and a number of high profile endorsements, this initiative never really moved forward. Arafat, before his death, suggested that he might accept this offer as the basis of a negotiated settlement, [26] despite the wishes of the Palestinian people for whom he was ostensibly speaking. [27] On the Israeli side, there has never been any expression of interest from the democratically-elected government. [28] Accounts from both the Israeli Right and Center are fairly unanimous in rejecting these terms, [29] and thus the Israeli Zionist Left has largely alienated itself by continuing to stand behind this and similar initiatives.
The net result of all these trends has been to significantly narrow the options available for a sustainable peace within Israel/Palestine. Basically no negotiated proposal that meets the minimum conditions of the Palestinian side is on the table at all, so a permanent negotiated settlement is not even at issue. The failure of “Disengagement” to bring about peace in Gaza has dampened Israeli enthusiasm for unilateral separation while the continuing violence has reinforced the Rightist position that no Palestinian autonomy - much less freedom - is compatible with Israeli security interests. The default position is to maintain the status quo, forcible subjection of the Palestinians to Israeli rule, but most observers agree that this will never result in peace and is ultimately unsustainable.
If one rules out a mutually accepted negotiated settlement and unilateral separation, any sort of sustainable two-state option becomes impossible. Continued subjugation through military force, though it can be maintained for quite some time, will not result in peace and is ultimately doomed to failure. This, in turn, brings us to the final two options that, at least in theory, could result in a sustainable permanent resolution of the conflict inside the borders of Israel/Palestine: either some sort of one state option or systematic ethnic cleansing.
Various notions of Israeli-Palestinian political unity – the one state idea – have been around from the outset of the Zionist colonization of Palestine [30] and, due to current circumstances, have been making a dramatic come back over the last few years. [31] Of course notions differ widely, from the extreme Right-wing Yesha Council’s proposal [32] to the notion of one democratic secular state that is being reluctantly accepted within the non- or post-Zionist Left. [33] Suggestions span a range of different configurations including the unitary democratic secular state, the democratic religious state, assorted bi-national models, federalization and so on. It is outside the scope of this article to explore this issue in any detail, but it does represent one of the alternatives remaining if one rules out a two-state solution.
II. The Rehabilitation of “Transfer”
The other option is also something of a “one state” notion, but it is based on the premise of one ethnic nation-state that would result after the systematic ethnic cleansing of the “others.” Like sharing the land, the notion of ethnic cleansing has been around since the beginning of the Zionist project [34] and on both sides of the divide.
On the Palestinian side, the idea of expelling the Zionists has been around since the colonization began in earnest and most famously articulated by the “drive the Jews into sea” notion in 1948. [35] Great capital has been made of such demands by Israeli propagandists and even today such rhetoric is occasionally heard in heated public reactions to various Israeli provocations. For example some Hamas activists made statements to this effect after the Israeli assassination of Shaykh Ahmed Yassin in 2004. [36] Nevertheless, the occasional rhetorical outburst notwithstanding, in general most Palestinians understand that the Israelis are there to stay and accept this reality: “…despite the bitterness of the conflict, the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians accept the permanence of the other, and on each side only a few really fantasize about the disappearance of the other.” [37]
On the Israeli side, the creation of the state itself depended on the ethnic cleansing of Palestine conducted in 1948, [38] so beyond rhetoric, the factual application of this tactic already constitutes a historical element of Zionist reality. To quote noted Israeli historian Benny Morris: “Ben-Gurion was right. If he had not done what he did, a state would not have come into being. That has to be clear. It is impossible to evade it. Without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen here.” [39] After Al Nakba – the original ethnic cleansing of 1948 – virtually all Israelis, except the extreme Right, ruled out a second ethnic cleansing as a desirable or realistic possibility. The pretense that the ethnic cleansing of 1948 never happened [40] and that modern Israel would never endorse ethnic cleansing [41] remained in vogue, even among the respectable Israeli Right, until the collapse of the peace process.
