Contra Michael Neumann & his "snake oil"

Contra Michael Neumann & his “snake oil”
By John Sigler, 27 May 2007

I. Preliminary Notes and Observations

On May 15, 2007, Michael Neumann - the Canadian academic, writer, and outspoken advocate for Palestine – had an article entitled “Two States, One State and Snake Oil” published at Counterpunch.

Like many of those hostile to one state advocacy, Neumann’s credentials in support of the Palestinian people are impeccable, so this should be seen as an argument among friends. This author flatly rejects the contention by Uri Avnery that there can be “no compromise”[1] between one state supporters and two state supporters; instead agreeing with the Jewish Voice for Peace position: “the situation is so dire and so far away from a permanent resolution that allowing academic debates over one or two state solutions to divide us does not make sense to us.” [2]

That being said, Neumann’s “Two States, One State and Snake Oil” is a direct attack on modern one state advocacy that deserves analysis and refutation. The over all gist of the piece is that modern integrationist one state advocacy is “cheap” and “is sold without a price tag” and is therefore “snake oil,” or a magical cure all that cannot be taken seriously. While there are a myriad of apparently random attacks on various aspects of one state advocacy, the key argument tends to focus on the settlements and settlers, arguing that removing the Israeli settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), is a much more realistic option than challenging the dominant role of the Zionist ideology in both Israel Proper (pre-1967) and the OPTs collectively. This is not an uncommon argument and deserves to be addressed, as will be done in the following deconstruction of the article in question.

One observation that should be noted is that in his book “The Case Against Israel,” Neumann identifies the political ideology of Zionism as being more or less the root of the conflict, but then goes on to validate this ideology by arguing that the solution is for Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders. While sharing the view that the ethnocentric and exclusivist ideology of Zionism is the root of the problem, many one state supporters argue that as such, this should be the target of our activism. In other words, that the physical manifestation of this ideology – the modern state of Israel and the only functional governmental authority in all of Israel/Palestine – is not the problem in of itself, but instead can serve as an effective foundation for the creation of a post-Zionist ethnically-neutral state encompassing all of Israel/Palestine.

II. Deconstruction and Refutation

1. Paragraphs 1-3

Neumann begins his article by constructing a disingenuous “straw man” that is promptly toppled by the end of the third paragraph. A not uncommon rhetorical device, in this instance it is accomplished by describing the old 1960’s PLO one state proposition, specifically that most – or even all – Jews that have immigrated to Palestine over the past hundred years or so as part of the Zionist project simply pack up and leave, leaving the land to the Palestinians. Neumann finds this proposition “unattainable but otherwise unobjectionable” and promptly tears down his construction by saying “I don’t feel there’s the slightest chance that Israelis would accept a one-state solution as described….”

The clear intent is to associate one state advocacy in general with what amounts to a completely unrealistic scenario as an opening salvo. In reality, this “straw man” construct has no bearing on the issue at all. One of the core assumptions of modern one state advocacy is that both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are “there to stay” and thus have to find some realistic way to co-exist within the confines of modern Israel/Palestine. A few marginal fringe elements notwithstanding, in general no serious advocate for the modern one state position argues for Israeli Jews to leave en masse. In fact, such a position completely defeats the purpose of modern one state advocacy as if this was seen as a realistic option then the old PLO model would be the rallying cry: “One Palestinian State” as opposed to the actual position of one democratic secular state for all its people regardless of ethnicity or religion.

2. Paragraph 4

Paragraph four is essentially an attack on modern one state advocacy arguing that the promise of one democratic secular state is “cheap,” i.e. that neither side has much to lose in adopting this strategy.

It is true that in general the modern one state camp argues that the transition away from exclusionary nationalism is easier than changing all elements of the physical reality on the ground, but this assertion is not based on the supposition that such an ideological transformation is “easy” per se; instead it is based on the notion that this transformation is already well underway. Modern one state advocacy is merely the logical result of current trends on both sides of the divide.