The idea of ethnic cleansing began to regain respectability after Sharon invited outspoken “transfer” advocate Rehavam Ze'evi to join his government in 2001. [42] The protests of Israeli Palestinians in support of the Al Aqsa Intifada [43] confirmed the popular suspicion that they still identified with their fellow Palestinians in the Territories and this too helped make talk of “transfer” more respectable in some Israeli circles. [44] Another significant factor in making talk of “transfer” more acceptable was the rise of advocacy on behalf of the Palestinian refugees calling on Israel to honor their Right of Return. [45] These and other factors led to a considerable increase in the number of Israelis that openly support the notion of “transfer”, as illustrated by various public opinion polls. [46] However, it should be noted that most Israelis supporting this notion in fact supported “voluntary transfer” as opposed to openly endorsing outright ethnic cleansing. Depending on who asked the question, “voluntary transfer” could mean either financially bribing Palestinians to leave or making life utterly impossible for Palestinians thereby “encouraging” emigration. The problem with the idea of “voluntary transfer” is that it is a largely fanciful notion that has never been seriously proposed and would probably be rejected by most Palestinians if it were.
Despite a myriad of proposals to provide economic incentives in exchange for Palestinian emigration, [47] realistically no serious offers to this effect have ever been presented by any Israeli government. In fact, even when the Israelis were encouraging the Palestine Authority to handle the “dirty work” of occupation on its behalf Israel refused to pay the bill, [48] calling on the world community do so. If Israel was unwilling to pay for the Palestinian Authority with full knowledge that most such money would remain within the Occupied Territories, and thus within reach; it seems extremely unlikely that Israel would be willing to pay vast sums to Palestinians to take outside of Israel/Palestine. Further, unless these financial incentives were truly extravagant, it is highly debatable how many Palestinians would accept such an offer knowing that to do so would mean permanently turning their back on their native land. [49] Like the Geneva Initiatives, there exists absolutely no reason to believe that any Israeli government would be willing to seriously consider this suggestion in terms that most Palestinians would accept.
As for “slow”, “creeping”, or “soft” transfer – slowly ethnically cleansing the land by attrition by making life utterly impossible for Palestinians – this has effectively been Israeli policy since the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada. [50] While the tactic has successfully resulted in the de facto expulsion of many Palestinians, [51] the tactic has not been effective enough to address Israel’s demographic concerns. Such measures have been primarily employed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where the legal status of the resident Palestinian population makes emigration extremely difficult, if not outright impossible. [52] Since most Palestinians in the Territories simply do not have the option of leaving, the notion of making their lives unbearable can not - and will not - result in increased emigration in large enough numbers to satisfy Israeli concerns.
The inescapable conclusion is that “voluntary transfer” is little more than a completely unrealistic fantasy. Therefore, most serious ‘transfer’ advocates must be really advocating forcible transfer, the deliberate and systematic ethnic cleansing of Israel/Palestine. This is the only way that “transfer” could result in a sustainable permanent peace inside the borders of Israel/Palestine and a unitary, undivided ethnocentric nation-state could be created. Though most advocates for this program are careful to frame this intention in relatively benign terminology, ultimately all transfer rhetoric is idle unless it is interpreted as meaning forced involuntary expulsion of the ethnically undesirable population.
This conclusion inevitably leads to another question: Is forced systematic ethnic cleansing really an option for Israel? Israel probably does have the brute military strength required to physically move any and all Palestinians from point A to point B against their will; however, when explored in detail, the idea of ethnic cleansing becomes much less viable than is popularly assumed. Further such a scheme seems likely to only exacerbate the existing problems of maintaining an indefinite military occupation and competing with the Palestinians demographically.
III. Expulsion to Where?
The most obvious problem with the supposition that “transfer” represents a realistic option for Israel deals with where, precisely, to expel the Palestinian population to. Despite some hints to the contrary, [53] none of Israel’s neighbors has any intention whatsoever of opening its borders to some four to five million highly-politicized involuntary Palestinian expellees. Such an enormous demographic shift would virtually guarantee the destruction of the existing governments of Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon; and while the Egyptian government might survive such an upheaval, it certainly wouldn’t voluntarily welcome it. Consequently, this means that Israel would be forced to invade and occupy the destination country as a first step in any ethnic cleansing scenario. The numbers involved mean that this would absolutely have to be a land based operation, meaning that these four states are the only ones under consideration as potential destinations. The question of where Israel could expel the Palestinian population deserves some attention.
a. Jordan
The most popular and traditional potential destination for the Palestinian population among “transfer” advocates is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on the other side of the Jordan river. A number of factors make this a popularly suggested destination, including Jordan’s historical association with the British Mandate, the fact that the majority of the Jordanian population is already Palestinian, [54] and the suggestion that Jordan has more than enough land to settle them on. [55]
However, the idea of invading and occupying Jordan also presents some major problems. First, in that there is virtually no chance that the Hashemite monarchy could survive such a massive influx of involuntary expellees, it can be safely assumed that they would use any all means available to resist. Secondly, the Jordanian monarchy represents one of the few Arabic governments that has both a historical record of cooperating with Israel [56] as well as a current policy of doing so [57] and is one of only two Arab states with a formal peace treaty with Israel. Finally, Jordan has entered into a close relationship with Israel’s primary benefactor, the United States, including a free trade agreement [58] and active cooperation with the U.S. “War on Terror." [59]
Thus, not only is it questionable as to whether or not wiping out the Hashemite monarchy would serve Israel’s interests, the notion that the United States would even allow Israel to do so is also debatable.
b. Lebanon
Another option that has been suggested is Lebanon. Lebanese instability, plus the large number of Palestinian refugees already living there, tends to suggest that Lebanon could serve as a suitable “dumping ground” in an ethnic cleansing scenario. The continued existence of Hezbollah could serve as an excuse for an Israeli invasion and occupation just as the existence of Palestinian resistance groups did in 1982. The Summer War of 2006 illustrated that no Lebanese government – even a pro-American one – can count on any external assistance when under Israeli attack. Finally, Israel already has considerable experience with maintaining a protracted occupation in Lebanon, as well as an extensive network of collaborators willing to handle some of the “dirty work.” [60]
However this scenario also presents a number of problems, not least of which is the fact that this would essentially result in a reversion to the situation as it existed in 1982. Such an enormous influx of angry expellees would almost inevitably result in a new Lebanese civil war, demanding protracted Israeli involvement throughout the country. Further, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, noting Hezbollah’s successful tactics, the revived Israeli occupation would be much more difficult than it was previously. Finally, such a move would effectively reintegrate the largest of the “forgotten” Palestinian refugee populations - those currently resident in Lebanon – back into the Palestinian struggle. [61]
While such an operation is theoretically possible, realistically it would be both an immediate and protracted disaster for Israel that would inevitably strain both the military and the state indefinitely. Once in, it would be virtually impossible for Israel to leave without sacrificing the security of most of northern Israel.
c. Egypt
Egypt is the one neighboring country whose government could probably survive the influx of Palestinian expellees. Further the Sinai could theoretically serve as both a destination area for the deported Palestinians and as a defensible buffer area between Israeli and Egyptian ground forces. In a strictly geographic sense, taking the Sinai would appear to be the best destination option for an ethnic cleansing scenario.
Of course looking beyond mere geography, a number of serious complications arise that make this option probably the least likely choice. First, Egypt is not only the most populous Arab state, but also has the most advanced military of Israel’s immediate neighbors [62] and has historically inflicted high casualties on Israel in previous wars. Egypt is also the other of the two Arab states with formal peace treaties with Israel and engages in significant – though downplayed – cooperation with Israel. [63] An even more important complication is Egypt’s relationship with the United States, from whom it receives massive financial aid [64] and has played a significant role in supporting the U.S. “War on Terror.” [65] The conclusion is that such a move would end Israel’s longest peaceful relationship with a neighboring state while Egypt can, and probably would, militarily resist exacting a significant price. Further, due to Egypt’s relationship with the United States and overall geopolitical significance, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the United States simply would not allow Israel to attack, invade, and occupy the Sinai or any other part of Egypt.