On the Palestinian side of the equation, the “vanguard” of the movement is the 1948 Palestinians that hold Israeli citizenship. This camp has become dramatically more outspoken in recent years, as exemplified by the recent release of “The Future Vision” paper by the Israeli Palestinian leadership [3] and Adalah’s “The Democratic Constitution” document [4]. Within the OPTs, popular support for a bi-national state has remained within the 25% to 35% range for the last few years [5] and this is a trend that is growing. With the refusal of Israel to end the effective occupation of Gaza even after “Disengagement” and the continued expansion of both the Wall and settlements in the West Bank, it is only logical that an ever increasing number of Palestinians are reaching the realization that a truly sovereign Palestinian state is not in the cards. Among the external refugees, especially those most desperately interested in return like those in Lebanon, many of their claims are focused inside the Green Line, and therefore it is unlikely that concentration in a Palestinian statelet would be considered an acceptable resolution to their situation.

On the Israeli side, despite the official standing of the Zionist ideology and its outspoken propaganda efforts, on the individual level many Israelis do not consider the notion of maintaining Zionist supremacy worth the effort. This trend is known as Post-Zionism and was well documented by Yoram Hazony in his desperate appeal for a rejuvenation of Zionist enthusiasm [6]. However, more than just an intellectual exercise, the trend is graphically illustrated in the number of Israelis choosing to voluntarily emigrate abroad. Already by 1993 some 760,000 Israelis had already emigrated abroad [7], though for demographic purposes they are still counted among “Israelis” with the false implication that they actually live in Eretz Israel. Further this is a trend that continues to increase as illustrated in recent media reports about how emigration has now overtaken immigration among Israeli Jews [8]. Quite simply, younger Israelis, like younger Jews of other cultures, are no longer locked in the persecution complex that demands an ethnocentric and exclusive “Jewish State” today and there can be no bolder statement of this than the emigration trends from Israel.

The one state advocate is not generally arguing that shedding ethnocentric and exclusionary ideology is a “cheap” or easy undertaking, but that it is a current reality happening by itself without any external stimuli. In the absence of the ideological demands for exclusivity and ethnic domination – on both sides – the one state proposition is both logical and realistic. Of course this is not to argue that there aren’t many obstacles to overcome – all one state advocates concede this – but that the obstacles are ones of ideology and attitude as opposed to physical separatist schemes.

3. Paragraphs 5-9

The focus of this section of the article is a series of random attacks on various aspects of the common one state practice of drawing inspiration and examples from the South African experience. Neumann quite correctly points out that many modern one state advocates – including this writer – rely heavily on the South African example and then he moves on to point out some of the key differences between South Africa and Israel/Palestine. However, this is something of another “straw man” construct as no one argues that the two situations are/were identical or that the significant differences should be ignored. It is not difficult to point out significant differences, but this does not invalidate many similarities either; the proposition that “no comparison is valid unless all comparisons are valid” is patent nonsense.

Neumann’s first line of attack relates to land and resources:

“South Africa is big (1,219,912 sq km), Palestine tiny (26,320 square kms). South Africa resource-rich, Palestine resource-poor. What is tolerable in South Africa is by no means tolerable in Palestine: the extraordinary magnanimity of South Africa's current leaders towards the white population is based on an abundance of land and resources not available in the Israel/Palestine conflict.”

Of course this is a legitimate difference, but it is also a misleading one. Both South Africa and Israel/Palestine are modern states whose primary economic strength is urban and industrial/technological in nature with the rural agricultural sector playing a secondary role. The same is true in modern Israel and would be true in the OPTs if they were allowed to develop without the retarding influence if the Israeli military occupation. The modern rural Afrikaner farms and African farming villages play an important sentimental role, but are not driving forces of the modern state and the same could be realized in Israel/Palestine. There is nothing to say that there cannot be small “Jews Only” rural kibbutzim or “Arab Only” farming villages in a united democratic state because the real economic power will remain urban and industrial/technological in nature.

Neumann then moves on to make a quick observation regarding the demographic differences, that are real enough but also relatively immaterial to the overall one state perspective. The demographic balance already slightly favors the Palestinians [9] and this is a trend that will only continue. Nevertheless, even this constitutes something of an argument in favor of a one state accommodation as to paraphrase noted Israeli one state supporter Daniel Gavron, it behooves Israeli Jews reach an accommodation from a position of strength before demographics erode it.

Neumann then moves on to a very valid point:

“When at last South African whites made serious concessions, it was not because they were awed by the fortitude of Nelson Mandela or crushed by economic boycotts. It was because violence within South Africa's borders was spiraling out of control.”

This is a valid observation. Unlike some of the self-congratulatory arguments presented by some of the anti-Apartheid activists abroad [10] it was of course the domestic opposition – much of which was violent – that really forced the white population to come to terms with the situation [11]. Similarly, the uprisings in the OPTs have also played a pivotal role in the Israel/Palestine conflict. It is almost impossible to believe that the Madrid or Oslo talks would have come about were it not for the First Intifada and similarly that Israel would be paying any attention whatsoever to the Palestinian issue if it wasn’t for the current hostilities, as has been repeatedly illustrated in times of relative Palestinian docility, 1967-1987 and 1993-1996. While clearly differentiating between terrorism and legal armed resistance [12], it cannot be realistically denied that violent pressure is required to keep the issue on the table at all. In so many words, the Palestinians only have one thing to offer that Israel really wants and needs and that is peace, so they would be foolish to surrender this one bargaining chip for anything less than an acceptable resolution to the issue.

However, Neumann then continues on to conclude that: “Israel does not fear massive violent unrest within its own borders. Israeli Arab rioters will not bring it down.”

What is neglected here is that the same was true in Apartheid South Africa. In a feat of strength, the African opposition had virtually no chance of forcibly bringing down Apartheid either. It was suggested that if it the whites chose to fight it out to the bitter end, they could have maintained their system for another couple of decades through increased armed repression and violence. Similarly no one – even most of the Palestinian militants that have discussed it publicly – believe that they can bring down the Israeli system through sheer force of arms; but they do recognize the vital role for continued resistance to maintain the pressure. This is standard guerrilla strategy in asymmetric conflicts, use violence to keep up the pressure though recognizing that victory will not be won through this tactic alone. Both sides of the conflict in South Africa and Israel/Palestine essentially hit an impasse; the insurgents couldn’t overthrow the existing system by force, but the existing system couldn’t eliminate the violent opposition either. In South Africa, the whites recognized this impasse and opted to compromise from a position of strength because time was against them; and most one state advocates argue that it is only a matter of time before Israelis reach this same conclusion.

So Neumann is correct, Palestinian resistance will not bring down the Zionist system, then again, African resistance could not bring down the Apartheid system either. Instead the goal is a strategic shift in the thinking of the dominant group that is/was the goal and this is realizable.

4. Paragraph 10

This paragraph makes two distinct arguments. The first is that the Zionist drive for a “Jewish State” is more deeply felt than the Afrikaner belief that white supremacy was fundamental to their national survival; and the second is that the world community lends more legitimacy to this article of faith among Zionist ideologues than it ever did for the similar case presented by Afrikaner nationalists.

Neumann writes:

“Finally and crucially, Israel's attachment to its existence as a Jewish state runs far deeper than the Boers' attachment to apartheid, because Israel thinks of itself as the sole barrier to the physical extermination of the Jewish race.”

Anyone who has bothered to read the writings of Afrikaner nationalists recognizes immediately how absurd this contention is. The Afrikaner people represent a unique national grouping unlike any other people – very much as Israeli Jews constitute a completely unique Jewish nationality unlike any other, even other Jewish communities – and as such they fervently believed in no uncertain terms that the maintenance of white supremacy against the “black menace” was absolutely vital for maintaining their national existence. In fact, the Afrikaner arguments were almost identical to Zionist arguments today, from the threat of being “driven into the sea” and/or otherwise exterminated to arguments that their right to national self-determination precludes accommodation with fellow residents of the same country that are not part of the nation. The arguments of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) – the Afrikaner “think-tank” that justified and defended Apartheid – almost exactly parallel similar arguments presented today by the World Zionist Organization and similar formations. The hard-core Afrikaner nationalist saw the white supremacy of Apartheid as “the sole barrier to the physical extermination” of the Afrikaner people just as fervently as any avid Zionist sees the same in Israel.

In the second part of the argument, Neumann writes:

“This commitment is fervently supported by the great powers; its legitimacy is an article of faith: in marked contrast, it was the *ill*egitimacy of South Africa's apartheid state that became an article of faith among those same great powers. In other words, international support for Israel's current status is mountainously greater than support for South Africa's apartheid.”