d. Syria
Syria is in the unenviable position of being confronted with active hostility from both Israel and the United States. Syria, like Jordan, ostensibly has enough land to handle the influx of expellees and an Israeli invasion would provide the opportunity to oust the regime of one of Israel’s primary regional enemies. Further, unlike Jordan or Egypt, such a move would be unlikely to receive censure from the United States. In fact it has been convincingly argued that the reason behind giving Israel a “free hand” during the Summer War of 2006 was that the U.S. intended for Israel to attack Syria. [66]
The primary problem with this notion - for Israel at least - is that Syria is not defenseless and maintains a “doomsday” option of its own. While in conventional terms it is unlikely that Syria would be able to effectively defend itself against an Israeli invasion, given a “nothing to lose” type situation, Syria has a massive chemical weapons stockpile [67] as well as an arsenal of missiles [68] capable of delivering these weapons. While the Israeli response to such an assault from Syria would probably be cataclysmic, if convinced that they are facing destruction anyway, there is no sound reason to believe that the Syrian government would shy away from using their “weapon of last resort.” All it would take would be a few Syrian missiles with chemical weapons to land in Israeli population centers to radically alter Israel’s situation in all respects. [69]
e. Protracted Occupation
Regardless of the destination chosen to serve as Israel’s “dumping ground” for the Palestinian population, another major aspect of the question is Israel’s ability to maintain its occupation for a protracted period. If Israel were willing to accept a Palestinian state with control of their own borders and import/export policy; then one of the major stumbling blocks for a two-state option within the Occupied Palestinian Territories would be resolved. However, as Israel has made clear, “security” precludes any Palestinian control over their borders or trade. [70] This same concern would hold true if the Palestinians were expelled to a neighboring state.
Specifically, if the Palestinians were allowed to freely import weapons and to freely import volunteer fighters, the Palestinian entity would become an intolerable threat to Israel’s security. Granting that even the expelled Palestinians would still have to be under Israeli security control, this would require massive long-term direct Israeli involvement. So in effect, this would amount to a radical expansion of the territory under perpetual Israeli military occupation. Such a scenario would also lead to an increase in the number of Arabs under Israeli military control as the already resident population would be added to the Palestinians. Increasing the area under long-term military occupation as well as the number of Arabs under direct Israeli control largely defeats the purpose of the whole exercise.
IV. Domestic Opposition
In the modern age when forced population transfers are no longer deemed acceptable, there would be inevitably be significant opposition to any effort at ethnically cleansing Israel/Palestine of its native population. Israel began the territorial aspect of its nationalist program too late to benefit from the conventional acceptance of ethnic cleansing that other earlier settler-states benefited from. The various ethnic cleansing schemes in Bosnia-Herzegovina finalized the notion that such tactics are completely unacceptable in the modern world.
This section only looks at the nature of opposition from the Palestinian victims and Israeli dissenters, as these are the two groups directly involved. Inevitably, an Israeli invasion and occupation of one of its neighbors followed by a forcible population transfer would result in various international reactions, but these are largely speculative. The Summer War in 2006 showed that the world community as a whole will not intervene against a full-scale Israeli onslaught against a neighboring state; nevertheless, the actions required to implement an ethnic cleansing program would be much more dramatic and as such might result in a more aggressive international response. Regardless, discussion of the nature of potential international reactions to such a scenario would be purely speculative and therefore this article does not concern itself with them.
The domestic opposition, namely the resistance of the Palestinians themselves as well as Israeli opposition are both completely predictable and can be explored in some detail based on current and past behaviors.
a. Palestinian Opposition
Obviously the most passionate opposition to an ethnic cleansing scenario would come from the victims themselves, the Palestinian people. In general, “transfer” advocates – excepting those arguing for unrealistic “voluntary” schemes – rarely go into any detail on how “transfer” or expulsion would be accomplished. This is because there is no “polite” way to describe such a process, therefore it is generally ignored. The strategy appears to be that first they want to gain a popular consensus supporting the general idea and only after that will all the nasty details be expounded upon. In the absence of any meaningful discussion of implementation, the default assumption appears to be that such a “transfer” would be similar to, and patterned on, the ethnic cleansing of 1948. That is, by use of terror tactics, psychological operations, and some forced removals; [71] the vast majority of Palestinians could be effectively “stampeded” in a panic to the “safety” of the desired destination.
The problem with such a fanciful notion is that it completely fails to take into account the lessons learned by the Palestinian people from Al Nakba. In 1948, the vast majority of Palestinians expelled were simple and uneducated fellahin and most that fled under Israeli pressure did so assuming that they would be able to return to their homes and properties after the fighting ended. Of course the Zionist movement had absolutely no intention of allowing this as it was the land they were after, not merely political control. The lesson – that if Palestinians leave their land they will never be allowed to return – has been learned; and as a consequence, Palestinians are much less likely to voluntarily flee than their forefathers were. This steadfastness was perhaps best exemplified during Israel’s 2002 “Operation Defensive Shield” that amounted to a series of full IDF attacks on various refugee camps in the West Bank. [72] Despite the onslaught, the vast majority of Palestinians flatly refused to evacuate the area. In a scenario of permanent removal – ethnic cleansing – one can safely assume that Palestinian steadfastness would be even more pronounced.
Further, unlike the majority of the fellahin in 1948, most modern Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have grown somewhat accustomed to living under brutal military rule, to Israeli attacks and raids, and other large scale violence. Thus the Palestinian people are not generally as easily frightened or intimidated as their forefathers were.
These two factors – knowledge that removal is probably permanent and a general unwillingness to be easily frightened away – mean that any Israeli effort at forced expulsion would inevitably be a very “hands on” affair. That is, ethnic cleansing would require direct individual-level forced expulsion, soldiers literally rounding up and physically removing the bulk of the Palestinian population. To make such a process even less desirable, it would inevitably be accompanied by various methods of Palestinian resistance, including armed resistance and suicide attacks, so there can be little doubt that any such effort would also be an extremely bloody affair. While the IDF record undeniably shows willingness to indiscriminately shoot Palestinians, [73] most such incidents are isolated from others and many are done at long range; whereas in an effort at forced expulsion the requisite killing would be on an entirely different order of magnitude and much more personal.
b. Israeli Opposition
As described above discussing Palestinian opposition, any modern effort at forced expulsion would inevitably be a very “hands on” up close and personal affair; therefore it would require a comprehensive national effort. Increased troops would be required to maintain and tighten control over Israel/Palestine collectively as well as maintaining control over the chosen destination for the expellees indefinitely.
Despite the fact that there would have to be a large majority of Israelis politically supporting the notion of “transfer” for it to move towards actual implementation; this support could not be only political. Such a massive effort would demand a full national mobilization of not only the standing IDF, but the reserves as well. For Israelis, such a policy would demand direct and active participation from most of the able-bodied populace, not just a quick, unobtrusive vote. When confronted with the necessity of direct personal participation, the idea loses a considerable amount of appeal.
The question of whether or not the Israelis could mobilize a full national effort to conduct such an onerous process is also highly questionable. In the mainstream Israeli view, the Summer War of 2006 was a fully justified response to the Hezbollah abduction of two Israeli soldiers. Nevertheless, despite the general view that the Israeli response was proper and justified, there were still thousands of Israelis actively marching in the street against the military onslaught in both Gaza and Lebanon. [74] This protest movement illustrated that even in situations where the vast majority of Israelis believe the action in question is justified, there is still significant opposition.
Another complication is that many in Israel clearly differentiate between ostensibly defensive military service “in their land” – which usually includes the Occupied Palestinian Territories as well – and serving in other countries. An example of this is the original Refusnik movement that was launched by Israelis refusing occupation duty in southern Lebanon. [75] The invasion, subjugation and protracted occupation of territory that is unquestionably not Israeli would likely pose a significant morale problem for Israel.
Yet another issue relates to the general assumption of innocence among Israelis regarding IDF behavior. That is, most Israelis still assume that although the military might make mistakes on occasion, in general it is a relatively humane and conscientious institution, despite testimony to the contrary. Since “transfer” would demand those participating to conduct an operation that could only be justified in an abstract political way and would involve actions that could not be characterized as in any way humane; the likelihood is that opposition and rejection would again be noticeably increased. Even today a number of Israeli soldiers have rejected occupation and decided to speak out against what they were ordered to do in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. [76]
The point is that it is extremely doubtful that Israel could conduct a comprehensive ethnic cleansing campaign without the active support and participation of an overwhelming majority of Israelis, and getting such an overwhelming majority to directly join in such a program seems unlikely at best.