It is certainly true that the world community in general, and especially the dominant “First World” states, have afforded Zionist ideology and its claims vastly more legitimacy and justification than they ever extended to the exact same arguments made by the Afrikaners. However, the last 20 years of Palestinian struggle (beginning with the start of the First Intifada and continuing to the present) coupled with the fact that Jews – in fact a majority of Jews – live throughout the “First World” and live well there, has utterly undermined the central Zionist thesis, namely that Israel is an absolute requirement for the continuation of the Jewish people. A review of United Nations voting patterns [13] clearly illustrates that if it were not for US diplomatic pressure and protection, most of the world community – including most of the “First World” - would have long ago imposed South African-style sanctions against Israel pending a mutually acceptable resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians. In effect, the empirical voting record of the United Nations as well as other international bodies (such as the Conference of Signatory Powers to the Geneva Conventions) graphically illustrates the invalidity of Neumann’s contention.

5. Paragraphs 11-24

This section of the article is focused primarily on the issue of Palestinian land claims. One of the interesting elements of this portion of the article is the “shift” from individual to collective rights within the space four paragraphs (11-14). In paragraph 11 Neumann invalidates a comparison – not unreasonably – with South Africa by focusing on the individual land claims, correctly pointing out that precise land ownership in Israel/Palestine is much better documented than was the case in much (though not all) of South Africa. However, by paragraph 14, in presenting his argument for a resolution of the issue, he completely discards the individual land claims in favor of collective national rights, namely that everything in the OPTs becomes “Palestinian” and that’s that. However, if you are to discard the individual land claims in favor of collective rights, the South African example regains some of its appeal and the issue becomes solvable within a one state model.

Land claims and restitution are issues that are hotly contested even within the one state camp. So the view expressed here should not be taken as that of anyone else. The following is just one of a number of proposed resolutions to the issues raised by Neumann.

For the record, the exact restitution of properties is not mandated by international law as exemplified by U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 [14]. Secondly, an exact restitution is made inviable by 60 years of radical transformation under Israeli auspices; one claimant might find his property is now a high rise apartment building housing hundreds, while another might find his traditional land is now a landfill. Thirdly, since entire generations of refugees have been born since 1948, it has to be assumed that virtually any property from 1948 would today have a myriad of legitimate claimants making exact restitution virtually impossible. If one accepts these arguments – or any of a number of others - as ruling out exact individual restitution as a possibility, one must by necessity accept the contention that a just resolution to the refugee claims has to be treated collectively.

In fact, this is exactly what Neumann suggests in paragraph 14:

“In a two-state solution, land claims are settled in the clearest and most brutal way. The Jewish settlers in the occupied territories leave, period. The whole of the occupied territories belong to the Palestinians. In Israel, the property situation is essentially unchanged, with Israeli Arabs doing as well as they can. Though immeasurably better than the death and starvation that today stalks the Palestinians, this is a bad solution. But it is doable, and its flaws are out in the open.”

Completely discarding the obvious moral and justice related problems with this proposal, there is a much more salient and practical objection, namely could a Palestinian statelet – even granting the unfounded premise that this involved a total Israeli withdrawal and complete Palestinian control of their own borders and resources – physically sustain an influx of Palestinian refugees? While in such a scenario those refugees with acceptable alternatives would probably choose financial compensation over return, those in more dire circumstances – such as those in Lebanon and Iraq – would have little choice but to accept the offer of “return” to the 22% of Palestine that would comprise the Palestinian state.

Even in the most optimistic models – and assuming a total lack of Israeli interference and extremely generous international support – it would take the Palestinian statelet decades to recover from the Israeli occupation and to create a functional enterprise. At the same time, already existing population pressures due to natural growth would only increase creating a situation in the West Bank similar to the one that already exists in Gaza; an enormous population of people in abject poverty with no realistic chance at improving their lot. Is it realistic to expect such an entity to also take responsibility for major segments of the external refugee population as well?

Another of the key elements of modern one state advocacy is that even given ideal circumstances (a complete and total Israeli withdrawal, complete lack of Israeli interference, fully supportive neighboring states, and extremely generous international support), the 22% of Palestine under discussion is simply not large enough, or has the requisite resources, to address the Palestinian issue realistically, especially once the external refugees are added to the equation.

In view of the above, Neumann prudently writes the following:

“And how does this work in the snake oil one-state solution? Here the sales pitch gets murky. In Israel, Jewish property holders either keep what they have, or the disputes continue as they have since before Israel's foundation--it isn't clear. In the occupied territories, though, the settlers get a sweet deal: Jews in the occupied territories simply keep what they have.”

Neumann is very much correct in pointing out that few one state advocates have even suggested a resolution to these issues; however the following represents one proposed solution to the problem.

Granting the previously established premise that individual restitution isn’t a realistic option, the question has to be answered from the perspective of collective rights as opposed to exact restitution of exact properties. In such a scenario the fact that most land is owned not by individuals but by the state provides the answer. Within the Green Line, some 93% of the land is owned by the state and within the OPTs more than 50% of the land has been placed under the ownership of the state [15] including most of the land upon which settlements exist.

First, what privately held land there is should remain privately held by its rightful owners. Should the ownership of such privately held land be contested, the matter should be brought before the courts and the resolution should be based on the merits of the specific case. This does NOT include land held by the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael) inside the Green Line whose lands are governed by the Israeli Land Authority and have been held by the courts to represent Israeli State Lands [16]. Lands held in the OPTs owned by the World Zionist Organization, another pseudo-governmental formation, are also to be considered state land and not private property. UN controlled property, the refugee camps, would also be considered state land.

With respect to state lands, the issue isn’t one of private property rights opposed to state control, but one of non-discriminatory access; a matter of legislation. Using existing Israeli legislation [17] in a non-discriminatory manner as well as existing Israeli legal precedent stemming from the measures taken to integrate previous mass inflows of Jewish olim, the state could easily accommodate the entire Palestinian population, including those external refugees opting for return. Interestingly, Israel’s own unique experience in accepting and integrating large numbers of foreign olim gives it ample experience – as well as an already existing legal/social infrastructure – for integrating large numbers of people who are essentially foreign in every respect. Israel already has the ability to fully house and integrate – with decent conditions – the entire Palestinian population without radically altering the state or harming existing property holders. On the Palestinian side, it wouldn’t be a perfect solution, but it would still be vastly superior to the current situation in the refugee camps and the like.

Finally, who gets to live where? Private land holders should be able to include or exclude who they like, thus the ethnically exclusive kibbutzim or Palestinian villages alluded to previously. However, state lands would have to adopt a non-discriminatory premise, meaning that whoever has the money to purchase a lease should be allowed to do so regardless of ethnicity or religion. Obviously, due to the wealth disparity, many of the well-to-do neighborhoods would see virtually no change at first. The majority of Palestinians would end up in government subsidized communities on state lands, probably with lease restrictions. As for the existing settlements, being almost exclusively on state land, they would have to be open to integration, a process that would probably involve massive security expenditure at first, on par with the forcible integration of institutions in the United States after Brown vs. Board of Education. As for the existing settlers, they could stay or go as they see fit, and being in better financial circumstances they would have a wider range of options available to them.

The above represents one of many proposed solutions to the questions raised by Neumann with respecting to land claims, housing, the settlements and integration.

6. Paragraphs 25-26

The point of these two paragraphs is that it is much easier to remove the settlers than to expect a major ideological shift and the examples of Gaza and Algeria are cited. As commented on previously, the ideological shift is happening on its own quite naturally; so the new question raised here is: would moving the settlers really be easier?

Even if we discard the more important issues (Israeli security, natural resources, Palestinian border control and import/export policy, &c. [18]) and accept Neumann’s premise that if only the settlers could be removed a two state solution would be virtually accomplished, a review of the political climate shows that this isn’t even under consideration, much less in the offing. In a strictly technical sense, Neumann’s observations in these paragraphs are quite legitimate, specifically that the settlements and settlers are not self-sufficient and could not exist without the encouragement, support, and protection of the Israeli state. But this argument rests upon the premise that the Israeli state could be convinced to withdraw this support, something of the standard two state case. However, there are three primary problems here: first there is the character of the settlements and settlers themselves, second there is Israel’s dependency on coalition governments to do anything, and finally there is the very simple lack of Israeli will to change its policy.