V. Effects for Israel
Realistically speaking, the effects of engaging in such an operation would likely be completely disastrous for Israel on many different levels, even – as noted above – ignoring potential international intervention. As described below, not only is it unlikely that such a program would resolve most of the existing issues faced by Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but it would probably exacerbate many of them while placing a much greater strain on the Israeli state.
a. Expanding Military Occupation
As noted previously, one of the primary objections to a viable Palestinian state within Israel/Palestine is that Israeli security concerns completely rule out the notion of affording the Palestinians free control of their own borders, immigration policy, and trade – import/export – policy. If this is true for any Palestinian state inside Palestine/Israel, it is also true for any Palestinian state on the border. This means that Israel would have to maintain control over whatever territory is chosen as a destination for the ethnic cleansing program. Thus, after the operation was completed, Israel would remain locked in an indefinite military occupation of territory that it has even less of a claim to than the current Occupied Palestinian Territories.
b. More Arabs under Israeli control
Although a successful “transfer” scheme would ultimately result in less – or even no – Arabs within Israel/Palestine itself, the number of Arabs under permanent Israeli control would in fact increase. This is because not only would most of the Palestinians remain under Israeli control; to these would be added whatever Arab population was already resident in the destination territory. Although it is likely that Israel would institute various self-administration partial-autonomy measures, in the end the actual number of Arabs under Israeli military control would increase and these too would have valid grievances and claims against Israel.
c. Encouraging Jewish Emigration
For such a policy to be put into practice, a strong majority of Israelis would have to support – and actively participate – in the process. In that most Israelis, especially the more liberal secularists most likely to oppose such a measure, are well-educated and have marketable skills; it seems probable that those strongly opposed to ethnic cleansing would take advantage of their opportunities and would emigrate from Israel/Palestine. As of 2004 there were already some 760,000 Israelis living abroad full-time [77] and the adoption of such a policy could only result in even more leaving Israel permanently. Although after a successful ethnic cleansing operation the perceived “demographic crisis” within Israel/Palestine would be at least temporarily resolved; Israel would still be forced to constantly increase the gross number of Israeli Jews resident in Israel/Palestine to maintain the new status quo. Thus emigration would undermine the sustainability of the new situation in much the same way it undermines the current status quo.
d. Discouraging Jewish Immigration
Despite the blind eye turned toward Israeli actions and gross double standards applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, most non-Israeli Jews, being both minorities and the targets of hate groups, tend to be disposed toward a liberal and tolerant outlook. It is only by ignoring Israeli behavior and myopically focusing on the worst extremes of Palestinian reaction that are they able to maintain this double-standard regarding Israeli treatment of the Palestinian people. However, modern communications – flashing images and testimony of actual events around the world in real time – has severely undermined their ability to ignore the Palestinian situation.
In a development as extreme as invasion, occupation and ethnic cleansing, most non-Israeli Jews would find it virtually impossible to continue turning a blind eye to Israeli behavior, forcing them to literally choose between whatever ostensible connection they have to Israel and their general world view and outlook. In such a scenario and in view of current trends – an increase in Jewish dissent from orthodox Zionist ideology [78] – it is not unreasonable to believe that a significant number, perhaps even a majority, of non-Israeli Jews would repudiate Israel and Zionism. Further, even for those able to maintain the double-standard or those that believe ethnic cleansing is justifiable, in view of their relative security and prosperity elsewhere, it seems likely that few would choose to voluntarily hop into such a contentious situation by immigrating. It is one thing to support Israeli atrocity from the safety and security of the United States, but it is entirely another to move there and have your own children conscripted into the fighting. The probable result would be that immigration from the developed world – where the majority of non-Israeli Jews live – would decline dramatically; making Israel’s demographic situation even more precarious.
e. Extreme upsurge in Global Anti-Zionism
Regardless of the reaction of foreign governments and international formations, such a policy would inevitably result in a massive upsurge in popular global anti-Zionism and probably anti-Semitism as well by those who do not differentiate between Judaism and Zionism. Of course, Israel thrives on anti-Semitism, as it validates the entire Zionist project and encourages immigration, but as Israel is not economically self-sufficient, [79] it cannot turn its back on the rest of the world either. Therefore those Jews that flatly reject the ethnic cleansing policy – and thus refuse to immigrate to Israel – would be almost forced to become outspoken opponents of Israel and Zionism. The result would be even more Jewish dissidents strengthening the movement towards popular rejection of Zionism as an ethnocentric – racist - ideology and more clearly differentiating between racist anti-Semitism and humanist anti-Zionism.
VI. Conclusion
Although the threat of “transfer” – ethnic cleansing – has served as a dark shadow behind all Israeli measures related to the Palestinians, this article has tried to show that in reality it is largely an idle threat. Though such a policy could theoretically result in the ethnic “purification” of Israel/Palestine, it could only do so by radically expanding and exacerbating Israel’s current problems and would, in all probability, escalate the collapse of the entire Zionist enterprise.
When explored in some detail, the entire threat of ethnic cleansing as a viable option for Israel becomes much less likely and possibly even suicidal. Of course this means that the default – the sole remaining option – is some sort of co-existence model. Despite the threat of ethnic cleansing, it really is time that people devoted to finding a way out of the current impasse begin working on the ways and means of achieving peaceful co-existence within Israel/Palestine. Ethnic cleansing is simply not a real threat today and does not deserve the degree of serious consideration that it has been afforded by people both supporting the notion and fearing it.
Notes
*John Sigler is a writer and activist based in Denver, Colorado. Among the various projects he is currently involved with are the Colorado-Palestine Solidarity Campaign (http://colorado-palestine.blogspot.com/), Jewish Friends of Palestine (http://www.jewishfriendspalestine.org/), and the U.S. Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation. Recent independent side projects include the One State Online Bibliography Project (http://www.onestate.org/) and others.
[12] John Ward Anderson & Molly Moore, "Palestinian Authority Broke and In Disarray; Collapse Is 'Real Possibility,'" Washington Post, 1 March 2004
[28] Elaine Sciolino, “Informal Peace Plan for Mideast Is Unveiled in Geneva,” New York Times, 1 December 2003
[34] Chaim Simons, A Historical Survey of Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine, 1895-1947, Self-Published, Kiryat Arba, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Revised edition, 3 June 2003
[35] Rony E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study), Paris: Librairie Minard, 1959, p. 88.
[45] BADIL Resource Center, "The Right of Return: Palestinian Refugees and Prospects for a Durable Peace, BADIL Briefing Paper," BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights Website, 8 April 2000, http://tari.org/badil.htm
[49] A famous poll commissioned by a group supporting the “voluntary transfer” of ethnic undesirables (Arabs) from the “Jewish State” relates: "Close to 20% (17%) explicitly declare that if they had the ability and resources, they would relocate and permanently reside in some other country." Jerusalem Summit, “Poll among Palestinians favors Humanitarian Solution,” Jerusalem Summit Website, 22 November 2004, http://www.jerusalemsummit.org/eng/news.php?news=102
[50] Tanya Reinhart, Israel/ Palestine: How to End the War of 1948, Seven Stories Press, St. Paul (MN), 2002
[52] Recognizing this problem, at least one Right-wing Israeli Jewish organization has been established to “assist” Palestinians with leaving and selling their landed property to Jews: Hamotzi-Assisted Emigration Services, http://www.emigrations.net/ See: Haim Shapiro, "New organization aims 'to empty the state of Arabs'," Jerusalem Post, 26 August 2002
[56] Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine, Columbia University Press, 1988
[57] Lori Plotkin, Israel-Jordan Peace: Taking Stock, 1994-1997, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997
[71] Benny Morris, "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948," Middle Eastern Studies, January 1986, pp. 5-19.
[79] Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," CRS [Congressional Research Service] Issue Brief for Congress - CRS Web, 26 April 2005, http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/israel_asst.pdf "Israel is not economically self-sufficient, and relies on foreign assistance and borrowing to maintain its economy."