To quote Elyakim Ha’etzni:

“The settlers who moved into the house in Hebron and those who plan to march on Homesh today, … are seeking to correct the mistaken belief that the Israeli regime can survive the expulsion of 300,000 people as easily as it survived the expulsion of 8,000… . We must go back to the first grade of pioneering Zionism, on which all of this was built.” [19]

This statement is quite accurate despite the fact that it excludes the 160,000 additional settlers that reside in and around Jerusalem/Al Quds. Quite simply you have almost half a million fully armed, militarily-trained settlers living in the West Bank thriving with the active collaboration and cooperation of the Israeli military [20], even when such collaboration and cooperation runs contrary to official IDF policy. Further, in the wake of the “Disengagement” from Gaza (most of whose settlers relocated to the West Bank [21]), the settlers are reorganizing their political apparatus [22] and increasing their violence against Palestinians [23]. Ha’etzni is quite correct in pointing out that removing hundreds of thousands of settlers is a very different undertaking than removing 8,000 isolated and fenced off settlers from Gaza. Even the bribery technique that convinced most of the Gaza settlers to leave voluntarily – some $200,000 to $350,000 per family [24] – isn’t an option in the West Bank due to the sheer numbers of settlers. Of course Neumann could be right in suggesting that if the Israeli state leaves the OPTs, the settlers will come running right behind and this brings us to the second problem.

The second question is whether or not any Israeli government could remove the settlers due to its political structure. Israel has a proportional multi-party political structure and throughout Israeli history, every government – without exception – has been a coalition government. In many respects this system is more democratic than one- or two-party systems, but at the same time it gives minority parties significant leverage. This means that for a real Israeli withdrawal to even be a possibility, the Israeli public would have to elect a Knesset that is utterly dominated by parties and groups that would be willing to simply leave the OPTs – and following Neumann’s suggestion – leave the settlers behind on the assumption that they would quickly follow the state’s forces behind the Green Line. In order for Neumann’s scenario to work, Israeli citizens would have to elect a strong majority to the Knesset that would be willing to simply turn its back on some 460,000 Israeli citizen settlers on the hope that they would be smart enough to come running “home” afterwards. Discarding the simple fact that absolutely no Israeli political party would – or probably even could – adopt such a platform and maintain any relevance, it is at least theoretically possible, which brings us to the third problem.

Specifically, the third problem rest with Israeli popular will to end the occupation. Poll data does suggest that a majority of the Israelis residing within the Green Line are in general opposed to the settlements, or at least those that are not part of Greater Jerusalem, and is the basis of the Zionist Left’s two state advocacy. However, poll numbers notwithstanding, this alleged majority has never – through forty years of occupation and fifteen years of negotiation – managed to even stop its government’s support of settlement expansion, much less press for withdrawal. Without exception, all Israeli governments since 1967 – Labour, Likud or Kadima – have pressed forward with settlement expansion and are continuing to do so even to this day. [25] Over the last forty years there has only been one brief period when the government stopped all settlement expansion, a period that lasted a few months during the presidency of George H.W. Bush and was literally imposed by the U.S. through then Secretary of State James Baker, and he remains vilified by the Zionist Right to this day because of it. [26] By almost all accounts Israel is a democracy, at least for its Jewish population, therefore the only real conclusion is that either the Israeli majority supporting withdrawal is a myth or that most Israelis, while opposed in principle, don’t really consider the settlements – and by extension the two state solution and the continuation of a “Jewish State” – all that important.

Either way, there is no where near the required popular will to see an Israeli withdrawal from the OPTs as a realistic possibility at present. Even if there were this political will – as the Zionist Left still claims – then it is extremely doubtful whether or not that will would translate into a Knesset capable of maintaining a government that attempted a withdrawal. And finally, even if there were the will and they managed to elect a government strong enough to carry out a withdrawal, due to the sheer numbers of settlers in the West Bank and the religious significance of that region, the level of forced withdrawal – and the subsequent national trauma – would be of an entirely different magnitude than the small withdrawals from Yamit or Gaza.

So, would it truly be easier to remove the settlers than it would be to encourage already existing trends in promoting a shift away from ethnocentric and exclusionary nationalism? Reasonable people may disagree in answering this question, but the notion of simply “removing the settlers” is certainly as cheap – if not more so – than any suggestion coming from the one state camp. At least the one state argument against the nationalist ideologies reflects a current and growing trend whereas forcibly evicting 460,000 Israeli settlers most certainly does not.

7. Paragraph 27

In paragraph 27, Neumann opposes the one state movement on the grounds that it validates the Israeli settler movement and the settlements and “means a great big pat on the back for the very worst, least conciliatory, most violent political forces in Israel, the spoilt, fanatic racial supremacists who conceived the settler movement and made it into the formidable force it is today.”

By this, it has to be assumed the “very worst, least conciliatory, most violent political forces in Israel” being discussed is every democratically elected Israeli government since 1967 “who conceived the settler movement and made it into the formidable force it is today.” In this, he is correct. The entire premise of the one state notion is an acceptance of Israel as a de facto reality that isn’t “going anywhere” just as it accepts the Palestinian people as a de facto reality that isn’t “going away” either. From the beginning of the occupation, every Israeli government set out on a deliberate policy of making separation impossible – just as the vast majority of Palestinians decided they would not be chased out of their country a second time – and both have succeeded in these goals. The one state argument is that separation is no longer an option and in the absence of this possibility there is only one viable alternative.

8. Paragraph 28

This concluding paragraph is just a rather crude attack on Jeff Halper and Virginia Tilley as well as the one state idea in general. His final line – “Humpty Dumpty couldn't have got it more ass-backwards.” – summarizes both his opinion and this paragraph more than adequately. There is nothing to respond to here as everyone is welcome to their own opinion.

III. Concluding Thoughts

This article was chosen to introduce this blog project because it touched on a number common attacks against one state advocacy and raised some legitimate questions and concerns. Contrary to Neumann’s suggestion, a two state solution is no closer than a one state option; neither can be implemented tomorrow nor will be. In fact, it seems that either option is at least a couple decades away from being realizable and if one accepts this, one has to take into account the realities as they will be then. Virtually all one state supporters concede that this notion is a long term idea but also believe that this will be the only route to a viable sustainable permanent peace. This is NOT to argue against palliative measures to relieve the current situation, but only Israel can implement these and it has made it clear that it’s idea of a two state option is either a series of ghettos (like modern Qalqilyah) or a completely controlled little Palestinian Bantustan (like the Palestine Authority during Oslo); and in the end, these options will not result in a lasting peace.

Notes:

[1] Uri Avnery, “One State: Solution or Utopia,” Uri Avnery’s Column (Gush Shalom), 12 May 2007

[2] Jewish Voice for Peace, “JVP Deeply Appreciates Rabbi Lerner's Apology,” Email to JVP list, 12 May 2007

[3] National Committee for the heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, 2006, (English)

[4] Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), The Democratic Constitution, March 2007, (English)

[5] See the routine polls conducted by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC), online at: http://www.jmcc.org/

[6] Yoram Hazony, The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel’s Soul, 2000, Basic Books,

[7] Gideon Alon,"760,000 Israelis have left the Promised Land," Ha'aretz, 19 November 2003

[8] For example, "Emigration from Israel exceeds immigration, report," German Press Agency (DPA), 20 April 2007

[9] Michael Brown, Ali Abunimah, Nigel Parry, “EI Exclusive: Palestinian population exceeds Jewish population says U.S. government” Electronic Intifada, 1 March 2005

[10] For example, George W Shepherd Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western policy in the Liberation of South Africa, 1977, Greenwood Press

[11] For a good introduction to the matter, see: William Cobbett and Robin Cohen, eds. Popular Struggles in South Africa, 1988, Africa World Press

[12] John Sigler, “Palestine: Legitimate Armed Resistance vs. Terrorism,” Electronic Intifada, 17 May 2004

[13] American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, “United Nations Voting Records,” Jewish Virtual Library Website (pro-Zionist source), undated

[14] The resolution “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;” U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, Para.11

[15] B’Tselem, Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002, B’Tselem Website

[16] Uri Avnery, “Abolish the JNF,” ZNet, 21 April 2007,

[17] For example: Agricultural Control Authority Law (5748-1988), Agricultural Settlement (Restrictions on Use of Agricultural Land and of Water) Law (5727-1967), Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law (5710-1950), Development Towns and Development Zones Law (5748-1988), Planning and Building Law (5725—1965), State Property Law (5711-1951), et al.

[18] To quote some of my own comments on this topic made at Realistic Dove at: http://www.realisticdove.org/archives/103#comments

“First there is the issue of borders. Israel’s argument – which is fairly legitimate – is that if a Palestinian state has control of its own borders, esp. in respect to import/export policy and immigration, the Palestinian state would be able to (or assuming the Palestinian gov’t was acting in good faith, its militants would be able to take advantage of corruption to) import all manner of advanced weaponry and/or volunteer fighters resulting in intolerable cross border security situation for Israel. Giving the legitimacy of this concern, the net result is that the borders of the Palestinian Bantustan would remain under Israeli control either directly or indirectly (via the use of international intermediaries, but with an Israeli security override along the lines of the current Gaza crossing into Egypt) thereby placing all external trade and population movement under perpetual Israeli control. This is absolutely unacceptable in any and all Palestinian-supported two-state scenarios.

“Second there is the natural resources issue, which is interpreted as a security matter (http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-29781-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html). This primarily relates to water presently, though once the natural gas deposits off the Gaza coast are tapped, this will be included as well. The key points of contention at present are access to the Jordan River and the West Bank aquifers. As it is, the Jordan River is already under severe threat due to its exploitation by Israel and Jordan even with the existing extreme restrictions on Palestinian water usage in the West Bank (http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/JORDAN.HTM). A sovereign Palestinian state would demand an extreme upsurge in Palestinian access to Jordan River water, a drain that would be not be workable unless Israel dropped its usage, which isn’t on the agenda. In all Israeli-backed plans for a two-state solution, Israel maintains control of the Jordan Valley in part to control the borders and in part to maintain control over the water.

The West Bank aquifers are also being taxed to an extreme today and Israel’s answer is not to stop using the aquifers for its own purposes (most of northern Israel relies on the W. Bank aquifers) but that the Palestinian statelet is to acquire its water from a massive desalination facility in Caesaria – within Israel Proper - instead (http://www.countercurrents.org/pa-pearce210604.htm). This clearly tightens the Bantustan’s dependency on Israel allowing Israel to simply “turn off the water” should the Bantustan misbehave in some way, the same way Israel controls most of the electricity in Gaza. It is a control mechanism that again is completely and utterly incompatible with any Palestinian-supported notion of independence or acceptable vision for a Palestinian state.

“Third, there is the issue of a functioning Palestinian government that would be required to administrate the Bantustan and is plainly a requirement for security. However, as most honest observers will grant, there is no functioning Palestinian government at all and since neither the PLO nor the PA were designed to serve this function (as discussed in more detail on the other thread) there isn’t even the pretense to a starting point. In this case you end up with something of a Catch-22, an effective Palestinian governmental structure can’t be established as long as Israel maintains direct military occupation (as any such entity would either have to comply with Israeli administration, meaning it is viewed domestically as a quisling force OR it could try to function independently, meaning it would have to be established under IDF fire) and at the same time, Israeli security demands that military occupation be maintained until there is a effective Palestinian government.”

[19] Cited in Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Living Without A Solution – Forty Years of Occupation and Settlement,” Settlement Report, Vol. 17 No. 3, May - June 2007

[20] B’Tselem, Foreseen but not Prevented: The Performance of Law Enforcement Authorities in Responding to Settler Attacks on Olive Harvesters, B’Tselem Website, 2 December 2002

[21] Greg Myre, “Many Evicted Gaza Settlers Go to West Bank, at Least at First,” New York Times, 23 August 2005

[22] Nadav Shragai, "Yesha Council hopes makeover will renew its political relevance," Ha'aretz, 10 May 2007

[23] Ahmad Jaradat and Anahi Ayala Iacucci, "Israeli Settler Attacks in the OccupiedPalestinian Territories During April 2007 ," Alternative Information Center, May 2007

[24] Nathaniel Popper, "Gaza Settlers Brace for Disengagement," The Forward, 28 January 2005

[25] Foundation for Middle East Peace, "A New Era of Settlement Expansion in Jerusalem and Environs Begins" Settlement Report, Vol. 17 No. 2, March-April 2007

[26] Herb Keinon, "Israel should embrace, not fear, James Baker," Jerusalem Post, 21 November 2006